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ABSTRACT
This dissertation provides an historical and theoretical inquiry into “covenants” as a device
within Anglo-American political theory. It includes an overview of Biblical covenants which are
the source of the covenant device, together with an analysis of subsequent application by early
modern and contemporary political theorists. I demonstrate that this revealed political theology,
moderated by the political traditions of salus populi and natural law, provides support for
contemporary political imperatives of liberty while avoiding both the terrors of gnostic political
religion and the inevitable moral and political failure of natural political theology. The argument
begins with an examination of contemporary covenantal theory in the scholarship of Daniel Elazar
and David Novak. I then turn to the revival of the covenant device during the British Reformation
and American colonial experience. As background, the dissertation surveys Calvin, Bullinger,
Buchanan, Knox, Goodman, Mornay, and Rutherford (among others) and their prescriptions for
the form of government and for resistance theory. I also examine important events during the
British Civil Wars and the implications of the covenant device therein. Reformed theologians
demonstrate both unity and diversity in their approach to political questions. In formulating
political theory around the covenant device, they collectively create a provocative and valuable
political theology par excellence with important implications for liberalism, republicanism, and
constitutionalism. The dissertation pays close attention to the ways in which theological
differences had explicit and implicit consequence for political theory. Those differences include
the varying approaches of Reformed theologians to the covenants of works and grace respectively,
the visible and invisible Church, and the accommodation of natural law, common law, and natural
right.

vi

SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Subject of the Dissertation
This dissertation provides an exploration of “covenants” as a device used within the
development of Anglo-American political theology and political theory. It researches the
covenant device both historically and theoretically. The covenant device is ultimately derived
from the Bible and from systematic theologies. It is a theological concept with implications for
political theory. The dissertation is therefore primarily a study of political theology
1.2 Political Theology Defined
The term used to categorize this study, “political theology,” requires some explanation. A
brief defense of the term may be helpful, including my choice to use it instead of the term “civil
religion.” There are two reasons for preferring the term “political theology” (or sometimes “civil
theology”) to “civil religion.”1 “Theology” is a term that emphasizes the scholarly tradition of
logos within Western religion, particularly Biblical religion. This “logical” tradition emphasizes
both justification and argument and encourages engagement with secular philosophy and theory.
Civil religion implies a hierarchical approach to religion and politics where in the outcomes of
religious opinions are critiqued by criteria of civil objectives.2 As I will argue in the second

1

I do not use the term in any way connected with Carl Schmitt or his book Politische Theologie (“Political
Theology”), published in 1922.
2

For example, one application of the term “civil religion,” understood in the context of Jefferson, Franklin,
Rousseau, or Machiavelli, would consider only the civil benefits or consequences of religion. This could be a more
idealistic use for religion, as Jefferson or Franklin would have prescribed it – encouraging the habits of ordered
liberty or republican virtue. Or it could be a more cynical use, as Machiavelli or Rousseau would have prescribed.
But in either case, this is a consequentialist approach to religion. For a more recent approach to civil religion,
particularly in the case of America, see Gentile, Politics as Religion. In the Introduction, Gentile writes, “There is
not, however, a contradiction between the principle of separation of church and state asserted by the Constitution,
and the profession of religious faith expressed by the mottos, symbols, and political rituals of the United States. The
reason is the faith in God or the Almighty as expressed in symbols and rituals of the American nation is the
manifestation of a particular form of religion, one that does not correspond to any particular religion professed by
the citizens of the United States. It is a civil religion, by which we mean a system of beliefs, values, myths, and
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chapter, “civil religion” flirts with judging religious opinions only in terms of what is expedient
for the civil. The result is a dichotomous, even adversarial, approach to the intersection of
religion and politics.
Politics and religion are better understood as being both complementary and yet also in
tension. Neither can take absolute priority over the other. Furthermore, in a liberal political order,
religious opinion and expression are among many rights that the magistrate is supposed to
protect. As a natural right, it precedes the power of the magistrate. If one takes the long view of
the Western experience, particularly following the Reformation, mutual respect and support
between politics and Biblical religion has encouraged liberty. Even suggesting dichotomous
priorities of “religion” and “politics” invites paranoid analysis and taints sound discussion.
Theoretical dichotomies that seek to divorce the civil from the religious, or to subordinate one to
the other, function well only in the abstract; they are contrary to political reality. Rather than
being thought of in traditionally dichotomous or competitive terms, both civil politics and
revealed religion should be understood to reflect complementary and fundamental constituents of
human nature. Modern political theory should respect their necessary tensions and construct an
understanding of their intersection that allows for liberty. This creates a society fit for human
beings.
The great traditions of Biblical religion, the dominant Western tradition, are political by
nature. Religion is inevitably and unavoidably political. First, it is political insofar as it is social
and requires institutional structures and offices. (This is denoted, for example, by particular
denominational categories within Protestantism: Congregational versus Presbyterian, for
example, which are centered on different forms of ecclesiastical polity.) Second, it is political
symbols that confer an aura of sanctity on the United States as a political entity, and on the country‟s institutions,
history, and destiny in the world.” (page xiii, emphasis in original)
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insofar as it is legal and ethical, setting boundaries on behavior.3 Third, it shares with political
theory grounding in anthropology - its first principles begin with human nature. The great
challenge for modern legal and political practice, therefore, is not to separate the “religious”
from the “political,” but instead to determine the proper jurisdictions of the civil and religious,
particularly as they relate to civil law. This is the great challenge taken up by the most prominent
early modern political theorists – Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau, for example. Each tries to
determine the proper boundaries for ecclesiastical and civil authorities. Not until the “gnostic”
politics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries does political theory try to supplant religion. (I
will discuss this below.) It was the Reformation which revived a modern reorientation of religion
and politics. This dissertation makes an important contribution by providing a concentrated study
of one tradition of political theology within the Reformation. This “Reformed” (sometimes
erroneously called “Calvinist”) tradition is particularly important within the Anglo-American
tradition because so many persons subscribed to its theology. Reformed theology was more
familiar to thousands of Europeans and Americans than the works of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau
and its doctrines had enormous political import. Central to Reformed doctrine is the covenant
device, which becomes a centerpiece of Reformed theology.
1.3 The Contemporary and Historical Importance of Political Theology
It is probably not unreasonable to presume that some readers are suspicious of the
assertion that there exists a legitimate “political theology” within political theory, but our current
and past experience affirms just that very thing. Both contemporary practice and the historical
record of politics remain intransigent against efforts over the last century to purge it of
3

This is why even early tolerationists, for example, would not entertain atheists under their plan for toleration. They
were not considered trustworthy. This is a position against which criticism may be justly leveled both on grounds of
overstatement (How trustworthy are believers anyway?) and understatement (What about natural law as a universal
moral code?). Nevertheless, the point remains that morality is traditionally associated with religion.
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theological content. One need only look at the annual controversies surrounding court cases or
public expenditures in America to see the continual contest between religion and politics. One
might also consider recent debates about theological language in the proposed drafts of the EU
constitution.4 Perhaps most urgently, while the West continues to decide what crumbs of
acknowledgement or influence it will toss to its historical political theologies, it is being attacked
by a radically other political theology - that of a resurgent Islam.5 One cannot simply argue that
they have a political theology while the West does not, or that the goal should be to eliminate all
political theology from political study and practice. The West continues to draw on our own
political theology – even if only implicitly.6
The old Biblical theologies not only stand in contrast to those of most Islamic tradition,
they may also serve to revive the liberal West‟s deepest values in the face of social amnesia. That
is to say, the West now not only confronts its identity crisis in the face of a hostile Islamic
political theology; it is also seeing its own succeeding generations unable to articulate any
significant apologetic for Western political virtues. The West is forgetting that religious axioms
historically mattered – in both theory and practice. This dissertation hopes to remind us of that
fact. No one has yet succeeded in re-founding our modern, Western political virtues apart from
some degree of theological premise. Until the proponents of a-theistic ideologies can succeed in
the re-articulation of Western political values, we are left with our theological roots. I hope to

4

For example, see Schlesinger and Foret, “Political Roof and Sacred Canopy?: Religion and the EU Constitution.”

5

Proponents of a radical political Islam often oppose the West on contradictory grounds and these reflect our own
inconsistencies. Islamic radicals are unable to decide if our worst crime is being ambivalently secular or standing as
heir to medieval Christendom and its conflicts with the Islamic world.
6

Classical liberal arguments which emphasize the liberty and equality that radical Islam denies may be themselves
largely rooted and supported, if not sustained, by a certain kind of Biblical political theology. See, for example,
Forster‟s John Locke’s Politics of Moral Consensus, Parker‟s The Biblical Politics of John Locke, or Waldron‟s
God, Locke and Equality for examples of theological or Biblical content within the development of liberalism.
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revive an understanding of those roots here, in a way that is still sensitive to modern sensibilities.
But whether or not political theologies can be made sensitive to modern sensibilities or not
cannot deter one from studying the historical record and making contemporary applications
where one can. The historical record is what it is. Though the successes of political theology can
be debated, they cannot be dismissed out of hand or forgotten.
1.4 Defining a Protestant Politics
Though contemporary political theory bears something of a prejudice against political
theology, it is important to remember that theology likely had far more impact on the
dissemination of political theory than the so-called “Great Books.” Political owes much to its
engagement with the Church (as a political institution), Christian theology (which has political
implications), and the Bible (as a political text in its own right). So much of modern political
thought is written against the background of religious controversies and wars acting as catalysts
to change. Until there is a successful effort to construct contemporary political theory free from
historical arguments (essentially from “whole cloth”), we must acknowledge that what is
contemporary is inextricably bound to what is historical.7 In other words, one cannot think of
what is “historical” as something that is simply past and done. Original justifications may be lost
for the time being in political theory and practice, but original justifications rarely become
irrelevant.
While it is true that Christianity has influenced political theory, and one can follow its
threads of influence back for many centuries, the “Christianity” that intersects more intimately

7

Consider the case of Descartes, for example, who proposed to construct epistemological foundations from whole
cloth in his Meditations and Discourse on the Method. While Descartes is rightly influential, he cannot be said to
have constructed his argument from whole cloth. He remains dependent on many historical arguments, traditions
and methods.
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with modern political theory is self-consciously different. It is decidedly Protestant.8 Given the
permeating and persevering political influence of Protestant theology on so many generations,
and over centuries, one can only conclude that those who leap from “Christian and medieval” to
“secular and modern” as the high water marks of political theory will have a stunted
understanding of political theory. To reference Western political thought over the past five or so
centuries is largely to move away from the scholastic synthesis of the Middle Ages. Puritan
humanism, though diverse and catholic at heart, was self-conscious of its intended differences.
Because it is no longer scholastic does not mean that it is no longer Christian. Nor does it mean
that it is devoid of natural law or humanist traditions. Some have argued a Protestant and modern
debt owed to the medieval scholars, and I would largely agree with those.9 But the tradition
under discussion in the dissertation comes self-consciously out of the Protestant Reformation.
Not enough studies, surveys, or scholarship have done justice to this crucial shift. Selfconsciously Reformed (“re-formed”) political thought is notably absent from many anthologies,
histories and surveys of the field. Few critical studies of modern political theory take the
influence of Christianity seriously, let alone carefully discern its role in forming what we now
call “modern” political theory. It is certainly true that many factors and philosophies came
together to overcome medieval Christianity and its Aristotelian variants. But many scholars in
political theory practically ignore Christianity in its new Protestant formulations, particularly
during the period of early modernity when it was most influential. This ignorance is especially

8

How it is or is not essentially different from pre-Reformation Christianity, or what it may or may not owe to earlier
medieval and Catholic formulations, is a worthy debate. But it lies outside the scope of this dissertation.
9

I do not intend here, or elsewhere, to imply that all good things began with the Reformation. Many key modern,
even Protestant, ideas had their origins in the Catholic Church. But it cannot be denied that many of these ideas did
not come to fruition in articulation or practice until the crucible of the Reformation forced them to. Modern political
theory owes much to the scholastics, as argued by Tierney‟s The Idea of Natural Rights or Brett‟s Liberty, Right and
Nature, for example. But deciding those particulars is not my mission here.
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negligent given the highly political nature of the Reformation, the massive subscription to
Protestant doctrines by all classes of society over three centuries of early modernity, and the
consequences of the new Protestant political theology for three centuries (and more) of political
activity. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the standard "canon" of political thought,
wherein one finds few explicitly Protestant Christian authors beyond perhaps Calvin, Luther and
occasionally Richard Hooker.10 Students reading standard histories of the field are led to think
that the starting point of many modern political ideas came from epistemological whole cloth or
that there was no significantly influential political theology beyond the work of a couple of key
Reformers or churchmen.11
1.5 Philosophical Polities or Church Polities? The Experience of Common Persons
If modern political theory is essentially (and radically) secular in its roots and
justifications, one would have to wonder how such ideas would survive among laypersons and
clergy in America and Britain over the last five centuries. John Adams recognized this when he
cited Reformation era political texts as key to the development of America‟s liberty:

10

A brief sampling of anthologies, surveys and textbooks demonstrates the problem. Strauss and Cropsey‟s History
of Political Philosophy (3e) gives one chapter to Luther and Calvin together and one chapter to Hooker.
McClelland‟s A History of Western Political Thought devotes no space to Luther, and less than a page to Calvin and
Knox. Hallowell and Porter‟s Political Philosophy files Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau under “Calvinism” in the
index but gives no space to Luther or Calvin in the text. Tannenbaum and Schultz‟s Inventors of Ideas: An
Introduction to Western Political Philosophy (2e) does devote eleven pages to Luther and Calvin in a chapter
entitled “The Religious Basis of Modern Political Thought.” Germino devotes one chapter collectively to Luther,
Calvin and Hooker in Machiavelli to Marx: Modern Western Political Thought. Ebenstein and Ebenstein devote
none of their chapters to the Reformation in Introduction to Political Thinkers (2e).
11

The fact of the matter is that too many of the significant Reformers simply go ignored. If one is consider only
Calvin and Luther as the two great Protestant political theologians, Calvin had more influence than did Luther on
North American and most of Europe. But it is simply laziness that refers to “Calvinist” or “Calvinistic” influence
when Calvin may not have been the essential root of many key political ideas. In the area of political thought,
Calvin's influence may not have been as great as Bullinger's or the Scots or Huguenots (Knox, Mornay or
Rutherford), for example. Why is Calvin so familiar to some political theorists while the latter are practically
unknown? But even this problem doesn‟t completely get to the point of understanding politics under the influence of
the Reformation. Referencing Luther or Calvin is important, but it is only the beginning of a sound understanding of
Protestant political theory.
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There have been three periods in the history of England, in which the principles of
government have been anxiously studied, and very valuable productions
published, which, at this day, if they are not wholly forgotten in their native
country, are perhaps more frequently read abroad than at home. The first of these
periods was that of the Reformation, as early as the writings of Machiavel
himself, who is called the great restorer of the true politics. The "Shorte Treatise
of Politick Power, and of the True Obedience which Subjects owe to Kyngs and
other Civile Governors, with an Exhortation to all True Natural Englishemen,
compyled by John Poynet, D. D.," was printed in 1556, and contains all the
essential principles of liberty, which were afterwards dilated on by Sidney and
Locke. This writer is clearly for a mixed government, in three equiponderant
branches, as appears by these words: „In some countreyes they were content to be
governed and have the laws executed by one king or judge; in some places by
many of the best sorte; in some places by the people of the lowest sorte; and in
some places also by the king, nobilitie, and the people, all together. And these
diverse kyndes of states, or policies, had their distincte names; as where one ruled,
a monarchie; where many of the best, aristocratie; and where the multitude,
democratie ; and where all together, that is a king, the nobilitie, and commons, a
mixte state; and which men by long continuance have judged to be the best sort of
all. For where that mixte state was exercised, there did the commonwealths
longest continue.‟ The second period was the Interregnum, and indeed the whole
interval between 1640 and 1660. In the course of those twenty years, not only
Ponnet and others were reprinted, but Harrington, Milton, the Vindiciae contra
Tyrannos, and a multitude of others, came upon the stage. The third period was
the Revolution in 1688, which produced Sidney, Locke, Hoadley, Trenchard,
Gordon, Plato Redivivus, who is also clear for three equipollent branches in the
mixture, and others without number. The discourses of Sidney were indeed
written before, but the same causes produced his writings as did the Revolution.
Americans should make collections of all these speculations, to be preserved as
the most precious relics of antiquity, both for curiosity and use.12
There is simply no reason to think that some of the texts now included in the canon of political
theory substantially informed the political thinking of many Anglo-American Protestants in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when compared with their own (ultimately political)
theologies. Many American Protestants in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were learning
politics largely in the various doctrinal, ecclesiastical and theological beliefs and practices of

12

Adams, A Defense of the Constitutions of the United States of America. Volume III: Chapter I. Cited in Carey, The
Political Writings of John Adams, 224-225.

9

"Reformed" Christianity.13 This was even true in the case of Anglican strongholds such as
Virginia, where Patrick Henry learned from Presbyterian Samuel Davies. American Protestants
and their church elders were familiar with theologians who were also political activists:
Theodore Beza, the Scots John Knox, George Buchanan and Samuel Rutherford, or the
Huguenot Mornay. Americans, like their British colleagues, wrote long political treatises in
controversies over antinomianism, religious liberty, church polity, revivalism, covenant
theology, and church membership. In the case of America, civil leaders in the Reformed tradition
also had the chance to experiment with systems of government derived from their theology. Such
was the case in New England.
In addition to the political implications of theological texts is ecclesiastical practice.
Could prominent philosophical texts, even theological texts, take precedence over the political
theory learned from participation in a Presbyterian synod, experienced in a congregational
controversy about baptism and membership, necessitated by the errand into the wilderness, or
constituent to controversies about itinerant revivalism? To focus on prominent texts or famous
authors is to miss the social dynamic of Protestantism as an active force in church and civil
polity.14 This social dynamic was probably even more important than the prescriptions of
prominent texts. As Tocqueville observed in the case of Puritanism, for example, American
Protestantism is overtly political in both theory and practice.15

13

This general point about the religious ideas of common persons, and their significance for politics, is made quite
prominently in Shain‟s The Myth of American Individualism.
14

For a discussion of the proliferation of theological interest and debates among common Scots, for example, see
Steele “The „Politick Christian‟: the theological background to the National Covenant” 50-51.
15

Democracy in America, I.i.2: “Puritanism was not only a religious doctrine; it also blended at several points with
the most absolute democratic and republican theories.” Quoted from Mansfield and Winthrop (eds), Democracy in
America, 32.
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1.6 Plan of the Dissertation
The dissertation is divided into sections and chapters. Section I provides three chapters of
introduction. This first chapter provides a general outline of the plan and a defense of the general
subject of political theology. The second chapter continues my defense of political theology,
arguing that political theology is best rooted in revealed texts and that covenant theology is a
revealed political theology par excellence. I also explain why revealed religion is inevitably
political and explain why secular political philosophies can be more threatening than political
theologies to liberty. The third chapter concludes this first section and prepares the academic
ground with a short literature review of studies related to the dissertation.
Section II includes three chapters on the subject of political covenanting; these are
theoretical and theological in method. They raise larger conceptual questions about the nature of
a covenantal orientation and the prospects for such an orientation in the current political climate.
Chapter Four introduces the Biblical narrative of the covenants and their contrasting presentation
in Jewish and Christian theology. It also offers some general characteristics of political
covenants in contrast to other models of political orientation. Chapter Five provides analysis of
the work of Daniel Elazar, a pioneer in the study of political covenanting within political science.
Chapter Six provides analysis of the work of David Novak, a pioneer in the study of political
covenants within philosophy and religious studies.
Sections III and IV are mainly historical. Section III presents political covenanting as it
developed in Reformation-era political and religious controversies. Chapter Seven provides an
introduction to the theological controversies in which early modern covenant theology and
political theory took root. Chapter Eight provides an overview of Reformed political
prescriptions. Chapter Nine explores the development of Reformed political theology during the

11

British civil wars. Chapter Ten addresses the role of natural law in Reformed political theology.
Chapter Eleven addresses natural right in Reformed political theology. Section IV and Chapter
Twelve take up the use of the covenant device in America.
Section V concludes the dissertation. Chapter Thirteen offers conclusions about the
theory and history of the covenant device in politics, takes stock of its contemporary potential,
and offers suggestions for future research.

12

CHAPTER 2
DEFENDING POLITICAL THEOLOGY
2.1 Political Theology Defined
This dissertation is a study of political theology. This chapter provides a theoretical
background by broadly defining two different types of political theology: one relies on both
divine and natural revelation, and one relies only on natural revelation. I explore the political
meaning of these two kinds of political theology, noting the consequences that may follow from
each.
It is best to begin by defining terms. Political theology is a particular kind of normative
political theory. Political theory is a subfield within political science.1 Theology can be thought
of in two ways. All theology concerns God. Thus, any text that concerns God (or, more broadly,
religion) could be broadly categorized as a theological text. Some theological texts are selfconsciously dependent upon revealed sources – sources that self-consciously purport to provide
divine guidance in the study of God (e.g., the Bible), or else are recognized by a particular
religious or theological tradition to provide divine guidance about God. This is “revealed”
theology. Taking the lead of the Torah for example, one might think of this kind of theology as
“God’s talk.”2 Some theological texts, by contrast, claim to provide direction on the subject of
God (or, more broadly, religion) but do not claim to provide divinely inspired guidance. This
type of theology is sometimes called “natural” or “philosophical” theology. It depends on reason
(often inductive) and experience alone to draw conclusions about its subjects. These categories
1

I am not confining political science to a purely empirical and quantitative method of scientific examination.
Broadly conceived, political theory provides descriptive and normative study of political orientations. It provides
summary, explanation and critical analysis of theories and methods of political organization. Also, political theory
should not be entirely confused with pure political philosophy, which (in the Analytic philosophical tradition) is
more concerned with the universality of arguments and with testing for logical validity and soundness.
2

Novak, The Jewish Social Contract, xiii
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of revealed and natural theology are not dichotomous. They have traditionally been seen as
complementary in the Western tradition, particularly within non-“fundamentalist” Biblical
traditions.
Having defined two types of theological texts, a definition of political theology can now
be provided. Political theology consists of those works of political theory (and hence political
science), which are informed to some significant degree by theological texts – especially
revealed theological texts. “Significant” does not mean that the argument relies entirely on
theological sources. Nor is continual reference to a theological text necessarily “significant.”
Instead, it is best to define “significant” as meaning only that at least one key turn in an argument
relies on a theological text. Reclassification of texts from one category to this subcategory is not
the essential point here. Rather, the point is to emphasize that theological texts may provide key
axioms or premises in larger and more familiar theoretical arguments. Most familiar texts of
political orientation are a hybrid of both non-theological and theological arguments. If the
current academic and popular climate in the West is an indication of anything, the historically
eclectic approach may be threatened as political theology is put on the defensive. As Hatch
writes, “The modern distinction between sacred and secular has allowed the studies of religion
and politics to go their separate ways in virtual isolation.”3 It is therefore important to defend the
rights of political theology against standing prejudices.
2.2 The Failure of Political Secularism
What should the role of theology be in the construction of political theory? In the history
of the West, at least, there has always been some role for theology in the articulation of political
theory. The role of theology can be said to exist on a continuum between two hypothetical
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extremes. One extreme would assert that all political theory must be rooted in revealed theology.
Excepting some of the more radical Islamic regimes, which are not Western regimes anyway,
that is a hard standard to find in political practice. There has always existed a strain of humanism
in Christian political theory. At the other extreme is the assertion that political theory cannot
appeal to traditional theological categories at all. That standard can be charged to some atheistic
totalitarian regimes in recent memory, as well as some postmodern criticisms of traditional (or at
least metaphysical) theological discourse.4
In light of the historical record, any effort to purge all political theory of theological
content should be unsuccessful. Such an attempted purge would require one to precisely
disentangle the role of “theological” texts from “secular” texts in the historical and theoretical
articulation of political theory.5 The practical challenge of such an intellectual genealogy speaks
for itself. How does one conclusively disentangle longstanding theological axioms and premises
from recognizable conclusions? There are too many threads to follow and address. Any attempt
to provide a secular history of political theory would be confused at best and dishonest at worst.
Furthermore, such a segregation of texts may imply a larger threat against the rights and beliefs
of many persons, insofar as they consider theological texts to be an indispensable resource for all
matters of life.
Having raised the practical and historical problems of denying the significance of
theology, it now becomes important to examine the justification for such a denial. Asserting an
exclusive prerogative for secular political theory might be premised on the argument that
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whereas philosophical arguments are inclusive (because they depend upon a universal faculty of
reason), theological arguments are exclusive (because they rely on special experiences,
particularly supernatural experiences, for their authenticity). It is self-defeating, however, to
argue that political theology cannot inform political theory because theology is controversial,
lacks comprehensive agreement among the population, or is not universally well-known. The
same things can certainly be said of all political or moral philosophies and orientations, including
contemporary political ideologies. There is no standard interpretation of Marx, no widespread
knowledge of Mill, and no explicit popular agreement with Rawls. Their supposed rational
accessibility gives them no advantage whatsoever in practice. While it may be the case that
revealed theological texts are self-consciously exclusive by nature, merely appealing to the
faculty of reason or experience does not give something universal appeal or acceptance.
It also cannot be argued that theological texts impose, prima facie, an undue burden on
the conscience. That is not true of theological texts any more than it is true of any text of secular
moral or political philosophy. For example, why should the Kantian imperative to act always
consistent with duty, or to treat people as ends instead of means, be any less of an imposition on
conscience than the Biblical imperative to “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with
all your soul and with all your mind”?6 One may simply disagree with Kant, or find oneself
unmoved by his argument. One cannot repair to claiming that Kant, for example, relies on reason
whereas the author of the Gospel relies on faith. Those categories are not so easily dichotomized.
I heartily acknowledge that there are good reasons why theologically or religiously rooted
imperatives are greeted with sensitivity. But the justification for sensitivity to religion was itself
often derived from theological and religious arguments. The concept of an “inviolable
6
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conscience” historically articulated in Western political theory was predicated on theological
arguments and a desire to protect conscience and religious practice from state imposition.7 One
of the most famous arguments for toleration is Locke’s, for example, who argued for toleration
on the ground that the imposition of a particular way to heaven might put one on the wrong path
to heaven.8 He further argued that toleration was a Christian virtue.9 If one did not believe in
such virtues, or rejected the authenticity of heaven’s existence, a new argument for toleration
would have to be constructed. Locke’s appeal, predicated on religious grounds and against the
abuse of religious and civil authority, would have to fall on deaf ears if offered to an atheist.
Finally, insofar as secular political ideologies may share characteristics similar to the
theologies that they criticize, they can claim no superiority over political theology. One of the
most important reasons why modern (secular) political theories come into conflict with political
theology is because a-theistic theory presents a competing eschaton and/or philosophical
anthropology. Following Voegelin’s lead, I mean by eschaton that they direct their political
theory toward some event of ultimate significance - even something that might be called heaven
or redemption.10 Political eschatons are quite often some vision of a future utopia. This would
especially include the utopia of the so-called “left wing” Hegelians, for example. One can only
guess what Marx himself would have done if he sought political power, but it is certain what
terrors greeted those who endured the eschaton of his disciples. For Mao or Stalin, for example,
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communism’s vision required subordinating persons to a totalitarian government.11 Not
surprisingly, these regimes saw revealed religion as a mortal enemy.12 Modern political
ideologies understand the challenge posed by political theologies and are quick to offer
competing visions. Feuerbach, for example, presents an eschaton of human progress.13 Rousseau
undermines revealed theology with his philosophical anthropology of amoral, asocial, and free
human beings in his Discourse On the Origin of Inequality and with the civil religion of his
Social Contract.14
Because these modern ideologies appeal to events outside of historical experience, they
may rightly be criticized as hypocritical in their criticism of theology. Their eschatons of
progress and earthly salvation may rightly be called Christian heresies. Neither Feuerbach nor
Rousseau, for example, gives us any compelling “evidence” why we should believe their
particular anthropology or eschaton. Preferring secular eschatons and philosophical
anthropologies to theological ones still requires, in a manner of speaking, an act of faith. Insofar
as both rely on some measure of faith to interpret our experience toward these conclusions,
neither is more epistemologically inclusive than theology. What is snuck into the promotion of
secular theory is the implication that it alone is a rational politics. Political theologies are cast as
11
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parochial and mystical, in contrast to “secular” political theories which are cast as inclusive and
factual. This is simply not the case.
2.3 Two Methods for Neutralizing Political Theology
In the sections that follow, I present and critique two means of navigating the intersection
of religion and politics which avoid the use of a robust and revealed political theology. The first
alternative to a robust political theology is to attempt the articulation of religion without
eschatological significance. Eschatological content often creates moral imperatives of the most
passionate, exclusive, and fundamental type. These eschatological imperatives may conflict with
modern ideologies, and perhaps even with tamer political teleologies. Eschatological content can
also inspire politically significant acts – resistance, revolution, zealotry, violence and martyrdom.
If religion can be stripped if its most fundamental and absolute moral imperatives, it will be less
likely to conflict with the moral and political demands of competing political ideologies.
Removing the eschatological imperative will allow religion to remain, but disarm it of its more
politically minded content.
The second alternative to a robust political theology is a civil religion in the spirit of
Machiavelli or Rousseau, for example. This civil religion is designed to serve political ends. It
serves to promote loyalty, courage, or civic mindedness, for example. It may even retain
eschatological content, but articulate it for the purposes of furthering civil objectives. I am not
intending here what some mean by “civil theology” – the intersection of a standing religion with
a standing regime, each existing for its own sake, and their successful symbiosis. Instead, I am
addressing the more cynical kind of civil religion. This kind of proposal creates a moral
hierarchy for human ends and religion becomes subordinate to politics. I argue that this
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alternative is guilty of significant epistemological and ontological overreach, and fails as a
proposed alternative.
2.4 Christianity: Intelligible Only or Existential?
I now consider the first alternative: religion without an eschaton. Is it possible to have
religion without an eschaton? In other words, is it possible to have religion that is not directed
toward some climactic and ultimate justifying event? Exploring that question comprehensively
would require many scholarly monographs, so it will be simplified in two ways. I will confine
myself only to the political theology under examination in this paper. Rephrased: can
Christianity be robbed of its eschaton? Second, because the theological question of diverse
Biblical eschatologies can become quite complicated, I will ask a simpler question. Can
Christianity be reduced from its historically existential role, calling for experience and action, to
mere intelligibility – a set of propositions without existential significance?
If Christianity can be reduced to an eidos, intelligible only and not existential, then the
demands of the Christian eschaton may no longer come into conflict with the demands of the
civil polity. After all, politics is a practical science having existential significance. 15 Neutralizing
Christianity of its eschatological consequence would have the benefit of disabling it as a
potential competitor to politics. But can Christianity be understood as something less demanding
than politics, or at least subordinate to it? The question must be asked with a close eye to history;
it cannot be asked simply in the abstract. For example, we cannot ask if a non-existential
Christian theology can be formulated on paper regardless of whether or not that formulation has
anything to do with the historical Christian tradition or the text of its scriptures. We must
examine particular historical articulations of Christianity because this is what real people are
15
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historically adhering to. The relative merit of political theology must be evaluated based on what
is, not on the basis of what one might wish for.
There are three main historical periods that I will address in this inquiry. The first period
doesn’t concern Christianity as such, but considers the context of early Greek thought. The
second period pays attention to two high water marks in Christianity’s articulation – the
metaphysics of Aquinas and the central claims of the Reformation. The third period of
consideration is the rise of a parochial natural theology (which seeks to exclude revealed
theology) and the challenge of modern atheism in modern philosophy. This last period is
important because it seeks to offer logos about God without the use of a revealed theological
text. I argue that by the deliberate omission of revealed theological texts, natural theology not
only misses the key existential ingredient of historical Christianity – the role of the theological
text as willed revelation, it also leads to the development of modern atheism. The resulting death
of religion itself will not lead to the loss of the eschaton, however.
2.4a The Classical Period
The foundations of the Christian West are found in both the classical (Greco-Roman) and
Biblical traditions. Getting to the roots of Christianity first requires addressing the ancient Jewish
tradition; that tradition will be examined in detail in the next section of the dissertation and I will
demonstrate the deeply existential nature of the Hebrew tradition. Here I will proceed to the
classical Western tradition instead. Classical philosophy provided part of the intellectual and
philosophical milieu in which Christian doctrines were first articulated.16 And it is in this milieu
that one can see the tension between what one might call an existentially stillborn natural
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theology (which revealed theology opposes) and the vibrant and existentially living revealed
theology that characterizes historic Christianity.
It is evidence of the fundamentally existential nature of religion itself that the Western
philosophers who first inquired into the cosmos could not think of it in exclusively “intelligible”
terms. As Gilson points out, even the founders of the Western nexus of theology and philosophy
found it impossible not to think of the logos of things in existential terms. In their search for
cosmology, the Pre-Socratic philosophers never confused the foundational elements (water or
earth, for example) which lacked existential qualities, with the gods. Water or earth may have
provided an intelligible “how” but it failed to provide any kind of existential “why.” The material
elements of earth or fire do not think or decide, will or command. A person’s lot in the universe
was not explained by his being favored or disfavored by prime matter, but instead by his
relationship to the gods.17 Whatever was at the back of what happened in the world, it had to
have a will. It had to be the deliberate product of an acting (and therefore willing) being.18 Gilson
argues that Greek mythology was not a stepping stone to philosophy, but a stepping stone to
“true religion.”19 This preserved the existential nature of the logos, even though this meant a
dualistic logos in the early Greek schema – non-existential matter and existential (divine)
persons. Gilson insightfully summarizes the timeless problem: “By far the hardest problem for
philosophy and for science is to account for the existence of human wills in the world without
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ascribing to the first principle either a will or something which, because it virtually contains will,
is actually superior to it.” 20
Gilson argues that it was in Aristotle’s philosophy that the Greeks lost their religion. 21
This is because the existential nature of the gods was lost. Aristotle asserts a class of interesting
divinities existing in the spheres, and his famous unmoved mover, but their existential status is
unclear. They are engaged in an activity, but it is not clearly dictated by any kind of willed
activity. It is more necessary (by nature) than it is chosen.22 All of this means that while
Aristotle’s divinities provide a kind of ontological benchmark for excellence, they provide no
clear moral imperative.23 Neutralizing any existential significance for divinity, Aristotle stresses
that the most perfect being has no apparent relationship with persons or the rest of existence,
save for the way in which it puts the other spheres into motion.24
Aristotle’s divinities are certainly excellent. They are, according to Aristotle’s argument,
perfect. That fact, Aristotle argues, ought to be inspirational for our pursuit of the contemplative
life. But the existential import of this fact for us is otherwise nil or unclear. His divinities are
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indeed active, and we are inspired to mimic their excellent activity of contemplation. 25 But there
is no deliberate relationship for these gods to us or to the world, nor is Aristotle’s god a
deliberate Creator – one who governs toward a revealed or willed end. The Olympian gods were
capricious; but at least they were paying attention. That had much more existential import for the
average person, and perhaps for politics. So while Aristotle may have advanced the theoretical
and metaphysical framework for theology, he did not advance its imperative (moral and ethical)
status in any relational (and therefore existential) way. This, I argue, made it existentially
stunted.
2.4b Two Watershed Moments in the Development of Existential Christianity
The progress of religion in the West has depended upon not simply the progress of
metaphysics, but upon transcending metaphysics. As Gilson points out, “The Lord our God is
one Lord” or “He Who Is” are certainly progressive statements in the development of
metaphysics.26 They are also significant for asserting divinity as something characterized by
existence (characterized by reason, will, and morality) rather than intelligible propositions. But I
do not think that Gilson gets to the real significance of the transition from Greek to Christian
theology by articulating it as a “continuum of progress” in Western metaphysics. There are key
points at which this Western “progress” of metaphysics goes beyond just metaphysics. Such is
the case of the Biblical God, whose direct communication provides an existential dimension
transcending Greek essentialism. In the Biblical account, God speaks to Moses to reveal that he
is the “I Am Who Am.” He is YHWH: “He who is.” This is, as Pascal reminds us, the God of
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Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. This is a God who deliberately speaks to persons to provide moral
imperatives.
These moral imperatives are not simply appeals to absolutes. In other words, God is not
presented merely as a co-laborer with mankind to recognize some truth that stands above both
Himself and mankind.27 Revealed moral imperatives are intended to directly communicate both
man’s nature and his destiny. They are at the heart of man’s relationship to God. They are
essential to covenants – the blessing and cursing that summarize much of the whole Biblical
message. These covenants comprise the existential (and therefore moral and political)
significance of Biblical religion. In asserting that God communicates directly to persons through
word and text, (revealed) theology makes its decisive break with philosophy, and with a purely
philosophical (natural) theology. This speaking by God to persons to communicate ultimate
moral imperatives of temporal and eternal consequence is the source of the eschaton in Western
theology. It is part of what makes religion ethical, and therefore political. The Biblical eschaton
is not merely discovered by reason or experience, as might be the case if confined to classical
metaphysics. Divine revelation is a quantum leap in political thinking. The eschatons of Plato,
for example, are argued inductively from the nature of justice. They do not claim divine
inspiration in the same way that the Christian texts do. Plato seems to point us to the gods for the
sake of what is true and rational, not pointing us to what is true and rational for the sake of the
gods.28 The emphasis is on grasping truth, not establishing a deliberate relationship with the
divine person who is the source of that truth.
27
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Thomistic metaphysics, though deeply appreciative of Aristotle, expands the gulf
between Christianity and the ancients.29 Thomistic metaphysics cannot be reduced to a
syncretistic synthesis. Existing things are what they are not simply because they possess some
apprehendable essence, as argued by Plato or Aristotle, but because they exist as the thing that
they are in the mind of a willing Creator. They are the product of a deliberate and willed creation
that began in the mind of God. This makes all intelligibility inexorably bound to God’s own
existence. The fundamental act of Creation becomes the foundation for intelligibilty. There is
therefore no intelligibilty apart from God’s supreme existence and actions.30
It is not enough to say that things exist because God exists. That, broadly considered,
would simply restate what Aristotle said about the unmoved mover. Rather, things exist because
a God who defines himself as “I Am Who Am” exists and chose willfully to bring about all
existing things, particularly other rational and existential beings made in the Imago Dei. Behind
existence, understood in this way, is a creative will and purposeful mind that has generated these
existences and made them as they are. Thus, we can move beyond the how a thing is what it is, to
also answer the why of what it is. It is this why that enables a relationship among rational beings.
Why gives moral purpose.
Because their deities are not revelational, Aristotle’s why can only be “nature” (phusis)
and Plato’s can only be the existence of a cosmos or a transcendent but imprecise realm of forms.
because one does not know holiness apart from what God reveals to us. If such were not the case, then biblical
revelation would be supplemental rather than essential or critical.
29
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Gilson argues that the Greeks never get beyond nature or essence. In St. Thomas’s metaphysics,
by contrast, a thing’s essence exists and is communicable because it first existed in the mind of
God.31 It is doubtful that one would understand such a thing through philosophy alone, let alone
enter into a relationship with its Creator; that necessitates the existential act of divine revelation.
As Gilson says, “Because his own existential metaphysics has succeeded in forcing its way
through that crust of essences which is but the outer coating of reality, Thomas Aquinas can see
the pure Act of existing as one sees the presence of the cause in any one of the effects.”32 To
apprehend such Self-Existence behind all existing things would push reason to the breaking
point.33 The overwhelming intellectual burden of discovering or comprehending Self-Existence
also made revelation, the source of revealed theology, necessary. To comprehend the source of
all things, and to comprehend it as willing and acting Self-Existence, requires direct revelation.
Revelation does more than reveal something that is intelligible, however. It also calls one
into a relationship with that Self-Existence through covenants. Of note in Aquinas (for example)
and the Biblical text are the distinctly Christian virtues: faith, hope and love. These provide not
simply intellectual aid in the face of what would otherwise be supernatural and intellectually and
metaphysically overwhelming; they also enable a relationship with the Creator. The Christian
virtues are relational virtues. They enhance the existential dimension of Christianity and give
force to the Biblical eschaton.
Thomistic metaphysics kept Christianity from collapsing into neo-Platonistic dualism and
Averroism.34 Both would have frustrated a full relationship between God and those created in
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His image. Averroism neutralizes the significance of revealed religion by proposing an
unnecessary dichotomy between the “secular” and the “sacred.” Neo-Platonism posited two
separate realms, an intelligible realm and a physical realm. In Platonic metaphysics, the senses
are an obstacle to knowledge. They are the gateway to a false world. Aquinas knows neoPlatonic dualism to be incompatible with the Biblical text in two significant ways. First, it made
the act of Creation of no real consequence for man’s rational progress. Second, classical authors
have no place for the Incarnation – an idea Plato would surely have found abhorrent.35 According
to the Biblical text, the Word takes on flesh, and dwells among us.36 Christ comes to redeem a
fallen Creation.37 This is done through the communication of a covenant. Not only this, but
Christ ascends with a physical body.38
Protestantism further strengthens the existential qualities of Christianity. One need look
no further than the mottos of the Reformation – sola scriptura, sola fides, sola gratia. This
heightened emphasis on Scripture (the revealed theological text) enhances the existential
dimension by emphasizing the key act of God communicating directly to those made in the
divine image. The emphasis on faith and grace, insofar as these emphasize one’s direct
relationship to God through Luther’s concept of the individual priesthood of the believer, also
maximize the existential and eschatological responsibility of the acting individual. These are
states of being which are sought, won, and felt.
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The existential aspects of the Reformation are prominent in Calvin’s theology and what
he called “Christian philosophy.”39 Calvin’s humanism encouraged him to provide logical
justification for doctrinal articulation wherever possible, but he also looked to experience as a
confirmation. For example, Calvin argued against inquiring too much into logical demonstrations
of Scripture and the life of faith. He instead refered the reader to the confirmation of
experience.40 Partee, for example, quotes Calvin to point to convictions that rely on experience
rather than logical explanation: “I speak of nothing other than what each believer experiences
within himself – though my words fall far beneath a just explanation of the matter.”41 In
defending his theology of communion, Calvin asserted, "Now, should any one ask me as to the
mode, I will not be ashamed to confess that it is too high a mystery either for my mind to
comprehend or my words to express; and to speak more plainly, I rather feel than understand
it."42
This is not to say that Calvin believed that anything from Scripture could be argued from
experience alone. Scripture and experience would sometimes be at odds.43 For example, Calvin
writes, “Faith cannot arise from a naked experience of things but must have its origin in the
Word of God.”44 Partee writes,
There is no chapter in Calvin’s writings which deals with experience by itself, but
he often uses experience as a descriptive term in connection with Scripture and
faith and even, as above, with reason. Thus the appeal to experience identifies an
39
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epistemological position which surpasses reason and in which Scripture and faith
find confirmation. Calvin does not develop this insight in a technical way, but it
serves an important function in his thought.45
Experience is brought into Calvin’s theology because he knows that faithful exposition of the
Scripture does not always produce a truly “rational” synthesis. Of the Christian life, for example,
Calvin wrote, “It is not apprehended by the understanding (intellectus) and memory alone, as
other disciplines are, but is received only when it possesses the whole soul, and finds a seat and
resting place in the inmost affection of the heart.”46
In short, Reformation theology is often a theology of experience. It is something felt as
much as understood. And as will be evident in the chapters that follow, it is in the revival of
covenant theology that the existential aspect of Christian theology becomes magnified during the
Reformation. Metaphysical theology is not discarded during this time, but instead becomes
supplanted by a theology of covenant relationships.
2.4c Modern Philosophy: Natural Theology and Modern Atheism
It is now appropriate to turn in the direction of natural theology and modern atheism.
Ironically, modern atheism has its origins in modern natural theology, which is sometimes
nothing more than an attempt to make God intelligible while ignoring the existential act of divine
revelation and its eschatological and ethical implications. This explains why natural theology is
preferred by some to Biblical theology; the effect is to make God intelligible while neutralizing
any existential consequence.47 Any escape is short lived; the existential reasserts itself with a
vengeance in the nineteenth century’s climax to philosophical theology, Hegel and his aftermath.
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It has become customary to argue that the death of revealed religion begins partly with
Descartes. In his Meditations, Descartes promises the theology faculty of the University of Paris
that he will prove the existence of the soul and God without using what he calls the “circular”
argument of faith. Here one sees a clear attempt to join philosophy and theology in a way that St.
Thomas’ metaphysical efforts argued could not be done.48 The problem here should be selfevident. Unless Descartes was not picky about what kind of god and soul he was going to
demonstrate, would he not have to rely on divine revelation (theology) to one degree or another?
If Descartes could simply start with reason and experience, and wind up at the same place as
Scripture, then what would be the point of Scripture in the first place? Descartes therefore
marginalizes the import of God revealing Himself through divine revelation. The result was
logically predictable. What Descartes “proved” by working inductively and backward from
reason alone rather than forward from statements of Scripture was the existence of something
other than the Biblical God and soul.49 This loss of Scripture in the argument is not just the loss
of YHWH who is existence itself, Self-Existing and Creating. It is the loss of all the
accompanying moral imperatives and covenants that accompany such a God.
In asserting that he would demonstrate God and the soul through philosophy alone,
demoting “faith” to a second class form of demonstration, Descartes embraces the dichotomy
that Aquinas rejected. Rather than enabling theology and philosophy to complement one another,
Descartes sets up a hierarchy. If Descartes’s demonstrations fail, he has done more than simply
fail his promise to the Paris academics; he has opened a gulf between revelation and reason and
reversed Western thought by centuries. Aquinas would have argued that theology (defined as
48
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This brings to mind Hume’s insightful critiques about natural theologians who work inductively, backward from
experience.
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divine revelation) must inform philosophy, and that philosophy cannot speak comprehensively to
many Biblical subjects. Descartes replies that this is not necessary. The resulting antagonistic
dichotomy between philosophy and theology continues to this day. Furthermore, Descartes’s
God in the Discourse becomes little more than phusis under the old pre-Thomistic philosophy.
Descartes’s is not a return to pure Greek essentialism, but it revives the old problem of how one
can search for a why in the universe without an existential source.
There is practically nothing relevant to the Christian eschaton in Descartes natural
theology. There is no Incarnation – no willing and acting person. There is nothing that can be
called supernatural. Gilson rightly calls Descartes’s God “stillborn.”50 Descartes’s legacy
continues undiminished so long as the natural theologians who follow concur that one can arrive
at God apart from the need of divine revelation. Natural theologians are theologians only in the
general sense that they are studying a god. But they are not studying an existential God - one
Who is behind the historical Christian eschaton. By the late eighteenth century, exemplified in
the work of Hume, it is not surprising that we have returned to the Stoics: to the unknown god.51
One can say that philosophers found a religion that is intelligible but not existential.
Atheism is now close at hand. Natural theology went from dichotomzing divine
revelation from philosophy to denigrating it. So long as divine revelation is unnecessary for
understanding God, but relational existence remained bound to divine revelation (God speaking
to persons), the historical God of the covenants becomes of no real consequence. God, as an
existential being, has therefore remained stillborn since Descartes. And because humans are
themselves living and existential beings, they have no use for a corpse. Nietzsche is therefore
50
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We meet Spinoza along the way, whom Gilson calls the most “pious” of the Cartesian descendants because he had
the sincerity to collapse God and nature into pantheism.
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right when he asserts not only that God is dead, but that the herald (madman) approached those
who already did not believe in him.52 The next logical step was to cast off the obvious absurdity
of treating an intelligible being, now no different from a geometric figue, as one would an
existential being.
Revealed theology was the only thing that could resurrect the existential God. But
because of developments in philosophy and elsewhere, revealed theology had been given its
walking papers from academic circles. Revealed theology was now the purview of an implicitly
second-class kind of thinking called “faith.” Kant’s distinction between phenomena and
noumena helped to emphasize that dichotomy. But Kant also took the next step in the revolution
against all theology and declared natural theology also to be philosophically inept. Seeing the
resulting vacuum in practical morality, Kant provides a similar but alternative morality. But he
was only putting the final nails into the coffin of a god who had been dead for over a century.
Schliermacher not withstanding, God was all but doomed since the determined rise of natural
theology. When forced to choose between a god with no existential qualities and no god at all, it
was only logical to choose no god at all. A god with no existential qualities is no god at all.
In the ninteenth century, the seeds planted by Descartes grow to maturity. Hegel marks
the transition from natural philosophy to atheism. This is ironic: Hegel is arguably the most
“religious” of the theological philosophers because he makes the most ambitious effort at natural
theology. Hegel seeks to provide more information about God than was ever attempted without
revelation, even in the face of Kant’s coup de grace against natural theology. Hegel transcends
anything his predecessors attempted through logical induction. But the result is what Voegelin
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rightly calls gnosticism.53 Unlike previous efforts at natural theology, which realized their
eschatalogical limitations because they never resorted to revealed theology, Hegel provides both
eschatology and cosmology. One might call it Christianity for atheists. Hegel’s progeny,
Feuerbach and Marx, follow by promising real liberation for those who will reject the Christian
eschaton for that of the historical dialectic. The West trades one eschaton for another. None of
the political philosophers before Hegel can be said to have had an eschaton. Now there was an
eschaton. By the time it was articulated forcefully by Hegel’s “left wing” disciples, it rivaled the
mansions of heaven. Thus, atheism built on the foundation of Hegel became as eschatological as
Christianity.
The atheism that followed Hegel was not neutral in eschatological significance. It either
created its own existentially significant eschaton or else denied persons an existential nature
altogether by denying them free will. The first case is exemplified in Marx or Feuerbach, whose
eschatons of historical progress monopolize moral imperatives and replace revealed religion with
quasi-religion – what Voegelin called gnosticism. The second case is exemplified in Nietzsche or
Freud, who deny an existential nature by essentially denying free will. Modern atheism becomes
the antithesis of freedom. It either robs persons of spiritual freedom, as in the case of Marx’s
disciples, or moral freedom, as in the case of Nietzsche or Freud. This refutes the conventional
wisdom casting modern atheism as a champion of freedom over and against political theology,
which is often cast as a tyrant.54
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It should not be presumed that my argument relies too heavily on Voegelin here. As I will summarize in the next
chapter, Voegelin believes that the Reformation and its key divines did much violence to metaphysics in the wake of
the collapse of Christendom. Thus, my relying too much on Voegelin’s full argument regarding gnosticism would
indict a good portion of the dissertation’s subjects. A careful reader will also note that my understanding of
revelation is more narrowly defined than Voegelin’s. But my broader definition of theology is like Voegelin’s
broader definition of revelation.
54

Sartre, to his credit, takes a more interesting route. Because he discerns the intimate relationship between the
traditional concept of “essence” as the source of intelligibility and the act of God’s Creation, he denies both God and

34

2.5 The Question of a Civil Religion
Given the existential qualities of Christianity and the existential demands of politics,
could one instead collapse their imperatives into something called a civil religion? What I mean
here by “civil religion” is the pragmatic (or cynical) articulation or modification of religion for
political ends. Such a move may be intended to promote certain virtues, such as loyalty, courage
or charity. It may be intended to provide a transcendent or omnipotent imprimatur for the regime.
Whatever the case, such a scheme does not intend to promote a particular religion in its own
right or on its own merits. Rather, the civil religion is promoted to promote the goals of the
regime.
Robert Bellah is correct when he argues that there is a particularly unique set of
advantages and problems for Christianity with respect to civil religion. He writes,
The very spirituality and otherworldliness of Christianity has provided a certain
avenue for reducing the tension not always open to other historical religions: the
differentiation of functions, the division of spheres. Yet no solution has ever
dissolved the underlying tensions described by Augustine and Rousseau. The
tendency has been for every solution to break down into religion as the servant of
the state or the state as the servant of religion.55
It is not only a point of institutional (and authoritative or legal) tension to subordinate the Church
to the State or vice versa. There is also an ontological challenge here. The demands of the Bible
on members of the Church, particularly the political language used in reference to Christ, invite
something even more complicated than Aristotle’s concern that the good citizen also be the good

essentialism in order to enable freedom. This is quite clear in his Existentialism as a Humanism (1946). If man has
an essential quality, he is bound to act consistent with it. But this would deny him the freedom that Sartre is
asserting. Persons have no essence. Thus, Sartre makes the unique philosophical maneuver of asserting absolute free
will while simultaneously denying any eschatological or essential moral imperative that should guide the use of that
will. Sartre and Camus, more than most contemporary atheists, realized the great need of man to understand things
in existential terms. But the political significance of a philosophy of absurdity is inconclusive, as evidenced by their
own feud over political ideas.
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man (for example).56 This challenge is not simply a matter of trying to be a good Christian while
not running afoul of good citizenship or vice versa. Civil religion is an ontological challenge
because it gets to fundamental identity. The political-cum-ontological question is not just
determined by whom one is ruled by. Pilate was told by the Jews, “We have no king but
Caesar.”57 That is an assertion of political loyalty. But ontology gets to the heart of both order
and identity. It answers the fundamental questions of philosophical anthropology, and therefore
politics. It determines the nature of what is overarching in the highest sense – the arche in which
we “live and move and have our being.”58 This statement was first made by the poet Aratus (in
his Phaenomena), then quoted by St. Paul, demonstrating the broad appeal of this ontological
concept to all persons.
I do not want to imply that the demands of the Bible require something exclusive of all
political philosophies, including all philosophical (as opposed to theological) anthropologies.
That would be an unhealthy fundamentalist approach and few Christians have historically
suggested (let alone successfully practiced) such a thing. There is much compatibility between
Christianity and political and ethical philosophies. But whereas a political or ethical theory,
prudently framed, can coexist or even complement religion (and Christianity in particular), the
kind of civil religion that I am indicting here intends to challenge the prerogatives of religion.
That solution is, for many reasons, impossible.
There is also an important historical challenge here, at least in the case of the modern
West. To borrow a concept from Heidegger, we are “thrown” into the historical situation of
Christianity. This is an experiential and historical question. It is not one that we can address any
56

Aristotle, Politics, 1276b16-1277b30

57

John 19:15

58

Acts 17:28

36

other way. A civil religion cannot now be created from whole cloth. We must accommodate the
standing Christian tradition. Short of instituting a nationalistic religion, as the Japanese did with
Shinto for example, we cannot think of the civil religion in terms of any radical genesis. For the
reasons articulated here, and for many more, a civil religion is not a possibility. It therefore
remains necessary to return to the historical articulation and practice of civil theology as we find
it in the Western experience, informed by appropriate theoretical and theological context.
2.6 Conclusion
Religion, and Christianity, in particular creates moral imperatives. The demands of
politics create moral imperatives. These imperatives often appear fundamental. They are
sometimes in conflict. I have argued in this chapter that there is no way to easily or readily
resolve tensions between these imperatives. Natural theology, which retains the subjects of
religion but denies its revealed content, cannot resolve the conflict. In the case of what Voegelin
calls gnosticism, natural theology can degenerate into modern ideologies with political demands
equal to or greater than revealed religion. Natural theology may degenerate into skepticism and
then atheism, creating a new problem by removing historical checks on political power.
Given the inevitable tension between Christianity and politics, it becomes important to
return to political theology on its own terms. Covenantal political theology, because of its
emphasis on revealed theology, lateral and vertical relationships (person to person and person to
God respectively), and conscience, is a political theology par excellence. Beginning in Chapter
Four, I will pursue a theoretical and historical investigation of this political theology to better
understand its role in the development of political theory.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes important general bibliographic background to the dissertation.
Here I will focus on studies of political covenanting in both Hebrew and Protestant articulations.
I will also address some general literature on American political theology, the final subject of
study. I will also show how the covenant device has been treated by prominent political theorists.
3.2 Covenant as Political Device: General Studies
There is a multitude of studies on the Biblical covenant. However, these are not always
applicable for research in political science. For this dissertation, focused political studies take
priority over those that are primarily theological or historical. My theoretical study of the
covenant device will focus on the work of two contemporary covenantal scholars. The first of
these is the late Daniel Elazar, who pioneered the rediscovery of “covenanting” as historical and
contemporary political theory. Elazar wrote extensively on the covenantal tradition in politics,
Jewish political thought, the politics of modern Israel, and political culture. He also founded
centers in the United States and Israel dedicated to the study of federalism. Under his direction,
there were an unprecedented number of colloquia, conferences, and publishing on the related
subjects of federalism and covenanting. Included in Elazar‟s important record is the ongoing
work of Publius, a premier academic journal on federalism. The second prolific scholar of
covenantal political theory under consideration is David Novak. Novak is a professor of both
religion and philosophy at the University of Toronto and author of numerous studies on
covenantal political theory. Novak‟s broad background in religious studies, political theory and
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philosophy enables him to provide a clear comparison and contrast with theoretical alternatives
to covenantal politics.
Elazar‟s most important work on covenanting is a four volume series: “The Covenant
Tradition in Politics.” The first volume, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical
Foundations and Jewish Expressions, researches the covenant mainly as a Hebrew idea
described in the Torah, Joshua, Judges, and throughout the reign of David. It also explores the
"Postbiblical Tradition" in the Talmud. The second volume, Covenant & Commonwealth: From
Christian Separation Through the Protestant Reformation examines the covenant tradition from
medieval expressions of covenant, oath and pact in Europe, through Reformation Federalism and
the covenantal political theology of the Puritans and Scottish Covenanters. It also draws some
application to federalism and consent. The third volume, Covenant & Constitutionalism: The
Great Frontier and the Matrix of Federal Democracy, studies the covenant as it has evolved in
America since the time of the founding. It also considers the potential for a revival of political
covenants in the Western and Southern hemispheres. The fourth volume, Covenant and Civil
Society: The Constitutional Matrix of Modern Democracy reflects on themes raised in the first
four volumes. It considers the evolution and fate of covenantal political theory and its
corresponding results: constitutionalism, federalism and consent. The disadvantage of Elazar's
work, as I will address in Chapter Five, is that his prescriptive view of the covenant sometimes
inclines him to be more generous in his identification of covenant-like language and legal
structure. Elazar is an excellent place to start a study of the covenant, so long as one keeps his
generous and ecumenical approach in mind.
Novak has written four prominent studies distinctly self-identified as Jewish political
theology; three of which provide a solid theoretical framework for comparison and contrast with
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other political theories. Jewish Social Ethics provides some minimal application for the task at
hand, but is mainly rooted in the application of Jewish social ethics to contemporary problems.1
In Covenantal Rights, Novak is providing what he calls a study in Jewish political theory with a
close eye on contemporary political philosophies. Novak takes this idea of “rights,” a more
modern, European, and even Christian concept, and examines it in light of the Jewish covenantal
tradition.2 Novak‟s most recent contribution, The Jewish Social Contract, is both a study of the
origin of modern social contract theory and a defense of political theology in the public square.
These last two books figure prominently in Chapter Six of the dissertation.
Among other political studies of the covenant, a few are worth noting here. Joel
Kaminsky's Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible emphasizes the relationship of the
individual to the community as a covenantal idea. Kaminsky also examines key texts dealing
with corporate responsibility in the Old Testament. George Wesley Buchanan's The
Consequences of the Covenant examines various consequences of the covenant on the history,
politics, faith and ethical behavior of the “chosen people” throughout the Biblical record.3 The
first part of this book, which focuses on the Old Testament record, is particularly relevant.
Closely related to Elazar's work is Gordon M. Freeman‟s The Heavenly Kingdom: Aspects of
Political Thought in the Talmud and Midrash. Though Freeman's work on the Talmud and
Midrash will have little real significance for my research (because the Talmud and Midrash have
1

Novak says of this term Jewish social ethics, “It cannot be located by any particular reference to the data of the
Jewish past. Rather, it is a term I have borrowed to designate my own reading of the normative Jewish tradition in
order to uncover some of its vast riches so they might enter into discussions of the important ethical issues
concerning society in today‟s increasingly cross-cultural world.” Novak, Jewish Social Ethics, 3
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Novak describes his intent in writing the work as "an attempt to enter some of the insights from the Jewish political
tradition into current political discourse in general, a discourse that heretofore has been primarily concerned with
rights and that shows no signs of losing such concern. . . . This book is my attempt to show that Judaism provides a
broader meaning of rights than the one provided by liberalism and a deeper meaning of rights than the one denied by
conservatism." Novak, Covenantal Rights, x
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comparatively little impact on British or American covenanting) his comparative study of Greek
political thought and work on Biblical precedents to Rabbinical writings are helpful.
It is in the “Reformed” tradition that the covenant device is most frequently applied to
politics.4 Reformed political theology is mainly historical scholarship by this point with only a
smattering of Reformed persons trying to revive the idea of political covenanting in the tradition
of the Covenanters or the Puritans, for example.5 But as I argue in this dissertation, the Reformed
legacy is important and influential.
Calvin is often overstated relative to any unique application of theology to political
theory. Nevertheless, insofar as “Calvinism” has become equated with covenant theology, it is
important to survey various political studies of Calvinism and often to begin with Calvin himself.

4

Most scholars refer to this particular tradition by the general title "Calvinistic". I prefer "Reformed" because this is
more inclusive and emphasizes the theological influences of Reformers besides Calvin both in the early and later
development of this tradition within Protestantism. I do not presume, however, that Reformed theology, let alone
Reformed political theology, is self-contained however. See Skinner‟s discussion on the influence of Lutheran
political theory on the Reformers, for example, in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume 2, and also
“The Origins of the Calvinist Theory of Revolution.”
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Advocacy of covenanting continued well into the nineteenth century. Some of this was a reaction to "backsliding"
in the eighteenth century. Although they fall outside the chronology of the dissertation, a few of these works provide
insight into the later development of covenantal political theory. The list includes: Samuel Wylie's A Sermon on
Covenanting and The Two Sons of Oil (1850); William L. Roberts's The Duty of Covenanting, and the Permanent
Obligation of the Religious Covenants (1853); James M. Willson's Civil Government (1853); John Cunningham's
The Ordinance of Covenanting (1843?); John Brown's The Absurdity and Perfidy of All Authoritative Toleration
(1803); Archibald Mason's Observations of the Public Covenants Betwixt God and the Church. (1799); and
Barrow‟s The Covenanted Reformation Defended Against Contemporary Schismatics (1998). The later development
is sometimes classified by reference to proponents modern or early modern – “Steelites” or “Cameronians.” There is
a social covenanting movement still alive today among certain Presbyterian churches. The centers of this movement
are in Pennsylvania and Alberta. The Alberta-centered movement (including a publishing/reprint and photocopying
operation known as Still Waters Revival Books) has encouraged covenanting of all forms and reprints written works
on the covenant in social contexts. They have, for example, reprinted A Hind Let Loose, published by Alexander
Shields in 1687. This famous sermon rooted in the covenanting principle was originally included in Sandoz's
Political Sermons of the American Founding Era and attributed to Stephen Case (1797). The Alberta church‟s
presbytery has compiled a collection of documents on covenanting entitled The Duty and Perpetual Obligation of
Social Covenanting (1996). Other reprinted collections applicable to the period are: The Covenants and the
Covenanters (Kerr, 1895); The Acts of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland From the Year 1638 to the
Year 1649, Inclusive (1682); and A Solemn Testimony Against Toleration (1649).
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I have tried to limit this to some select and recent studies on Calvin‟s political ideas.6 That
includes Ralph Hancock‟s Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics, Harro Hopfl‟s The
Christian Polity of John Calvin. Older and broader studies of the “Calvinist” political tradition
include John T. McNeill‟s The History and Character of Calvinism and Calvinism and the
Political Order. There are a few key secondary books that provide an overview of the political
theory of the Reformers. Included in this list is Quentin Skinner‟s The Foundations of Modern
Political Thought.
Aside from Calvin, the most seminal covenant theologian is Heinrich Bullinger.
Bullinger's theology and its political significance is examined by Charles McCoy and J. Wayne
Baker in Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenantal Tradition. Baker's
earlier work on Bullinger, Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant, also explores the political
implications of Bullinger‟s covenant theology. The most recent work on Bullinger is an edited
collection by Gordon and Campi: Architect of Reformation: An Introduction to Heinrich
Bullinger. Covenant theology and the understanding of federalism were later modified in the
work of Johannes Cocceius. Cocceius' federal theology is examined in Van Asselt‟s The Federal
Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669).
There are different articulations of covenant theology, and this has consequences for
political theory. Just as there are many studies of the covenant within Jewish theology, there are
many theological and historical studies of the covenant in Reformed theology. I have tried to be
fairly selective, focusing only on the more generally acclaimed studies and more particularly on
those examining the contrasting varieties of covenant theology. These monographs include Von
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Rohr‟s The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought and Weir‟s The Origins of the Federal
Theology in Sixteenth-Century Reformation Thought.
Puritanism in Great Britain (including Scotland) provides important background to the
covenant‟s implication for politics. Scholarship on Puritanism enjoyed a revival in the middle of
the twentieth century, but some of it was concerned more with sociological or economic analysis
rather than political theology for its own sake. For example, there is the Marxian interpretation
which sees the Puritan revolution and reformations in terms of class and economics. Notable for
this approach to the Puritans is Christopher Hill. Because Hill‟s work does not provide any
assistance in isolating political theology as an influence for its own sake, I have not paid much
attention to it.7 Another revisionist thesis is suggested by Michael Walzer's The Revolution of the
Saints. Walzer contrasts various strains of Calvinist political thought, particularly the Vindiciae,
Contra Tyrannos and the Marian exiles, and introduces the element of class to explain why
Calvin's doctrine of resistance by lesser magistrates evolved into calls for revolution by the elect.
E. Clinton Gardner's Justice and Christian Ethics, by contrast, is critical of Walzer and others for
seeing the covenant as an instrument of social control. Gardner suggests a nobler relationship
between justice and the covenant, trying to more clearly understand the covenant‟s political
prescriptions in the context of Christian theology and early modern political philosophy.
Controversies in the development of British Puritanism play an important role in Section
III of the dissertation. The execution of Charles I emphasized differences in British Reformed
theology. My starting point for these differences is Noel Henning Mayfield‟s Puritans and
7

Marxists see secularism as a progressive force in modern revolutionary movements. Mayfield, for example,
describes Hill‟s description of John Cooke as a forerunner of modern secularism as “quite misguided.” See
Mayfield, Puritans and Regicide, 168. Other problems in Hill include the yoking together of radical movements
(under the direction of the Presbyterian view of things) and the failure to discern the traditional (Calvinistic)
theology as the root of egalitarianism among the Independents rather than what Hill mysteriously calls
“universalistic spirituality.” See Mayfield, 200-202. For another critique, see MacKenzie, God’s Order and Natural
Law, Chapter 10.

43

Regicide and continued in John F. Wilson‟s Pulpit in Parliament. In addition to warring against
their neighbors in England, the Scottish provide an explicit historical case study of political
covenanting in their national covenants of 1638 and 1643. Studies of covenanting and
Covenanters in Scotland are thus important for the dissertation. Two of the most prominent and
influential Reformed Scots are Samuel Rutherford and John Knox. Both are addressed as part of
recent historical and theoretical studies, including Richard Greaves‟s Theology and Revolution in
the Scottish Reformation: Studies in the Thought of John Knox, Roger Mason‟s Kingship and the
Commonweal: Political Thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scotland, J.H. Burns‟s The
True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early-Modern Scotland, and John Morrill‟s The
Scottish National Covenant in Its British Context. I have also closely pursued Rutherford as
presented in three modern treatments: the only modern biography of Rutherford, Coffey‟s Politics,
Religion and the British Revolutions; Richards‟s more recent essay, "The Law Written in Their
Hearts? Rutherford and Locke on Nature, Government and Resistance”; and John L. Marshall‟s
unpublished PhD dissertation at Westminster Theological Seminary, “Natural Law and the
Covenant: The Place of Natural Law in the Covenantal Framework of Samuel Rutherford‟s Lex,
Rex.”
3.3 Studies of Political Covenants by Prominent Political and Social Theorists
With these background studies in mind, it now becomes important to ask how covenantal
political theory has been addressed by major twentieth century political theorists. This includes
Michael Walzer, Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, and Robert Bellah. Each is unique in his treatment
of covenantal political theology.
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Of the four, Strauss makes the sharpest distinction between theology and philosophy in
his approach to political theory, rooting his studies in both natural law and natural right. 8 Insofar
as Strauss sees the biblical covenant as incompatible with natural law and natural right in the
philosophical tradition, he ignores its use in political theory. Aside from some considerations of
Grotius, who arguably presents a largely secular political theory, Strauss‟s studies pay little
attention to Protestants beyond Hooker. Novak argues that Strauss incorrectly characterizes the
Hebrew Bible as rejecting philosophy and therefore natural law. The resulting dichotomy
handicaps “Straussian” studies on the subject.9 Novak disputes Strauss‟s exclusive definition of
philosophy and nature and argues Strauss‟s articulation to miss the essential character of the
moral function of revelation. More than this, however, there is the question of whether reason
(also cast as “natural law”) is incompatible with revelation. Strauss sees these two things in
exclusive rather than complementary terms.10 Novak traces this problem to Cicero, who argued
that reason governed both men and the gods. Novak offers a different understanding of natural
law that accommodates revelation while respecting it on its own terms and denying the sharp
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As Gunnell puts it, “He would eventually conclude that „no one can be both a philosopher and theologian‟ and that
revealed divine law and rationally discerned natural order present fundamental alternatives which can be neither
transcended nor synthesized.” See Gunnell, “Strauss before Straussianism: Reason, Revelation and Nature,” 65 and
also Strauss The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, 270. For a more recent, though controversial treatment
of the subject, see Smith‟s Reading Leo Strauss. Strauss is sometimes read as if this distinction demonstrates his
reverence and respect for theology and his desire to preserve it from the rationalist controversies of philosophy.
Others are critical of this dichotomy between philosophy and theology, however, and see it as unnecessarily
confining. There is also the question of whether Strauss sees revelation as superior or inferior to philosophy.
Whatever the case, Strauss is critical of any “theologico-political” project.
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That includes, for example, Pangle‟s The Spirit of Modern Republicanism and Zuckert‟s The Natural Rights
Republic and Launching Liberalism.
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Marvin Fox, another prominent Jewish scholar, argues this very point and therefore denies natural law any place
in Judaism. Characterized by Fox or Strauss, the question comes down to: Is God subject to a natural law?
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Straussian dichotomy.11 This summarizes Novak‟s answer to Strauss‟s dichotomous approach to
revelation and reason:
If one adopts a more modest and limited definition of natural law, understanding
it as the body of elementary norms without which a society of interpersonal
communion would not be possible, then one can see these norms being
presupposed by the Torah in its attempt to create the supreme example of such a
communion in a covenanted community. Although this natural order is the
minimal form of such a communion, personal-historical-relationship with God
and Israel is its maximal substance. The formal structure is the background, not
the ground, of this reality; its conditio sine qua non, not its conditio per quam. In
Platonic-Stoic metaphysics, conversely, form and substance are ultimately one.12
If Novak is right, one wishes that Strauss would have engaged the subject in a more generous
and inclusive way.
Voegelin also disagrees with Strauss‟s dichotomy of reason and revelation. Rather than
create separate categories of philosophy and religion, Voegelin argues that both philosophy and
religious texts can provide insight into the tension that man feels as a spiritual being. Philosophy
and revelation are not dichotomous for Voegelin. They are equally legitimate sources for
political theory. In his first volume of Order and History: Israel and Revelation, Voegelin thus
presents the experience of the Hebrews and the drama of the covenant (berith) as a valuable
political cornerstone. But Voegelin does not believe that the symbols of one group‟s political
experience can always be appropriately translated to another. This is especially the case with the
Biblical covenant and he is a severe critic of contemporary attempts to apply it outside the
particular experience of Israel. In The New Science of Politics Voegelin directs sharp criticism at
covenantal politics, citing the Puritan Revolution as a case study of “gnostic” politics. Prior to
his indictment of the Puritans, Voegelin warns against any immanentizing of Christian

11

Novak, Jewish Social Ethics, 29-33

12

Ibid., 32

46

transcendental fulfillment. Voegelin offers a summary of Christianity that lends itself to the
priority of mystery. He writes,
Uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity. The feeling of security in a „world
full of gods‟ is lost with the gods themselves; when the world is de-divinized,
communication with the world-transcendent God is reduced to the tenuous bond
of faith, in the sense of Heb. 11:1, as the substance of things hoped for and the
proof of things unseen.13
Voegelin castigates those who claim certainty in such matters, a corrupted and heretical claim to
knowledge in the face of this uncertainty. This criterion applies particularly to those who claim
their knowledge to have political import. Writing eloquently of the existential Christian
experience and the temptation toward what he calls gnosticism, Voegelin says,
The life of the soul in openness toward God, the waiting, the periods of aridity
and dullness, guilt and despondency, contrition and repentance, forsakenness and
hope against hope, the silent stirrings of love and grace, trembling on the verge of
a certainty which if gained is lost – the very lightness of this fabric may prove too
heavy a burden for men who lust for massively possessive experience.14
Voegelin finds this temptation much indulged during the Reformation – in both its soteriology
and its political theology. The Reformation, Voegelin argues, is a “successful invasion of
Western institutions by Gnostic movements.”15 Calvin‟s Institutes is called “the first deliberately
created Gnostic koran.”16 While Voegelin‟s critique repeats many of Richard Hooker‟s criticisms
of Puritanism, he sees the movement in much more critical terms than Hooker.17 In short,
because Puritanism‟s heretical assertions destroyed the careful metaphysical balance of
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Christianity, it brought about the destruction of the public order.18 Voegelin goes so far as to
associate Puritanism with Communism, National Socialism and Hobbes‟s authoritarian state.19
For Voegelin, the Reformation is not only catastrophic in its destruction of the social
order; it contributed nothing to the development of political theory. Voegelin says of the
monarchomachic trend,
What these various authors have in common is not a new theory of politics; one
can hardly speak of a theory at all, as we said, before the end of the century and
the revival of scholasticism. What they have in common is a new problem that
they try to solve more or less skillfully by means of theoretical fragments picked
from ancient and medieval literature. Their problem arises through the release of
the polity (the term state is not yet permissible) from the enveloping charismatic
order of imperial Christianity.20
Of the leading political theologians of the Reformation, Voegelin writes, “If anything is
characteristic of the Reformation, it is the fact that we cannot connect it with the name of a single
great political thinker. . . . None of the thinkers stands for himself as a great ordering mind; they
represent partial aspects of a revolution that as a whole escapes them all.”21 Voegelin is highly
critical of both Calvin and Luther; he attributes the Reformation to Luther‟s personality, and
reserves for him his harshest criticism.22 Voegelin characterizes the whole sixteenth century (in
which many important works of Reformed political theology were written) as “singularly barren
with regard to the work of intellectual distinction in politics” (excepting Bodin).23 Whatever
political ideas the Reformers did offer, Voegelin argues, had already been argued. He writes,

18

Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, 133-161

19

Voegelin, History of Political Ideas: Religion and the Rise of Modernity, 98

20

Ibid., 41

21

Voegelin, History of Political Ideas: Renaissance and Reformation, 217

22

Ibid., 218

23

Ibid., 17

48

Nevertheless, the arguments for the people of God against the heretical king are
the very same that are used for the people without God against the secular king.
When the lex regia is used as an argument for the people‟s right to deprive the
king of a power that has been delegated to him during good behavior only, it does
not matter whether the argument is advanced by a pre-Reformation secularist or
by a Calvinist; the cumulative result of such arguing will be the idea of the
sovereignty of the people. This point needs special emphasis. While the
Reformation interrupts the secularistic trend in political speculation, it does not
interrupt, but on the contrary strengthens, the populist component that is present
in it.24
Althusius‟s Politica (1603) is noted for being written in the covenant tradition, but Althusius‟s
discussion of religion is inconsequential for Voegelin. He argues that it is a “slight step” that
would lead to a secularized system of natural law.25 Voegelin‟s verdict on the Vindiciae, Contra
Tyrannos (1579), and its use of the Hebrew Covenants is that while its arguments serve their
purpose to provide a scriptural rather than a natural law, its details are conventional rather than
original.26
Given the sweeping nature of Voegelin‟s History of Political Ideas and Voegelin‟s sharp
eye for both forest and trees, his provocative charges certainly merit consideration. He is correct
to scorn the tendency of Protestant political theology to sometimes become messianic, something
I will address in Chapter Nine. As to the originality of what is taking place in the Protestant
authors, particularly the Reformed authors, I will argue in Chapter Eight that the Reformation
makes a significant contribution. But given the difficulty of untangling this contribution
precisely, something I already claimed in Chapter One to be impossible, Voegelin‟s claim cannot
be fully addressed here. I do believe that the key to the Reformers‟ contribution, a contribution
ultimately owed to the Biblical covenants, is found in the relational demands of their political
24
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theory. That requires a less ecumenical view of revelation than Voegelin‟s own, an approach
more akin to what I have already described in Chapter Two. I think that Voegelin also fails to
acknowledge the merit of the Reformation in transmitting existing ideas using the anthropology
and symbolism of its era – particularly to America.
In contrast to Voegelin and Strauss, who share a deep sensitivity to the supernatural or
transcendent nature of theology and revelation, stands the work of Michael Walzer. Though The
Revolution of the Saints should not be underappreciated as an important discussion of Puritan
politics, it also reflects the “scientific” cosmology of its era.27 The study of Puritanism was very
much in vogue. So, too, was the study of revolutionary movements as social phenomena. Like
many of his contemporaries, Walzer does not take the theology of the movement to be its raison
d’etre.28 Hancock is correct when he characterizes Walzer as follows,
Walzer‟s unquestioned sympathy for modern radicals, however, frees him from
fully scrutinizing the theoretical matrix of this radicalism and thus invites him to
detach the question of the practical impact of Calvinism from that of its
theoretical or theological content. Walzer interprets Calvin‟s writings not as
theology or – as Calvin himself sometimes described them – as “Christian
philosophy,” but as ideology (22-30). He is concerned not with any claim to „offer
believers a knowledge of God‟ or to „explain the world and human society as they
are and must be‟ but rather with Calvinism‟s „capacity to activate adherents and
change the world‟ (27). . . . To understand the ideological capacity for Calvinism
we may have to abandon the assumption that Calvinism is just an ideology.29
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Like Voegelin, Walzer accuses the Puritans of using politicizing theology for the sake of social
objectives. But whereas Voegelin sees this in metaphysical terms, Walzer sees it in sociological
terms of an elite-led revolution. (Voegelin is also quick to scorn the Puritans while Walzer‟s
“value free” social science approach discourages such a thing.) Walzer compares English
Puritans with Jacobins or Bolsheviks.30 Ironically, Voegelin and Walzer would agree on seeing
the Puritans as modern revolutionaries.
Finally one should note the work of Robert Bellah, who joins Walzer in a sociological
approach. But whereas Walzer is studying the uses of the covenant as historical phenomena,
Bellah‟s work is part of his larger studies of “civil religion” in America. In The Broken
Covenant, Bellah writes, “In the 18th century, as I will attempt to show, there was a common set
of religious and moral understandings rooted in a conception of divine order under a Christian, or
at least deist, God.”31 Bellah believes that America has, to its own peril, left those common moral
understandings. He writes, “A tendency to rank personal gratification above obligation to others
correlates with a deepening cynicism about the established social, economic, and political
institutions of society.”32 In some ways, Bellah is sounding warnings similar to the covenantal
jeremiads of the old American clergy; his text addresses themes such as the tension between
commercial success and virtue. 33 But there are also tensions cast in more modern terms:
individualism versus community, or the need for using small and voluntary networks versus
centralization. Bellah believes that these problems are best resolved by the old covenant,
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combined with certain variants of a less overtly religious republicanism.34 At the end of his book,
Bellah extols Winthrop and admonishes his American readers to “choose life.”35 It is not clear
whether Bellah himself believes this theological narrative of America‟s chosen status. But
perhaps that isn‟t important. What is important is that Bellah believes that America‟s selfunderstanding has thus far enabled protection from its own excesses.
3.4 Secondary Studies on American Political Theology
The final subject of the dissertation, addressed in Chapter Twelve, is American political
theology. It would be unwieldy to try to navigate the whole corpus of studies to provide
bibliographic background on every discussion of political theology in America. That could
include just about every major treatment of the colonies, Revolution and Founding.36 Instead, I
will focus on a few key studies.
It was Alice Baldwin who revived study of American political theology in 1928 by
studying the New England clergy during the Revolution. The New England Clergy and the
American Revolution should be retained by students of this period, serving as a helpful
introduction to many substantial and ancillary subjects. Baldwin wrestles with a subject still very
much on the minds of contemporary scholars: the intersection of philosophy and theology in the
rhetoric and justification of the American cause. I do not think that Hatch characterizes
Baldwin‟s text fairly when he argues that she falls prey to a temptation characteristic of her era:
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Locke et praeterea nihil.37 It is true that most pre-World War II studies of the Revolution and
Founding, influenced mainly by Becker and Hartz, emphasized its liberal aspects. But Hatch‟s
charge reflects the sensitivities of his own era - against liberalism and in favor of republicanism
in the Revolution and Founding. His critique of Baldwin demonstrates the influence of Bailyn,
Wood and Pocock.
Concurrent with Baldwin‟s revival of interest in political clergy was a broader revival of
interest in the American Puritans and Puritanism. Most prominent are the many works of both
Perry Miller and his student Edmund S. Morgan.38 As I will note in future chapters, Miller‟s
work has been broadly challenged. But his work is enormously influential and broad intellectual
histories of American colonial religion followed Miller‟s lead. Heimert‟s Religion and the
American Mind was the first since Baldwin‟s to substantially emphasize the political sermons.
Heimert‟s book emphasizes the differences between what he calls “Liberals” (characterized by
variations of Arminianism, rationalism or what Jonathan Edwards called the “legal scheme”) and
more orthodox divines such as Edwards. 39 Heimert strives to refute an assertion that traditional
religion was the opponent of progress: democracy, revolution and natural rights. Heimert turns
that thesis on its head.
Liberalism was profoundly conservative, politically as well as socially, and that
its leaders, insofar as they did in fact embrace the Revolution, were the most
reluctant of rebels. Conversely, “evangelical” religion, which had as its most
37
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notable formal expression the “Calvinism” of Jonathan Edwards, was not the
retrograde philosophy that many historians rejoice to see confounded in
America‟s Age of Reason. Rather Calvinism, and Edwards, provided preRevolutionary America with a radical, even democratic, social and political
ideology, and evangelical religion embodied, and inspired, a thrust toward
American nationalism.40
Heimert argues a now-familiar thesis: an intellectual division that formed in the aftermath of the
Great Awakening ultimately accounts for the Revolutionary fervor.
Nathan Hatch‟s study of the New England clergy in The Sacred Cause of Liberty:
Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England dissents from Heimert‟s
explanation for the Revolution. Hatch emphasizes the millennial aspects and republican
ideology, discerning a “republican eschatology” that grew up in the historical circumstances and
theological modifications following the Awakening.41 Hatch argues that hopes for the arrival of a
millennium, stirred by revivalism, could not have adequately fueled the theological
republicanism of the Revolution. Instead, Hatch places great emphasis on the Anglo-French wars
coupled with the rise of a republican rhetoric as an alternative source of political eschatology.
Contra Heimert‟s thesis, Hatch revisits the rhetoric of the Old Lights (as well as New) and
carefully examines the evolving eschatology between the Awakening and the Revolution.42
Unlike Heimert, Hatch also looks back to pre-Awakening Puritanism and forward to the clergy‟s
support of Federalism, attempting to explain how it is that the clergy who once supported
revolution came to become (in Hatch‟s words) “fearful traditionalists.”43
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Harry Stout and Dale Kuehne revived the study of New England clergy ten and twenty
years respectively after Hatch. Stout‟s The New England Soul provides a broader study of
religion more similar to Heimert‟s. Kuehne‟s Massachusetts Congregationalist Political
Thought, 1760-1790 provides a purely political study. Both take issue with Hatch‟s
characterization that there was an intellectual shift in the New England clergy which (as Hatch
claims) “saw the expansion of New England‟s functional theology to include republican ideas as
a primary article of faith.”44 Both believe that as Hatch presents this shift, too little is made of
theological content for its own sake. Stout replies,
The more one reads these sermons, the more one finds unsatisfactory the
suggestion that ideas of secular “republicanism,” “civil millenarianism,” or class
conscious “popular ideology” were the primary ideological triggers of radical
resistance and violence in the Revolution. . . . In Revolutionary New England,
ministers continued to monopolize public communications, and the terms they
most often employed to justify resistance and to instill hope emanated from the
Scriptures and from New England‟s enduring identity as an embattled people of
the Word who were commissioned to uphold a sacred and exclusive covenant
between themselves and God.45
This is not to say that the streams of thought influencing the clergy were homogeneous. Kuehne
concludes, for example,
Massachusetts Congregational political thought of this period is clearly indebted
to a number of intellectual traditions. It is difficult to discern, however, which are
most important. The thorniest problem concerns interpreting the ministers‟
commitment to republicanism and virtue. The sermons use ideas and language
that can be interpreted in various ways. Those who see the founding as a Lockean
event, those who see it as a liberal event, those who see it as a republican event,
and those who see it as a Calvinist event each can claim influence. While all
traditions are involved, it is the Reformed tradition that remains dominant. . . .
aforementioned republicanism, but overemphasizes language and historical circumstances. This last point is
characterized by Hatch with the question, “What was it possible for a given historical person or persons to think.”
Ibid., ix. I acknowledge the importance of historical circumstances, but disagree with the historicist implications.
This “Cambridge School” approach to language and context remains controversial.
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Although they were no doubt close to a point of transition, it appears that the
ministers were Christians first; their political thought can only be understood if
their religion is held to be primary. The other traditions certainly exist in their
thinking, but to hold any of them as primary is to misunderstand their thought.46
That conclusion coincides with the intent of this dissertation, which is to discern both the
flexibility and significance of political theology in the face of a changing landscape. Flexibility
demonstrates the genius of the clergy and the value of the covenant. As Kuehne puts it, “What
vexed them was trying to create a coherent vision of religious freedom and the Puritan desire that
religion pervade all of life, including politics.”47 But did the Congregationalist ministers tempt
what Walzer and Kuehne call the “corruption” of Calvinism? Or did the covenant remain central
despite its modifications? Kuehne writes,
The covenant remained as important to the Congregationalists as it was to the
Puritans, and it continued to form the basis of their political vision. Although the
mature Congregationalist constitution may have several similarities with secular
republican thought, in the ministers‟ eyes it was not secular at all…. The future
would show a failure of the cement to bond, but if these ministers had been forced
to choose between their present Constitutional theory and the covenant, they
would have reexamined their political theory immediately.48
Thus, it remains to be seen not only how the clergy reflected a variety of influences, but how
these modified the central device of the covenant.49
The central device of the covenant is also emphasized by Griffin, who has produced a
small but efficient and comprehensive study of Reformed clergy in the middle colonies. In
Revolution and Religion, Griffin joins Kuehne in seeing the arguments for revolution as an
extension of the theological heritage of Reformed Protestantism, rather than an abrupt shift to
46
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reliance on contemporary ideology.50 Particularly provocative is Griffin‟s position that
arguments from natural law, and for self-defense, were also extensions of Reformed theology
rather than anything attributable to political philosophy.
3.5 Conclusion
The covenant device is an important tool of political theory. This is demonstrated by the
attention paid to it, and to political theology in general, by Strauss, Voegelin, Walzer, and
Bellah. While Daniel Elazar and David Novak have provided broad and contrasting studies of
the covenant device over the last two decades, they are not sufficient. Elazar‟s studies are too
generous. Novak‟s studies are too parochial. Many studies within intellectual history and religion
have examined covenants and covenant theology, but they have not been focused on political
implications. In the chapters that follow, I provide a concise study of political covenanting in the
Anglo-American experience unlike any that has been done before.
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SECTION II
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COVENANT DEVICE
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CHAPTER 4
THE BIBLICAL COVENANTS
4.1 Interpretive Guidelines
This chapter provides an introduction to the Biblical covenants as a theological and
political idea. The subject at hand tempts a much longer study than necessary for the purposes of
this dissertation, so a few guidelines should be kept in mind. First, the chapter must confess to a bit
of interpretive simplicity. I am going to present the texts on their face as traditionally understood,
and not presume the need for any kind of sophisticated ―higher,‖ historicist, or literary criticism.
This will keep things efficient and thus sidestep the virtual universe of Biblical hermeneutics.
Where secondary authors call on rabbinic interpretations, I will include them. To articulate the
Christian interpretation of the covenant, I rely on apostolic interpretations. I will not impose any
―modern‖ reading on the Biblical authors. The ―modern‖ reading of the Bible only begins in the
seventeenth century.1
A second guideline requires that I distinguish between Biblical covenants and theological
covenants. By Biblical covenants, I mean those explicitly recorded in the narrative of the Bible.
Theological covenants are theoretical artifices articulated in the work of systematic theologians. I
emphasize the Biblical covenants in this chapter because they are the foundation of the West‘s
familiarity with covenants. Theological covenants are included in later chapters.
4.2 Origin
In English Bibles, ―covenant‖ is translated from the Hebrew word berith. It is used over
300 times in the Hebrew Bible. The etymology of the word is uncertain, with potential translations
1
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including: cut, bind, hand, fetter, or eat. The cutting may refer to its use in a ceremony not unlike
the one found in the Biblical text. ―Eat‖ may refer to a special meal that accompanies a
covenanting ceremony. Hittite civilization, which preceded the established Israelite society, also
had treaties similar to covenants. While there is some controversy regarding how closely the
Biblical covenants parallel those of surrounding civilizations, the latter might safely be considered
proto-covenants when compared to most of the Biblical covenants.2 Unlike the covenants of the
surrounding cultures, the Biblical covenants emphasized a certain level of equality – or at least
reciprocity.
Berith becomes diatheke in the Greek, a word which most frequently referred to a last will
and testament.3 This results in the now familiar Christian titles for two parts of the Bible– the Old
and New ―Testament.‖4 Diatheke appears over thirty times in the Apostolic Scriptures, with its first
usage in Paul‘s epistles.5 Some of these usages are quotations of the Old Testament, however. In
later Latin usage, the word most used for ―covenant‖ is foedus – the root of the English ―federal.‖
There is some controversy in Biblical studies about the meaning of the covenant (berith) in
the Hebrew Bible. Some argue that it refers to the covenant itself while others focus on the act of
covenanting.6 Rendtorff focuses on what he calls the ―covenant formula,‖ which occurs over 30
times. The covenant formula includes at least one of two important statements, or both together: ―I
will be a God for you‖ and ―You shall be a people for me‖ This, Rendtorff argues, is used more
2
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systematically than the word berith.7 It is the act of election, Rendtorff‘s ―covenant formula,‖
which defines the covenant and its relational characteristic. God‘s taking a people for himself is
commonly referred to in theology as ―election‖: God selecting a people for Himself.8
4.3 The Hebrew Chronology
Elazar argues that there are four stages of covenanting. In the first stage, God initiates
covenants. This is the case with Adam, Noah and Abraham. In the second stage, God seeks popular
consent, initiated through his designated servant. In the third state, the principal leader turns to God
and the people to covenant or re-covenant. In the fourth stage, the people themselves initiate a
covenant renewal.
Excluding for now what some Reformers claimed about a prelapsarian (pre-Fall) covenant
with Adam as federal head of his descendants, the first politically significant Biblical covenant is
between God and Noah. God makes a covenant in the plan for escape and afterward makes a
covenant with mankind (and other living things).9 God not only denies Himself the right to repeat
the destruction of the Flood, He establishes universal justice. This latter point has the greatest
political significance because it verifies the existence of what some commentators call natural
law.10 This natural law cannot be confused with Greek or Roman natural law, for example. The
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universal and natural law implied here resides first in the will of God rather than in some sort of
superintending nature.11
Covenants are later made with Abraham. They promise both people and land, and they
require both ceremony and sign.12 For example, in Genesis 15:17-20, this is recorded: ―On that day
the LORD made a covenant with Abram, saying, ‗To your offspring I give this land, from the river
of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates, the land of the Kenites, the Kenizzites, the
Kadmonites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Rephaim, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Girgashites
and the Jebusites.‘‖ Genesis 17:5-8 records this promise by God to Abraham:
No longer shall your name be called Abram, but your name shall be Abraham, for I
have made you the father of a multitude of nations. I will make you exceedingly
fruitful, and I will make you into nations, and kings shall come from you. And I
will establish my covenant between me and you and your offspring after you
throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be God to you and to
your offspring after you. And I will give to you and to your offspring after you the
land of your sojournings, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession, and I
will be their God.
These are foundational covenants, and eventually become the ones of greatest controversy – both
theological and political. Christians and Jews fundamentally disagree about the trajectory of the
covenant promise to Abraham thereafter.
Particularly controversial is this promise to Abraham in Genesis 22:15-18: ―And the angel
of the LORD called to Abraham a second time from heaven and said, ‗By myself I have sworn,
declares the LORD, because you have done this and have not withheld your son, your only son, I
will surely bless you, and I will surely multiply your offspring as the stars of heaven and as the
sand that is on the seashore. And your offspring shall possess the gate of his enemies, and in your
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offspring shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, because you have obeyed my voice.‘"13 This
not only echoes the dominion mandate found earlier in Genesis 1:26, 28, in which God tells
mankind to be fruitful and multiply and subdue the earth; it has further political implication.14
There is not simply a covenant with Abraham, but also with his descendants. It is used to establish
a ―people‖ and a homeland - two essential ingredients for any human polity.
Jews and Christians have important disagreements about who is the rightful heir of this
promise to Abraham. It is at the heart of their disagreement. As evidenced by Genesis 18:16-25,
the claim of being Abraham‘s rightful descendants is a powerful claim. These passages blend the
judicial and legal, social, familial, political, and eschatological together.
When the men got up to leave, they looked down toward Sodom, and Abraham
walked along with them to see them on their way. Then the LORD said, "Shall I
hide from Abraham what I am about to do? Abraham will surely become a great
and powerful nation, and all nations on earth will be blessed through him. For I
have chosen him, so that he will direct his children and his household after him to
keep the way of the LORD by doing what is right and just, so that the LORD will
bring about for Abraham what he has promised him." Then the LORD said, "The
outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah is so great and their sin so grievous that I will
go down and see if what they have done is as bad as the outcry that has reached me.
If not, I will know." The men turned away and went toward Sodom, but Abraham
remained standing before the LORD. Then Abraham approached him and said:
"Will you sweep away the righteous with the wicked? What if there are fifty
righteous people in the city? Will you really sweep it away and not spare the place
for the sake of the fifty righteous people in it? Far be it from you to do such a
thing—to kill the righteous with the wicked, treating the righteous and the wicked
alike. Far be it from you! Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?"15
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The three previous quotations are taken from the English Standard Version (ESV).
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Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And let them have dominion over the fish of
the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over every creeping thing
that creeps on the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female
he created them. And God blessed them. And God said to them, ‗Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and
subdue it and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing
that moves on the earth.‘‖ Genesis 1:26-28 (ESV)
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The judicial and legal point concerns God‘s justice and Abraham‘s role in it. The social, familial
and political are blended together in the covenantal promise to make Abraham‘s descendents a
powerful nation. The eschatological point concerns the future state of affairs brought by God‘s
justice in its own right (―Judge of all the earth‖) as well as the covenant with Abraham (―all the
nations on earth will be blessed through him‖). The judgment against Sodom and Gomorrah also
emphasizes the eschatological point, particularly when later referenced by Christ in Matthew 11.
We learn more about covenants in other parts of the Biblical narrative about Abraham.
Abraham is said to make a covenant of his own with Abimelech, a Philistine king, to establish an
alliance.16 This covenant demonstrates that covenants do not necessarily require complete doctrinal
orthodoxy between covenanting parties. Nor do they have to be dictated or approved by God,
though they are said to be made in his presence.
As noted above, the covenant made by God with Abraham is also made with his
descendents. Not much is learned from the account of Isaac (as an adult). 17 The case of Jacob (who
eventually becomes renamed Israel) provides a provocative insight. He schemes his way into his
father‘s blessing.18 Jacob also tries to treat the covenant as a contract for his own self interest. The
relevant passages are worth quoting, perhaps suggesting a contractual rather than a covenantal
approach on Jacob‘s part. That is, Jacob approaches the covenant as a bargain to be struck on open
terms rather than as something agreed to in a standing moral and legal framework for noble (and
even political) goals.
And he dreamed, and behold, there was a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it
reached to heaven. And behold, the angels of God were ascending and descending
16

Genesis 21

17

In Isaac‘s case, see Genesis 17:19, 21.

18

Jacob schemes with his mother to obtain Isaac‘s deathbed blessing in Genesis 27 though Esau is said to ―despise his
birthright,‖ trading it to his brother for food in Genesis 25:29-34.
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on it! And behold, the LORD stood above it and said, "I am the LORD, the God of
Abraham your father and the God of Isaac. The land on which you lie I will give to
you and to your offspring. Your offspring shall be like the dust of the earth, and you
shall spread abroad to the west and to the east and to the north and to the south, and
in you and your offspring shall all the families of the earth be blessed. Behold, I am
with you and will keep you wherever you go, and will bring you back to this land.
For I will not leave you until I have done what I have promised you." Then Jacob
awoke from his sleep and said, "Surely the LORD is in this place, and I did not
know it." And he was afraid and said, "How awesome is this place! This is none
other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven." So early in the morning
Jacob took the stone that he had put under his head and set it up for a pillar and
poured oil on the top of it. He called the name of that place Bethel, but the name of
the city was Luz at the first. Then Jacob made a vow, saying, "If God will be with
me and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat and
clothing to wear, so that I come again to my father's house in peace, then the LORD
shall be my God, and this stone, which I have set up for a pillar, shall be God's
house. And of all that you give me I will give a full tenth to you.19
We also learn from the case of Jacob, as presented in Genesis 31:51-54 and discussed by Elazar,
that a covenant can be used to separate as well as to join.20
The Exodus from Egypt is perhaps the most politically symbolic event in the Scripture, and
the aforementioned covenants made with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are the foundation for the
covenant at Mt. Sinai.21 God emphasizes this to Moses, telling him that deliverance from Egypt is
part of the covenant made with the patriarchs.22 A clear example of the covenant formula is also
evident after the Exodus when Moses is told to tell the Israelites: ―Ye have seen what I did unto the
Egyptians, and how I bare you on eagles' wings, and brought you unto myself. Now therefore, if ye
will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me
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Genesis 28:12-22 (ESV)
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Elazar, op. cit., 147
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Exodus 2:23-25 (KJV): “And it came to pass in process of time, that the king of Egypt died: and the children of
Israel sighed by reason of the bondage, and they cried, and their cry came up unto God by reason of the bondage. And
God heard their groaning, and God remembered his covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob. And God
looked upon the children of Israel, and God had respect unto them.‖
22

Exodus 6:2-5
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above all people: for all the earth is mine: And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an
holy nation. These are the words which thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel.‖23 This passage
not only repeats the usual political details (being a people, kingdom or nation), it also emphasizes
God‘s role in establishing and maintaining his part of the covenant. That is done even if His people
should fail him.
This covenant formula is repeated in many other places of the Old Testament.24 God
declares Himself to be Israel‘s God and Israel to be His particular people. But there are two kinds
of covenants. With the ―mutual covenant‖ comes the promise of blessing or cursing.25 By contrast,
the unconditional election of Israel is what Freeman calls the ―gracious covenant‖26 These
covenants may seem exclusive of one another, but they are not. Together, they mean that while
Israel is sometimes chastened, she is not destroyed.27
The covenant at Sinai is a corporate covenant made with Israel. Moses serves as mediator.
Moses is not a mediator in the sense that he negotiates. Rather, he is a mediator in that he acts as a
representative for both God and the people. The Sinai covenant confirms the movement from a
familial covenant to a national covenant. It includes not only the Ten Commandments, but the text
of case and civil law that follows. (This becomes the condition of blessing or cursing.28) It is the
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Exodus 19:4-6

24

Deuteronomy 7:6-8, 14:2, 26:17-19; I Samuel 12:22; II Sam 7.18; Jeremiah 7:23; Jeremiah 11:4; Ezekiel 14:1-11 for
example.
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This corporate promise of blessing and cursing is emphasized in many places, notably in Leviticus 26 or
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Freeman, op. cit., 4
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Reciprocity remains an important part of the covenant in either case. But the outstanding question will be whether
failure to reciprocate can result in complete separation or merely a loss of fellowship. Also, in Christian theology it will
be argued that God can provide both terms and satisfaction of covenant terms.
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basis for the new Israelite polity. It also assigns the division of power, separating prophetic,
priestly and civil functions.29 Elazar describes the Sinai covenant thus, ―For the Israelites of the
time, the general thrust of the Sinai covenant and its accompanying texts and actions was to bring
the existing tribes and their primordial political structures based on kinship into the framework of a
national constitution based on consent, comprehensive in character and designed to sanctify all
dimensions of human life, in order to build the holy commonwealth.‖30 What was once familial,
social and political becomes more explicitly and institutionally political.
In Joshua 24, we see the first explicit tripartite covenant of human design.31 Joshua harkens
back to the patriarchal covenant and reminds the people of God‘s covenantal faithfulness. They, in
turn, pledge their faithfulness. But Joshua himself also makes a covenant with the people. This will
have important implications for later generations of covenant theory. First, it establishes what
Kaminsky defends as ―corporate responsibility.‖32 This means that persons are also judged within
nations as nations for their collective faithfulness or unfaithfulness. Second, it implies the right for
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Elazar, op. cit., 188
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Elazar, op. cit., 213. Joshua 24:19-28: ―But Joshua said to the people, ‗You are not able to serve the LORD, for he is
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clergy to take the role of prophet, admonishing civil authorities, or the people, or both.33 Third,
God gives a special responsibility to the civil magistrate, as evidenced by the record of both Saul
and David.34 The leader of Israel was seen to function on God‘s behalf.35 Finally, God makes a
covenant with every individual Israelite, though these complement the corporate covenant.36 The
main application of this last covenant, between God and individual persons, is to emphasize that
the people owe their primary allegiance to God rather than to the ruler. God is King.37 To this
might be attributed the rise of political conscience and (in later Protestant manifestations) the right
of resistance and revolution.
The next significant set of covenants surrounds David, who is said to enjoy political power
by God‘s favor.38 David, as a ruler, covenants with his people.39 The Davidic covenant is clearly
presented as a continuation of the original patriarchal covenant – the covenant of election.40 David
also makes a covenant of friendship with Jonathan.41 The Davidic covenant is perhaps the last
great major covenant insofar as it both parallels the Abrahamic covenant and also asserts the
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covenant to be perpetual.42 The nation‘s covenant no longer stands in need of formal renewal.
Political rulers (kings) become the successors to the old tribal patriarchs. There is revival of the
longstanding promise of a homeland. This promise of land makes covenant theology what
Buchanan calls ―a theology of conquest.‖43 Not only are the covenant people to take possession of
a homeland, they cannot ultimately be defeated.44
The remainder of the Hebrew narrative tells of other covenants. These additional
covenants, such as one made by Josiah, are important insofar as they emphasize important social
and moral themes. There are stories of covenant renewal, religious revivals, moral revivals, and
political reassertions of the original covenant with Abraham. All of these will become important in
the iterations of covenant used by future theologians as the covenant is applied to persons other
than the Hebrews; but the aforementioned Hebrew covenants are the most significant for tracing
the main threads of covenant theology and the covenant narrative.
4.4 The Christian Interpretation
Christians not only acknowledge the aforementioned ―Old Testament‖ covenants, they
declare themselves the rightful inheritors of them in Christ. This move into a new covenant
becomes, for Christian theologians, a new Exodus. The author of the letter to the Hebrews, for
example, asserts to his readers, ―We received the good news just as they did,‖ and draws a direct
parallel with the Hebrew covenant. 45
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The narrative of Israel is considered to be the narrative of the Church, particularly in light
of judgment and redemption promised by the prophet Isaiah. Christians assert that Christ is the heir
of the Davidic kingship.46 This is important insofar as the Sinai covenant gave way to the Davidic
covenant, which in turn paralleled the Abrahamic covenant.47 Buchanan cites the many
―enthronement psalms,‖ for example, as an example of the Christian adoption of the Hebrew
covenant narrative.48 These ―enthronement psalms‖ refer to a king whose reign will not end. This
is a king who would subdue nations, deliver the saints, usher in the messianic kingdom, and put all
enemies under his feet. On this point, two messianic psalms are worth quoting in full.
Psalm 2
Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the
earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the LORD, and
against his anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their
cords from us. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the LORD shall have
them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath, and vex them in his
sore displeasure. Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Zion. I will declare
the decree: the LORD hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day have I
begotten thee. Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance,
and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Thou shalt break them with
a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel. Be wise now
therefore, O ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve the LORD with
fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish
from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little. Blessed are all they that put
their trust in him.
Psalm 110
The LORD said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine
enemies thy footstool. The LORD shall send the rod of thy strength out of Zion:
rule thou in the midst of thine enemies. Thy people shall be willing in the day of
thy power, in the beauties of holiness from the womb of the morning: thou hast
the dew of thy youth. The LORD hath sworn, and will not repent, Thou art a
priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek. The Lord at thy right hand shall
strike through kings in the day of his wrath. He shall judge among the heathen, he
46
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shall fill the places with the dead bodies; he shall wound the heads over many
countries. He shall drink of the brook in the way: therefore shall he lift up the
head.49
The New Testament authors frequently appeal to other messianic psalms (Psalm 22 and 69, for
example). One might even go so far as to argue that the repeated quotation of Psalm 110 in the
New Testament canon (cited more than any other verse from the Hebrew Scriptures) summarizes
the essence of Christian covenantalism.50 Regardless of the diversity of Christian eschatologies,
all argue that the age of Christ is essentially the messianic age promised in the Old Testament.
Jesus is given the throne ―of his father David‖ in order to ―rule the house of Jacob forever.‖51
Thus, Jesus inherits the role of covenantal ruler. The last book of the New Testament canon,
John‘s vision at Patmos, is written in typological format to echo themes of Jewish deliverance.52
The covenant blessing of Abraham can now be fulfilled by Christ‘s Great Commission.
For the Old Testament Hebrews, life in covenant is life in the fullest sense of the word.53
Death in the Old Testament meant not only perishing but being scattered, having community
dissolved, and being outcasts among foreign nations. In the New Testament, ―eternal life‖ becomes
synonymous with covenantal life.54 For example, Christ suggests going through earthly life
maimed in order not to be cast into fire whole.55 He also refers to himself as the ―bread of life.‖56
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Matthew and Luke speak of inheriting eternal life as the Israelites had spoken of inheriting the land
God had promised to their forefathers.57 Communion becomes the new Passover – instituted at a
Passover meal.58
An important question is whether these changes enhance or instead neutralize the earthly
and political implications of the covenants. Where is the new Promised Land, the Kingdom of
God? Hebrews 11, for example, makes explicit connection between Christ and the patriarchs; but
it says that they sojourned for a heavenly city, not an earthly promised land. Jesus also tells
Pilate that his Kingdom is not of this world.59 Should this diminish the political effect of
Christian covenantalism? Or should it make it all the more emphatic, albeit complicated? The
answer is disputed. And to complicate matters, the Church, unlike the Jewish society that they
rejected, acquire a social and political authority long since lost by their covenantal ancestors (the
Jews). The proper use of that authority remains at the heart of contemporary debates about
religion and politics.
4.5 Conclusion
The Bible is the most significant text in Anglo-American political theory. It may even
present, in the whole of the Torah, the oldest political constitution in historical record.60 The Bible
is significant not because it prescribes a particular type of regime.61 Rather, it is largely significant
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because of its covenants. These covenants offer a political theology par excellence. This is true not
simply because the covenants are found in accounts purporting divine inspiration, echoing the
importance of divine imperatives defined in Chapter Two. Rather, the covenants are foundational
because of their legal, political, moral, and social implications: ruling, dominion, land, nation,
people, inheritance, corporate responsibility, justice, mercy, conscience, and deliverance. Add to
this the eschatological or messianic content, for example, and one finds a very fertile ground for
politics that is at once prudent and ideological, conservative and radical. In the chapters that
follow, I will demonstrate how the Biblical covenants have come to outline the parameters of a
broad but identifiable political theory.
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CHAPTER 5
DANIEL ELAZAR’S STUDIES OF POLITICAL COVENANTING
5.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I addressed the Biblical presentation of covenanting, which is the basis
for all other studies of covenanting. In these next two chapters, I skip ahead to contemporary
research in both political science and political philosophy on political covenants. In this chapter,
I focus on contemporary studies of political covenanting and federalism under the leadership of
Daniel Elazar.
Elazar and his colleagues Donald Lutz and John Kincaid have provided numerous studies
of federalism, constitutionalism, republicanism, and political culture. They contrast political
covenanting, classified as strong or weak, with organic and hierarchical political arrangements or
those founded on conquest, natural law or natural right.1 They conclude that political
covenanting is uniquely able to fulfill political goals of liberty, equality and justice. Their studies
consider the entire history of covenanting, beginning with the Hebrew peoples and extending
into contemporary pseudo-covenants, treaties and trade agreements.2 They pay considerable
attention to the most recent period of explicit and orthodox covenanting, the Protestant
Reformation.3
To give their studies both historical and contemporary significance, Elazar and his
colleagues seek to demonstrate an evolution of political covenanting, discerning what they
consider to be both strong and weak contemporary influence. They argue that while orthodox
1

Elazar contrasts the covenantal model with models of conquest or organic development in Elazar, Covenant and
Polity in Biblical Israel, 35-51.
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(strong) political covenanting is no longer practiced, weaker forms of political covenanting
remain. Weaker forms, they argue, are evident in modern constitutionalism or theories of social
contracting. Orthodox political covenanting is distinguished by its explicit theological emphasis
and clear participation by God. Weaker political covenanting may emphasize morality or
community, but it lacks the explicit theological and divine component.
This distinction raises important questions. Given the intensely religious basis evident in
historical political covenanting, can one even speak of an evolving “covenant” at all? At what
point in the “evolution” of political covenanting does covenanting cease to be recognizable as
covenanting? Does a sharp dichotomy exist between social contract theory and political
covenanting? And more to the point, where would such a dichotomy be most evident in historical
experience and how should one address such an intersection? This chapter will begin to address
these questions as they are considered in the pioneering work of Elazar and his colleagues.4
5.2 Distinguishing Covenant, Contract and Compact
Lutz and Elazar offer a taxonomy of sources for modern constitutionalism. For their
schema they use common terms from the early history of Anglo-American constitutionalism:
covenant, compact and contract. Each, strictly considered, represents a different kind of political
agreement. Covenants and compacts are historically more prevalent than contracts and are more
constitutional or public in character. As reciprocal instruments, covenants and compacts bind
their parties “beyond the letter of the law.” Contracts tend to be private devices and not the
public documents that political theorists allude to when they generalize the foundations of
constitutionalism as “social contract theory.” Covenants, even more so than compacts, introduce
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a morally binding dimension above the legal dimension.5 Covenants are also distinguished from
compacts and contracts by the belief that God is a guarantor of, or a direct party to, the
relationship between parties in the covenant. Compacts do not explicitly include a divinely
transcendent dimension and instead rely on mutual pledges and a secular legal grounding.
Modern constitutions are no longer made with God but instead “under God.”6 In this respect they
are more like compacts than covenants. Contracts are distinguished primarily by their private and
strictly legal nature.7 Contracts also do not emphasize morality for their members beyond legal
and minimally moral reciprocity.
Covenants, compacts and contracts all seek liberty for their members, but each articulates
a different relationship between liberty and morality. At the one extreme, covenantal liberty has a
strong and binding communal nature, particularly under divine law. At the other extreme,
contracts tend to emphasize positive law and individualistic notions of liberty. Elazar contrasts
covenantal and contractual liberty thus:
Covenantal liberty is not simply the right to do as one pleases, within broad
boundaries. Contractual liberty could be just that but covenantal liberty
emphasizes the liberty to pursue the moral purposes for which the covenant was
made. This latter kind of liberty requires that moral distinctions be drawn and that
human actions be judged according to the terms of the covenant.8
A wider spectrum of moral license, pluralism and tolerance is consistent with the more secular
nature of contracts. Elazar argues that these two features of contracts, secularism and
individualistic freedom make it difficult for contracts to command moral unity or coherence. He
states, for example, of the early Swiss republics, “[T]hey were primarily civil and contractual,
5
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not animated by any vision of society but only by the need of people to protect themselves and to
cooperate…they were unable to galvanize their people in moralistic ways.”9 Elazar and Lutz
assert that covenantal documents often precede constitutions because covenants have an
explicitly moralistic nature and because consensual political organization requires some degree
of moral unity. Covenants, more so than compacts or contracts, articulate the moral adherence
necessary for representative government. This was particularly the case in colonial America.10
The way in which these three devices (covenant, compact and contract) parallel, intersect,
intertwine, or dominate one another has important political consequences. Each approaches the
moral and legal bases of society differently and thus results in a different political theory.
Covenants, compacts and contracts resolve the tensions of political life uniquely. These tensions
might include, but are not limited to: a society’s conception of rights; distribution of power; the
proper demands of community; and the appropriate extent of individualism. The most
individualistic and secular concept is “contract” and the most communal and religious is
“covenant.” Each serves as a different political reality upon which a society may order itself.
And this political reality will manifest itself in historical experience. The contrasts between
contract and covenant cannot be studied merely on a conceptual or idealistic basis. Instead, they
must be studied through the experience of a particular historical reality. That historical reality is
best found in seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain and America, both subjects of this
dissertation.11

9

Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, 61

10

Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, 8

11

As Elazar notes, there are some European nations that have not had essentially covenantal politics – most of Italy,
France, and Spain, for example. In discussing the differences between northern and southern Europe, he cites the
work of Putnam to illustrate the consequences of covenant versus hierarchy. See Elazar, Covenant and
Commonwealth, 60-69. For his discussion of northern societies with a political tradition rooted in secular and later
religious oaths, see chapters 4-6.

77

Most scholars do not consider the ways in which tensions of political life are resolved
differently by the various arrangements of covenant, compact and contract, though this is
important when examining the development of modern Anglo-American constitutionalism.
Scholars too often yoke all variations of consent together and ignore the respective implications
for political culture and institutional design. Also, many scholars view all forms of consensual
political arrangements with a modern contractual basis. This modern bias has made it difficult
for scholars to understand the historical reality in which consent theories, covenanting and
compacting, were developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The differences in these
consensual forms are important, and one cannot consider all covenants, compacts and contracts
as mere variations on what is essentially the same thing. It is the religious and philosophical
ideas of the period which determined how political texts and ideas were understood and
implemented. These, in turn, planted the seed which informs, to one degree or another, today’s
theories of social contracting. One cannot understand modern political theory if one does not
understand its historical development. The political culture and institutions that exist in many
parts of the world today were formed by answers that seventeenth and eighteenth century
political theory gave to longstanding political questions.
Elazar is probably on to something valuable in theoretical terms, but the precise
interpretive application of this taxonomy is somewhat limited. It is more valuable as a theoretical
tool than a means of interpreting historical documents. The test of Elazar’s taxonomy, especially
if one is going to use it as a tool for developing a theory of constitutional evolution, is whether or
not his historical subjects can be said to agree with him in seeing things in such strict terms. If
that cannot be established, and in many cases it probably cannot, the theoretical distinctions may
still hold. But as a means of interpreting historical documents, the application would be quite
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limited. One could not come to a particular document or time and impose Elazar’s definition on
an author’s choice of “compact” over “covenant” and determine that the intent was to avoid
theological significance, for example. In the case of Hobbes, for example, one could not
necessarily presume that the use of the term “covenant” was intended to signify a political
agreement of traditionally moral and theological significance.12 Despite these obstacles,
however, Elazar’s work is helpful for conceptually understanding what it means to have a
political covenant and how it may differ from other political arrangements.
5.3 Characteristics of the Political Covenant
Elazar begins his first volume defining a covenant as:
[A] morally informed agreement or pact based upon voluntary consent,
established by mutual oaths or promises, involving or witnessed by some
transcendent higher authority, between peoples or parties having independent
status, equal in connection with the purposes of the pact, that provides for joint
action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under
conditions of mutual respect, which protect the individual integrities of all the
parties to it. Every covenant involves consenting (in both senses of thinking
together and agreeing) and promising. Most are meant to be of limited duration, if
not perpetual. Covenants can bind any number of partiers for a variety of purposes
but in their essence they are political in that their bonds are used principally to
establish bodies political and social.13
He argues that these covenants are important politically insofar as they “establish lines of
authority, distributions of power, bodies politic and systems of law…. legitimize political life
and direct it into the right paths.”14
The divine party to the covenant is the key to establishing the aforementioned guidelines,
though Elazar seems to think that the moral consequence that results from the divine party’s
12
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participation may even be more significant than the divine party itself. The transcendent power
subscribing to this covenant obligates human freedom to be understood as federal liberty and not
natural liberty.15 Federal liberty emphasizes freedom within the boundaries of community and
moral responsibility. Elazar writes, “The omnipotent Deity, by freely covenanting with man,
limits His own powers to allow humans space in which to be free, only requiring of them that
they live in accordance with the law established as normative by the covenant.”16 Federal liberty
calls all partners to public and private adherence to both social norms and divine moral
prescriptions. 17 This binds the community together and transcends what may otherwise be only
minimal moral obligations prescribed by legal, contractual or private agreements. Without moral
reformation, no true covenant is possible. This explicit moral dimension, Elazar argues, qualifies
covenantal political theory as political theology.18
Covenants limit the authority of civil magistrates, defining the boundaries for the use of
power. The task of the civil magistrate is to lead by example in fulfilling the terms of the
covenant. They are to implement God’s justice and mercy, protecting virtue against vice and
appropriately guarding against heresy. They ignore this calling at their own peril because, unlike
other theories of political origin, there is a clear resistance theory inherent in covenantal political
theory.19 The people, or their appointed “lesser magistrates”, may remove a ruler by force of
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arms.20 According to Elazar, “The idea of constitutional or limited government is derived from
the idea of covenant.”21
Elazar views constitutionalism as the modern outgrowth of both medieval commonwealth
and covenantalism. From these pre-modern and modern foundations of commonwealth and
covenant came the idea of “civil society.”22 Elazar calls constitutionalism “a modern
reinterpretation of the covenantal tradition that gave it flesh and blood and enabled it to become
the instrument of liberty, equality, justice and democracy that it did.”23 Elazar sees a centurieslong intertwining of “covenant, natural law, and constitutionalism.” This is particularly true in
the case of America and other truly constitutional modern nations. Judging the constitutional
propriety of legislation, Elazar argues, is an idea rooted in both natural law and the covenant
device.
Testing constitutionality, Elazar argues, is the modern secular version of testing what the
covenantal tradition called federal liberty.24 In defining federal liberty, Elazar looks to John
Winthrop’s dichotomy between natural liberty and federal liberty. Federal liberty is defined by
Elazar as “the freedom to freely hearken to the law.”25 This is in contrast to natural liberty, which
Winthrop defined as a liberty to do whatever one wants. It is “a liberty to evil as well as to good”
and “incompatible and inconsistent with authority.”26 Thus, natural liberty is a liberty that is

20

Ibid., 247

21

Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, 2

22

Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, xi

23

Ibid., 5

24

Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel 28, 44

25

Ibid., 43

26

Winthrop “A Little Speech on Liberty” (1645) in Levy, Political Thought in America, 13

81

antinomian and incompatible with political life. Federal liberty is ever mindful of political
society and its need for morality and law. This distinction, Elazar argues, is at the root of our
modern idea of what is “constitutional.” To make a judgment of what is constitutional requires
more than merely perusing a text; one must determine what is compatible with the preconditions
of the political order of a civil society and what is not. Political constitutions themselves may
often be a kind of second-stage covenanting. In the case of America, for example, Elazar argues
that the Declaration of Independence served as a first covenant, with the Constitution to follow
as an additional covenant. Determining the propriety of subsequent legislation, its
constitutionality, was done according to the political vision set out by the first covenant. 27
Constitutionality is thus judged by the terms of previous covenants together with the general
moral guidance of the natural law.28
Covenants exhibit important and distinctive components. There are five broad elements
necessary for covenanting: “Historical prologue indicating the parties involved, a preamble
stating the general purposes of the covenant and the principles behind it, a body of conditions
and operative clauses, a stipulation of the agreed-upon sanctions to be applied if the covenant
were violated, and an oath to make the covenant morally binding.”29 A sixth element may also be
included, “provisions for depositing the covenant document and of periodic public reaffirmation
or recovenanting.”30 All of these elements emphasize politics as relational. Elazar argues:
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[A]ll covenantal political understanding revolves around similar questions of
obligation and consent, free will, self-government, and political order – in other
words, how are the relationships of humans one to another and to this universe
and its transcendent power established and maintained so as to preserve both
order and freedom, equality and opportunity, neighborliness and distinctiveness,
liberty and law.31
For Elazar, the degree of political covenanting apparently depends upon the degree of
divine participation. The strictest type of political covenanting insists that God is not merely
witnessing the act but actually brought in as a partner. It is possible to have a religious covenant
of this type without it being a political act, but it is not possible to have a strict political covenant
without it being a religious act.32 The Biblical covenants, according to Elazar, have three
dimensions. The first is a theological dimension wherein God is a party or witness to the
covenant. The second is national-political dimension, particularly in the case of Israel. The third
is a normative dimension that establishes the foundation and maintenance of justice.33 Modern
covenantal expressions recognize this divine dimension in three different ways. The first way is
through explicit pronouncement that the political genesis requires the partnership and rule of
God. The second way is to recognize God as a transcendent source of power over the covenant.
The third way is to express a divine origin for the nature of humanity. The last type of expression
is a very weak variant of covenanting and therefore closest to modern secular compacts or
contracts. Nevertheless, Elazar insists that there is a kind of political theology echoed even in
modern constitutions. That includes many American state constitutions and other constitutions.34
Covenants are voluntary and created by people who have equal moral standing. The
covenant, by pact and oath, creates a community (and institutions) that respect the integrity of
31
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each partner.35 This partnership defines and limits the powers of the parties. Through the
covenant, the nation becomes a people.36 Human power is limited through a separation of powers
and a sharing of responsibilities defined by the covenant.37 Covenanting even limits acts of God
in the affairs of men. Human partners are granted freedom. They may “hearken” to God or not,
though disobedience will bring judgment.38 There is a balance of sovereignties in the covenant.
Unrestricted human sovereignty is too much to manage. Unlimited divine sovereignty tends to be
both severe and ineffective.39
Punishment or reward under a covenant is communal, because it is the community rather
than merely the individual that agrees to moral reward or sanction. Covenant breaking by some
of the community may bring judgment on all of the community.40 This divine reward or
punishment can only be according to the terms of the covenant, however, and consistent with the
idea of a partnership.41 This idea of communal judgment, Elazar argues, opposes moral or legal
minimalism. Mutual dependence among human parties for Divine favor or punishment obligates
covenant love to be demonstrated beyond the letter of the law. (This is another expression of
federal liberty.) The resulting partnership, which views rights and liberties as a trust from God,
means that law comes through the covenant and even transcends the natural law. This is
particularly true after the covenant with Noah, according to Elazar. Implicit natural justice did
35
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not suffice prior to the flood. If it had, the wickedness which preceded it would not have been so
offensive as to warrant extensive judgment. The post-flood alternative was for God to explicitly
establish himself as the root of all justice, and charge mankind with enforcement of that justice.
Without faithful enforcement of this justice, persons risked divine sanction. After the Noahide
covenant, Elazar argues, natural justice becomes a moot question. 42
Elazar sees political covenanting serving three important functions which contrast it with
hierarchical or organic political orientations: a form of political conceptualization and mode of
political expression; as a source of political ideology; and as a factor shaping political culture,
institutions and behavior.43 Political covenanting is unique in its reconciliation of two goals of
political order: power and justice. Its conclusions and consequences are different from other
types of political organization.44 This reconciliation is enabled by unique political and social
traditions.45 A covenant is therefore more than an institutional or legal formulation. It becomes,
in short, a political and social worldview.46 Without this worldview, Elazar argues, certain
institutional dimensions of constitutionalism cannot succeed. This includes the separation of
powers, limited government, a jury system, and true federalism.47
Though not all covenanting societies have been Jewish or Christian, all had cultural or
perhaps even geographical characteristics that supported the voluntary act of covenanting. Many
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were involved in migration and/or had borderlands of cultural contact and interaction.48 Most
covenanting peoples first possessed and sustained a culture of political oaths before covenanting
was understood as a religious doctrine.49 Elazar argues that covenanting societies must also
possess texts to reflect their political ideals and vocabulary together with the figures, events and
concepts which embody that tradition.”50 The cultural influences of such a covenanting culture
may often persist long after explicit covenanting practices fade.51
Elazar argues that cultural traditions and worldview are the key determinants in whether
or not the institution of covenanting can take root.52 Old Testament covenanting borrowed from
regional cultural custom. Areas of modern covenanting embraced some critical amount of
covenantal (Reformed) theology.53 Insofar as this theological movement looked back to Hebrew
political ideas, there was hope for covenanting. Where Greek and Roman political ideas
prevailed, however, hierarchical and organic political organizations were prominent.54
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Within Protestantism, covenant theology is found mainly in Reformed churches.55 It is
not historically characteristic of Lutheranism or non-Puritan Anglicanism, particularly as a form
of political theory. In Lutheran theology, for example, the covenant is entirely a covenant of
grace wherein partners have no power to accept or adhere to the terms of God’s favor. It is a free
gift of God obtained through the Word and Sacraments. Thus, the covenant has little political
significance. Traditional Anglicanism, whose theology was only partially caught up in the
theological swell of Calvin, Zwingli or their allies, was also more conformist and hierarchical
than its Puritan dissenters desired. Puritans also dissented from Anglican practices of ceremony
and liturgy.56 Thus, there is something of an autonomous Reformed tradition wherein “modern”
(or early modern) covenanting thrives
The strongest covenantal expressions were found in Presbyterian and Congregational
churches. Elazar argues that this was due to their particular theology, which emphasized the role
of participation of persons in the work of God through the covenant. Elazar writes, “For the
mainstream of Reformed Protestantism, however, covenant was covenant in the true sense
whereby humans had to accept it and enter into a commitment to undertake God’s tasks and will
as His partners.”57 Simultaneous with this was a belief in Divine sovereignty (through
Predestination) and human depravity. On the surface, this might seem to be a contradiction of the
idea of human responsibility in the covenant. Depravity may make persons unwilling, or God
may be unwilling to overcome this depravity by Divine sovereignty. Elazar insists that while
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Divine sovereignty may have provided important problems for theologians, it was not terribly
problematic for Reformed political theorists as practitioners.58 (I will pursue this question at
length in Section III.) According to Elazar, covenant theology contributed to the movement for
limited government and political equality. He writes, “It is a historical fact that those groups that
accepted the covenant theology and made it the cornerstone of their faith were also the groups
that became committed earliest to human liberty and contributed most to its advancement.”59
The revolutionary nature of the Reformation was invaluable for the spread of political
covenanting. In the vacuum created by the rejection of anything associated with Rome,
particularly by the Reformed movement, this new theology was articulated at length and with
great import. Reformers found covenant theology in the Bible beginning with Adam, and it was
understood to extend to every area of life.60 Politically, covenantalism enabled a way to reorder
civil society against centralization, monarchy, and other forms of hierarchy prominent in
Europe.61 The nature of covenanted partners, distinct yet joined, enabled a reformulation of
church-state relations.62 Political order was also viewed as a matter of calling rather than simply
one dictated by nature. Rulers and citizens were understood to possess a vocational calling with
clear obligations to God and to one another.63 Rulers possessed sovereignty entrusted to them by
God and by the people. Each citizen became an obliged member of an association of
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associations.64 Johannes Althusius in his Politica Methodice Digesta (1603) best articulated the
idea of joining groups of associations into a body politic.65 Variations existed among the
covenant theologians, but the dominant articulations of the covenant were those of Bullinger and
Calvin.66
5.4 Consequences of Transition from Covenant to Compact and Contract
Today, the “strong” covenanting of the Hebrews or the Protestant Reformers takes place
only in church polities. Only the weaker political themes and culture of covenanting survive
outside church polities. In areas where strong and explicit covenantalism once ruled the political
landscape, there now exist only the weakest forms of covenantalism. These, Elazar and his
colleagues argue, are reflected in modern formulations of constitutionalism. Can one then say
that political covenanting has been lost, or simply modified? The answer to this question must
determine what distinguishes strong covenantalism from its weaker forms. It must also examine
the historical reality of how this change took place. Are the historical benefits of the covenant
maintained by contemporary consensual politics even if the argument for consent has changed?
Elazar addresses these questions with both hope and skepticism.
Every covenant involves, consistent with the Biblical idea, both separation and unification.67
Though these are concepts designed to communicate the way in which parties to the covenant are
both free and joined in community, Elazar applies this separation and unification idea to the
history of political covenanting. Elazar sees the covenant tradition as undergoing three
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separations. The first is the separation between Judaism and Christianity. The second is between
Christianity and Reformed Christianity. The third is the separation between “Jewish and
Christian covenantalists and believers in a secular compact.”68 This last separation is a
monumental shift from which reunification may not be possible. Elazar writes of these
separations, “Each established a stream of covenant tradition of its own, even as its predecessors
persist as living streams, with the several streams reconnecting from time to time at crucial
moments in human history.”69 While the metaphor is indeed illustrative, it seems to deflect the
severity of the change.
Elazar offers a persuasive argument for the survival of covenantalism when it is
contrasted with competing models. Consent and law on the covenantal model, and not the
Athenian model, is perhaps the healthiest surviving element of pre-modern politics. The
covenant, argues Elazar, builds a bridge between the pre-modern and post-modern epochs. It
may even provide the origin and basis for much of modern political theory, including
constitutionalism. This is discernable not only in institutions but also in political culture. As
evidence for this claim, Elazar cites the success that modern constitutionalism has enjoyed in
countries with a Reformation covenantal tradition versus those dominated by contrasting
political or religious traditions.70
What of the modifications to the covenantal tradition? It has been replaced by
constitutionalism and does not exist in its original form. As Elazar argues, “As constitutionalism
has spread, covenantalism seems to have retreated.”71 The change is most evident in the loss of
68
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explicitly religious language in modern constitutionalism. This can be called the “secularization”
of the covenant. At first, God was seen as a party to the political covenant. Then, God was seen
as the overseer of the covenant though not a direct party. Finally, in the weakest expression of a
divine covenant, the human parties to the covenant were seen to possess a power or end
consistent with the Divine Will. Elazar respects the practical difficulty of articulating God’s
direct participation in a pluralistic culture. But he still insists that some remnant of this
expression must remain in order for the traditional functions of covenanting to remain. What
Elazar means by that is unclear. The only relevant point that Elazar makes quite clearly is that he
does not see all expressions of divinity in covenantal variants being equal. He asserts, “There
seems to be little question that the full power of the covenant grows out of a political theology
emphasizing the first perspective, that of covenant as having its ultimate source in the will of
God.”72 But even where secularization persists, a “residue of religious commitment remains a
powerful force and magnet shaping political culture and behavior.”73 Only in France, for
example, has a truly secular model of consent emerged. Even so, one must still press the question
and ask how long covenantal culture and behavior can survive in a “contractual” political
regime.
Elazar recognizes that the loss of the Divine partner may represent both progress and
failure. A secularized covenanting process may enable a broader acceptance and use of
consensual politics, but it does not satisfy the same needs that a religious approach does. He
makes this very clear at the close of his study:
The rather denatured pact-making that represents the covenantal tradition in most
of the world today is undoubtedly a step forward. It may well be a way to
72
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preserve peace in a world as diverse in its ideas, expectations, and cultures as
ours. Nevertheless, it cannot go beyond that. In order to build a world whose
character is of the higher order, however, people must return to covenant in its
original meaning…. Humans must strive to live up to the terms of the covenant,
but the repair can only be made when God does His part as well, something which
only the right human striving can bring Him to do.74
This would seem to indicate that while Elazar is not suggesting a return to Hebrew or Reformed
covenanting, the Divine party to the covenant must be made more explicit again. But how is this
done? Elazar is unclear. He does assert that he is not arguing for a return to the “old-time
religion” (as he puts it) but rather to what brought about the religious devotion in the first place
and what gave it its compelling character.75 What Elazar means by this is also unclear, but
perhaps one can conclude that he is alluding to a sense of shared moral purpose among the
partners. This is not the full purpose and expression of the covenant, because it avoids the Divine
lawgiver. But it is more orthodox than simply emphasizing consent without a moral dimension.
Better to focus on the purpose of the covenant, its moral expression, than simply its method,
which is consent. Full covenanting must be true to both purpose and method.76 Elazar argues that
one can be covenantal in method but without the corresponding belief in God. That misses the
proper purpose, however. Elazar defines the full expression of the covenant as
[A] theo-political idea . . . resting on a belief in God and in a firm moral order
derived from that belief. . . . The human covenants with God not only establish
that moral order, but provide for human liberty in the form of federal liberty. . .
.In this framework, all of the better part of life is organized through covenants
subsidiary to the great covenant with God and life. . . . Where covenant lacks the
full theo-political dimension but serves as the foundation of society, society is
organized through a covenant or covenants which, while lacking an intense belief
in God, are often derivative from covenant as a theo-political idea once removed. .
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. . Covenant may not be the formal organization of society, but it may be used as a
method of political and social organization.77
The loss of explicitly religious language and understanding undermines a cornerstone of
covenanting: shared purpose and vision.
This invites an important question, and it is implicit in Elazar’s analysis. Can similar
vision and purpose be recovered in a secular age? Again, Elazar is unclear. He suggests that civil
societies can be reinvented on a similar basis.78 But he does not clearly spell out what that
means. To complicate the question, Elazar notes that while the call for moral reformation was a
source of the covenant’s original vision, it was also the cause of its downfall. Elazar writes that
Reformed Protestantism valued liberty and equality, but achieved them through institutions that
were “insufficiently broad or free” or else demanded an impossibly high standard of behavior
that the vast majority of people could not succeed. Thus,
It remained for the new science of politics and its developers and exponents, who
began with a very secular, if equally pessimistic, approach to human nature (the
development of which Reformed Protestantism actually facilitated) to provide not
only a bridge but a more satisfying framework for political theory and practice,
both of which drew on covenant ideas in new ways.79
But was the new science broadening the covenant for the sake of its survival, or was it
terminating its essential qualities to replace it with a fundamentally new formulation of consent?
It would seem that the loss of the calls to both moral reformation and divine partnering should
signify the end of the covenant.
With the loss of moral reformation comes a reformulation of the functions of
government. Elazar writes, “The modern polity became a state designed to provide security and
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services to its inhabitants rather than to motivate them by a compelling vision that obligated
them in someway. In place of solidarity came an emphasis on individualism and individual selfexpression.”80 The theme of a cultural and ethical shift is found throughout Elazar’s discussion
of the transition away from explicit covenanting, and he is clearly critical of the shift. It caused
covenantal commonwealths to become civil societies and later, social contracts.81 The purpose
and function of the state changed when the two essential elements of strong covenanting were
lost. One must ask here: if the practical consequences of covenanting are lost, how can one say
that the covenant remains in any form?
Of the new “compact” theory, Elazar is at once both ecumenical and critical. He sees
compacting as within the covenantal tradition, but yet distinct from covenanting primarily by its
secular nature. Elazar suggests that the covenant does not become lost altogether in compacting,
but that elements of it become integrated into new theories of civil society. Elazar writes, “In
many respects the modern epoch brought with it a secularization of the covenant tradition as the
aspirations to achieve a covenantal commonwealth gave way to the aspiration to achieve a civil
society.”82 This civil society was not without covenantal elements, however. Referring back to
his conceptualization of covenantalism suffering three major separation periods, Elazar writes,
Potentially, the conflict between secular compact theorists and religious
covenantalists should have been hardly less than that between Christianity and
Judaism. In fact, despite the potential for conflict on the theoretical plane, the two
came together so well in the practical application as to paper over real conflicts
until the die was cast one way or the other, usually in the secular way.83
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In the case of early America, Elazar sees the two woven together such that a choice between
covenant and compact was not forced.84 Secular theory was “closely intertwined” with Christian
covenantalism in America. Elazar writes, “If it was in the United States that the secular theory
took wing, it was never without being closely intertwined with Reformed Christian tradition.
Thus, the history of American politics reflects the dominance of neither covenant nor compact,
but the interaction between the two.”85
Elazar looks to the modern trend of democratic republics as demonstration of the triumph
of covenantal principles now secularized.86 He yokes the two justifications together in a
statement that can only be described as inclusive but imprecise in helping to sort out the various
streams of covenanting, its modification and influence. Elazar writes,
The justification for the republican revolution was drawn directly and explicitly
from the covenant idea in either its religious or secular form; that is to say, either
because God, in establishing His covenant with humanity, rejected tyranny as a
violation of the terms of that covenant, or because autonomous humans came
together in political covenants or compacts to form civil society in order to protect
themselves from the terrors of living in a state of nature and to gain the benefits of
association on the basis of mutuality. In essence, covenants or compacts created
the publics out of which republics could be constructed.87
Republicanism is thus, Elazar argues, the triumph of consent, common to all its variations:
covenant, compact and contract. Historically, Elazar is correct. Democratic societies have been
formed on both compacting and covenanting (and even contracting) theories. But consent is
simply the lowest common denominator of these traditions against organic or hierarchical forms
of organization. In order to argue the triumph of covenantal political theory, one would have to
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reduce it to its lowest common denominator. One would also have to accept Elazar’s claim that
political theories should be distinguished based on these common denominators of being organic,
hierarchical or consensual (covenantal). Elazar himself cannot seem to draw a conclusion here.
He writes,
Once an idea becomes all things to all men, it ceases to be effective as an idea.
The history of modern times is as much a history of the perversion of covenant as
a political idea as of its triumph, of its exploitation for covenantally illegitimate
ends, its distortion to justify those ends, and usually covenantally illegitimate
means to achieve them.88
The success of the main virtues of the covenant, its divine and moralistic elements, also becomes
the story of its failure. This is a perplexing conclusion and does not determine to what degree
covenanting (in method, practice and consequence) is merely modified or lost altogether.
Elazar seems both optimistic and pessimistic for the future of the covenantal tradition.
Even though the covenantal commonwealth is forgotten in the new liberal democracies, Elazar
argues hopefully, “The covenantal foundations remain and manifest themselves in those very
polities even in unexpected ways in every generation.”89 Part of this manifestation is evidenced
in the new language of political theory: foedus, pactum or pactio, confederatio, contractus and
consocentio. Part of it is found in the theme of “deliverance” in both covenantal theology and
social contract theory.90 Part of it is to be found in the understanding of rights as liberties integral
with justice and moral duties.91 Part of it is found in the moderate egalitarianism characteristic of
modernity’s rejection of organic and hierarchal arrangements.92
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However much these themes may reflect a covenantal past, their new articulators no
longer explicitly recognize that ancestry.93 And what’s more, there are seemingly new
formulations of civil society that contest or reject altogether the covenantal traditions. Elazar
laments what he sees as an obsession with “property rights” and the elevation of the right of
contract.94 He writes, “Going hand in hand with the special status of property rights was the
elevation of the right of contract to the same status, a further step away from the spirit of
covenant in favor of a narrow self-interest-based contractual spirit in civil society.”95 Elazar
favors neither the new postbellum American capitalism nor the rise of welfare entitlements,
arguing that the emphasis on self-interest or positive rights is inconsistent with understanding
society as mutually binding relationships.96 In the end, it seems as though covenant without
transcendent divine or moral elements ceases to be a covenant at all. Elazar argues, “When
covenantal arrangements have been reduced to mechanism they offer much less to the people
who use them. Often they degenerate to window dressing.”97
Nevertheless, Elazar argues, the descendants of these covenantal societies will probably
continue to succeed. In spite of having fewer moral and religious strictures, they recognize the
limitations of human society. It may sound as if Elazar is essentially making a pragmatic
argument here. But Elazar’s understanding of human nature is informed explicitly by political
theology. Sacrifices of natural liberty enable greater federal liberty under God.98 As long as that
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foundation remains, Elazar believes, liberty remains. When this theo-political foundation is
completely gone, Elazar argues, that political liberty will go with it. He writes, “I would posit
that if and when none of it would remain, the people, the civil society and its polity would cease
to be covenantal, cease to enjoy federal liberty, and in the end, cease to enjoy liberty at all.”99
Elazar argues that the acknowledgment of divine authority and a vision of a moral political
community are the catalysts rather than the enemies of liberty. He writes,
Paradoxically, for humans to be able to take matters into their own hands and give
them due reflection to make proper choices, they need to recognize the true
Sovereign Power of the universe who under normal circumstances is hidden from
them in its majesty. Politically this has the advantage of removing ultimate
sovereignty from any human agency and locating it outside of the sphere of
human authority except insofar as God delegates sovereign powers to the people
through covenant. According to the Bible, He delegates those powers as a
necessary aspect of the governance of the universe. At the same time, the
discovery of those universal laws and divine commandments necessary for life
and for the right life also become possible through covenant and, more important,
exist in human reflection and choice, providing what humans cannot (have not
been able to) provide on their own.100
The quest for politics is, for Elazar, fundamentally a quest for meaning. This meaning is possible
only under God’s direction.
5.5 Conclusion
In the work of Daniel Elazar we see the most ambitious contemporary study of political
covenanting. Elazar provides extensive theoretical and historical treatment of the covenant
device in politics, particularly as it differs from what he calls hierarchical or organic forms of
organization. Elazar characterizes covenanted polities as distinguished by their emphasis on
morality, what Elazar (following Winthrop’s lead) calls “federal liberty.” This morality gives the
polity a shared teleology and binds its members into a community with equality. The covenant
99
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determines the form of the polity and gives it legal boundaries. It also gives rights and duties to
its members and limits the power of their rulers.
But Elazar’s work is inadequate on at least two important counts. While Elazar’s
treatment of Biblical covenants is extensive, his treatment of early modern and modern
covenanting sometimes lacks coherence. His history is so sweeping and ambitious that it
sometimes fails to provide a more careful theoretical structure. Most of Elazar’s treatment of the
Reformation is “second-hand,” failing to take into detailed account its particular members and
controversies. If one is going to determine the eventual trajectory of the covenant device and its
contribution to political theory, a more careful treatment must be provided. I take steps to rectify
that problem in this dissertation. Second, Elazar is vague in determining where covenanting ends
and where other forms of political organization begin. The survival of the covenant in the
modern (or post-modern era) is not the subject of this dissertation, but to answer the question, the
first three centuries of modernity must be more carefully analyzed. This dissertation will also
make a significant contribution to that study.
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CHAPTER 6
THE JEWISH POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF DAVID NOVAK
6.1 Introduction
In the current theoretical exploration of what the covenant means for politics, I turn now
to the work of David Novak. His work is particularly valuable for the questions at hand because
Novak has a keen interest in the political and social significance of covenants. He is also mindful
to contrast the covenant with other political orientations. In considering Novak‟s work, however,
I will have to take certain liberties with its application. Novak‟s study is centered on the divine
election of Israel. This election, Novak argues, refers only to Jews - though he is aware of
various Christian interpretations of that covenant.1
6.2 Communal Priority: Novak’s Narrow Application of the Covenant
Novak draws a clearer distinction than Elazar does between a covenant and a social
contract. In contrasting them, Novak is mindful of their respective political uses. Covenants are
associated with those in the Biblical narrative. Social contracts are the phenomena of democratic
polities. He argues that neither can be considered merely the evolutionary development of the
other.2 He writes,
It is quite easy to surmise that covenant (berit), which plays a central role in
scriptural revelation, is a form of the social contract so frequently discussed by
modern thinkers. When glancing at Biblical covenants from a modern perspective,
one could very well take the institution of covenant to be a precursor of modern
ideas of social contract formulated in the political theories of philosophers from
Hobbes to Rawls (and, perhaps, even earlier). Even now there are those who still
use the two terms “contract” and “covenant” interchangeably. But this is a serious
mistake if one takes the English term “covenant,” in its usual modern sense, to be
1
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a translation of the Hebrew term berit as it is used in Scripture. A covenant in its
original Hebrew sense is much more than a merely primitive contract, and a
contract is much less than a more highly developed covenant. Neither term can be
reduced to the other without great conceptual confusion. Contract and covenant
designate two different types of social, political, and legal relationships. The
confusion of covenant and contract arose in early modernity, and it has found its
way into some Jewish political theory as well. Those who mistake a covenant for
a contract inevitably overestimated the role of a social contract while
simultaneously underestimating the role of a covenant, at least as far as Judaism is
concerned. . . . Nevertheless, covenant and contract are not totally disparate since
contracts can be seen as emerging from covenants. The very priority of covenant
to contract within classical Jewish sources, beginning with Scripture, indicates
that there is a relationship between the two, not one of equality or identity but,
rather, a hierarchal relation.3
A proper approach to each, Novak argues, articulates the priority of covenants and social
contracts in establishing both communities and civil societies respectively.4 Contracts are to
work in the service of covenants.5 This is because, Novak argues, the regime under which one
lives is not one‟s ultimate destination.6 Novak is not making the argument that politics is
unimportant or that one has a heavenly citizenship that eclipses one‟s earthly citizenship. Rather,
he is arguing that religious association and community take ontological and historical priority
over citizenship. This gets to the heart of the tension that religious persons may feel under the
ascendancy of the modern nation state. Not only is there the question of where a person comes
from – the historical claim. There is also the ontological claim – who am I?
Novak argues that politics cannot take historical or ontological priority over community
identities – especially over religious identity. In modern political life, excessive claims may
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come from both either totalitarian or democratic directions. The totalitarian regime makes a
harsh ontological claim – demanding full ideological commitment and absolute subscription to
the exclusion of religious life. But a democratic regime can also make unacceptable demands,
particularly its demand for full subscription to the idea of pluralism. Such pluralism, discussed in
Chapter Thirteen, may marginalize rather than respect one‟s religious community. But Novak
argues that so long as pluralism‟s demands are not too strong, they can be successfully
negotiated.7 Novak asks the question bluntly, “How can I as a traditional Jew actively and
intelligently participate in my democratic polity?”8 This reinforces what his distinction that one is
a participant in, rather than a part of, a political community.9 One cannot sacrifice one‟s
religious/Biblical identity for one‟s identity in political society.
This is an important difference between Elazar and Novak. Whereas Elazar addresses the
covenant as a potentially universally accessible political device – a method for legal institution
and political conceptualization, Novak confines the covenant strictly to the Biblical covenants.
Unlike Elazar‟s political theory which articulated the theory of a political covenant in a way that
made its function essentially similar to that of a social contract (setting the terms of political
obligation within the community). Novak is asking about the place of the Biblical covenant in a
larger political society that will not or cannot covenant. Consistent with Novak‟s emphasis on
ontological priority, he does not have Elazar‟s ecumenical view of the covenant. The covenant
7
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that Novak addresses is the one described in the Biblical narrative as being made by God with
the Israelites at Sinai.10 Novak‟s desire is to demonstrate that an authentic social contract can be
activated out of the Jewish tradition.11 To summarize Novak‟s position on the possibility of
political covenanting, it is suitable for a Biblically-guided people, particularly the Jews. But it
cannot be applied to anyone else in any full sense. Those outside the Biblical tradition would
only be able to subscribe to social contracts.12
Novak‟s insistence on covenants taking priority over social contracts not only emphasizes
ontological priority and Novak‟s own convictions as a Jew. It also makes claims about what
should be true of any functioning social contract in respecting its members. Novak argues that in
any social contract, not just one in which Jews are participating, it is important to see that only
“full” persons are capable of agreeing to a social contract. These are persons who first “reside”
(in the fullest sense) in communities, primarily religious communities. There must be respect for
preexisting historical and ontological identities in any political arrangement. 13 Properly
understood from the necessary perspective of communities, we are “persons,” not
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“individuals.”14 This has universal anthropological import for any social contract theory; it is not
just confined to those adhering to a particular political theology. By emphasizing communal
priority, and the idea of “persons” rather than “individuals” entering the social contract, Novak is
emphasizing persons in terms greater than their rights. Though rights are exercised legally by
“individuals,” the moral context for those rights is learned in original communities. Morality
comes from communities, which cultivate and nurture the individual and put individual rights in
perspective.
This parallels what Elazar emphasizes about morality being an essential part of any
covenant, though not exactly. When Elazar argues that a covenant precedes a contract in the case
of some constitutions, he is referring to the moral vision that the covenant sets in view for the
subsequent contract. The larger community may then have a covenant and a contract. In Novak‟s
case, the covenant is something that a particular community has within the social contract.15 It
certainly precedes the contract (as in Elazar), but also takes clear priority. A community has its
own covenant, and is then viewed (as a community) participating in the political society. The
covenant is not a broader device for the society at large. Though Novak never uses the term
“federal,” that is essentially what his political vision is. Communities preserve their integrity
even while subscribing to larger political units.
Though Novak‟s discussion of covenanting applies uniquely to the Jewish sources and
traditions, one may still gain much from his study. Not everyone would confine the covenant to
the Biblical covenants, as demonstrated by the theoretical work of Elazar and his colleagues, and
by the historical arguments of the British and Americans. Thus, one can extrapolate from
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Novak‟s presentation so long as one admits that Novak himself has not necessarily approved of
all the applications. In the sections that follow, I will not only present some of Novak‟s insights
into the covenant, I will expand on them in the effort to advance the larger inquiry into political
theology and covenanting in particular.
6.3 Covenants and Contracts Defined
Like Elazar, Novak offers a fivefold definition of a covenant.16
(1) A covenant is a perpetual relationship of mutual trust between two persons,
who are either individual, collective or both. (2) The terms of the covenant are
stipulated by the initiating party for the party who accepts them; they are not
negotiated between the parties. (3) Violation of covenantal stipulations does not
terminate the covenant either automatically or by decree from a third person; it
only entitles the offending person to demand rectification from the offending
person, or from a third party. (4) The covenant cannot be terminated even by
subsequent mutual agreement of the covenanting persons. (5) The covenant
cannot be terminated by any subsequent event that might happen to the
covenanting persons, short of the permanent disappearance of one or both
persons.17
Note the important differences with Elazar‟s definition. Elazar simply articulated the terms
which are negotiated between two parties. Not only is the covenant not negotiated, according to
Novak, it cannot be dissolved. It is perpetual.18 There are no “exit clauses.”19 That is true for
both God, who elects the covenanted people, and the people themselves - even if they are
unfaithful.20 Novak notes the important differences with a contract as follows:
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(1) A contract is not perpetual; it can be negotiated for a finite period of time. It
has both a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem. (2) A contract has conditions
negotiated by the parties themselves that, if violated, automatically terminate the
contract. (3) A contract can be terminated by subsequent agreement between the
parties, even without violation of prior conditions by either party. (4) A contract
can be terminated by subsequent accidents beyond the control of either party. (5)
The parties to a contract function as equals, at least as far as the contract is
concerned.21
(This is closer to Elazar‟s definition of a covenant, though not the same in many respects.)22
Novak‟s definition of contract is distinguished from a covenant by its conditionality and
negotiability.
Novak argues that only two Biblical cases are pure covenants (ha-berit). These are the
Noahide covenant and the Sinaitic covenant. The first is made with mankind. It is the assurance
of justice to all persons.23 The second is made with Biblical Israel. Both are everlasting.24 Any
further covenants, whether made with or between Jews or not, require one of these two
covenants as past or background, foundation or ground, future or foreground.25 The Noahide
covenant, while a very valuable legal and moral tool, is much different from the covenant at
Sinai. Whereas the Sinai covenant established a covenanted community by direct revelation, the
Noahide covenant is an indirect revelation that merely serves as a common guarantee of human
justice. It is akin to what philosophers have called the natural law. But however valuable the
Noahide law is (and Novak values it much more than Elazar), it is not sufficient for culture or
21
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community. This is because the Noahide law (or natural law) establishes no relationship with
God. By this, Novak means not simply that it fails to establish moral boundaries for a
relationship.26 Instead, it is through direct revelation from God that one establishes communal
history and festivals.
General human experiences cannot serve as the basis of celebration or history.27
Celebration and history require particular experiences of a particular people. This particular
history often takes the form of miracles.28 Experiencing and interpreting those miracles marks a
key difference between the universalizing, scientific homogeny of the Enlightenment cosmology
and the particular, historical Biblical cosmology. Hume, for example, serves as a representative
of the Enlightenment cosmology. He defines a miracle by its “supernatural” quality, which (as he
claims) violates the “laws” of nature.29 He prejudicially dismisses any function for miracles as a
relational device, making any relational significance subservient to its validity as phenomena. By
contrast, Novak sees the Biblical miracles for the revealed and relational qualities. It is the voice
of God.30
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On the subject of human covenants, Novak argues that while God must minimally be seen as a witness who
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For a Biblical demonstration of the Noahide covenant as a legal and moral (and political)
device, Novak cites the inter-human covenant between Abimelech and Abraham in Genesis. The
applicative value of this case is limited, however, because it was in the time of the patriarchs and
prior to the Sinai covenant. Nevertheless, it serves to show the foundational value of the Noahide
covenant. Abimelech and Abraham joined as political equals forming a bilateral pact or trust.
The covenant negotiated between them determined the conditions that enabled them to live in
peace with one another.31 They also share a universal moral law though they do not share the
same theology. Abimelech invokes the universal name of God, not the name of the God who
shared a unique covenant with Israel (YHWH). Novak writes, “Abraham‟s willingness to pray
for Abimelech (Genesis 20:17), and his willingness to covenant with him (Genesis 21:32),
indicate that both of them occupy a common moral universe, and as such, they can live together
in an ongoing political relationship.”32 By contrast, Abraham could not covenant with the king of
Sodom because of the kingdom‟s excessive sin.33 Novak argues that in such cases (Sodom or the
Hittites), Abraham can only arrange commercial transactions.34 It is also fundamentally
impossible for Jews to covenant with gentile polytheists. Only gentile monotheists can share
theological commonality with Jews.35
Novak argues that the closest thing to a bilateral covenant after Sinai is found between
King Solomon and Hiram, king of Tyre (in I Kings 5:26). There is no real equality in this
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covenant, however.36 It was an arrangement of expediency and similar to other covenants made
between stronger and weaker parties wherein one was Jew and the other gentile. In some cases,
the elect nation was the weaker party. (This was the case in the covenant with the Babylonian
king and the royal Judean stock.)37 These inter-human covenants did not establish a unified
community, which would have required a common historical revelation that did not exist. No
universal cultural border could be created by these covenants. After the Sinai covenant, which
distinguished the revelation of the Jews from all general human revelation, only the messianic
Zion can establish a universal cultural border.38
In order to have a universal culture and community, there needs to be a universal
language rooted in direct revelation and liturgy. Thus, while the universal Noahide covenant
makes lawful relations possible, it is not enough to establish full community. 39 Any attempt at a
universal language or community apart from direct revelation becomes idolatry – a “selfdivinization of the people” like the one at Babel.40 Novak sounds an indirect note against later
political triumphalism, both Protestant and secular, when he writes,
A monoculture for all humankind inevitably requires a process of elimination: the
enslavement or extermination of all those who do not quickly fit the mold of the
dominant, universalizing, or totalizing culture. After Babel, Abraham and Isaac
and Jacob well understood the possibilities and limitations of transnational
covenants initiated by the children of Adam and Eve. They were attempting to
survive in the world, not redeem it by themselves.41
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The all-inclusive national covenant is initiated only by divine election, not by inter-human
agreement.42 Because this revelation or election cannot be controlled by human persons, the
Jewish people can only assert a trust to keep the Torah safe until the messianic time. Judaism is,
as Novak notes, not an evangelical religion.43
6.4 The (In)sufficiency of Nature: Natural Law and Natural Right
As we will see in later chapters, the status of natural law and natural right is important for
any integration or implementation of political theology into broader political theory. Natural law
and natural right can provide a bridge between a covenanted community and the broader social
contract. It provides a broad language for Western political theory. It must then be asked what a
covenantal politics thinks of natural law and natural right. If one means by “natural,” only what
is known by unaided reason, then these concepts would seem to be minimalist or reductionist by
the standard of a revealed political theology. By definition, a revealed theological tradition
should articulate a legal tradition that goes above and beyond what is merely apparent by natural,
unaided reason. Natural law or right would serve only as a minimum standard. A revealed
theology would argue that the Biblical law supplements and enhances the natural law. It
improves upon general revelation.44
The basis of natural law is the revelation of God, but what is meant by revelation must be
clearly understood. Novak agrees that natural law is promulgated by God; the question is exactly
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how God‟s voice is heard. Novak argues that natural law cannot be confused with direct
revelation, which is akin to positive law in that it is known to a singular community at a definite
point in history. In the case of natural law, God‟s voice is mediated by the universal nature of
persons and the universal claims made by them. That establishes the universal morality. The
justice of these claims comes from what God commands by his creation. Novak writes, “Human
dignity, both personal and communal, reflects the voice of God through the real voices of the
humans who make their natural claims upon us here and now.”45 Human claims are just insofar
as they reflect the imago or imitatio Dei.46 Thus, while there is a natural law, it is an indirect
form of revelation that distinguishes it from revealed law.
Whether or not it is possible to establish a political society on natural law alone is quite
another question. It certainly would provide a common moral ground for parties to any social
contract.47 The Noahide law, established in the Noahide covenant after the Flood, provides
essential social prohibitions. It is necessary for any human community. But it is not sufficient for
what Novak calls “deep cultural existence.”48 This can only come from the Mosaic Torah. That
is, the failure of the Noahide law is not that its morality is insufficient to restrain or encourage an
orderly or just human society. Rather, it does not fulfill the deepest human communal needs. The
Noahide law serves an important function in regulating unethical excesses and guiding
legislation in any absence of revealed commandments. It guides Jewish-gentile interaction and
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any other social contracts. But while it serves as a necessary moral foundation, it cannot serve as
anything other than a formal and abstract guide. 49
Understood merely as “natural morality,” it does not constitute any real community in the
world, nor can it limit the power of the state. Novak writes,
Natural morality does not itself, however, constitute any real community in the
world. It cannot provide real communal priority for those living under the rule of
any human regime. This is why it cannot really limit the extension of state power,
which is the greatest power humans have ever devised for themselves. Natural
morality can only suggest certain internal restraints within the powerful existence
of the state itself. But only a real historical covenant, concretely affirming its past,
present, and future, provides its members enough wherewithal to participate in a
social contract without being totally enveloped by the state that any social
contract has created.50
This is a significant justification for covenantal political theory; communities require not simply
law, but also morality. That is particularly true if the community seeks liberty. But preserving
liberty against the overextension of the civil law and magistrate requires more than the assertion
of transcendent moral abstractions. It requires the moral claims of community to be considered
prior to the demands of political society. When human enforcement is too much, impersonal
institutions displace personal interaction. When enforcement is too little, protective institutions
are eclipsed by personal interaction. Institutions or interactions can subvert God‟s authority.
Novak argues, “Only when God‟s authority is presented in the covenant do the lesser authority of
society and the lesser authority of the individual person find their rightful places respectively and
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their rightful correlation one with another.”51 This will be a key point in the development of
Protestant resistance theory under covenant theology, though it will take the form of a more
explicit political theory.
When civil society is understood to come directly from a state of nature, the priority of
civil society is misunderstood. Such a misunderstanding would emphasize general justice, but
fail to establish a community. The Jewish alternative places the life mediated by the Torah in
between these two conditions; it recognizes civil society not as the teleological conclusion of
rights already known in the state of nature but instead as something that comes only after the
establishment of real moral community. The Noahide law, which provides foundational and
common human morality, is necessary but not sufficient for human community. It is the
covenanted community that serves as the next place for persons who leave the “state of nature”
as represented by the Noahide law. This serves to protect the rights of both God and His
people.52 Novak writes,
Any Jew who has not been fully socialized in the covenant enters a social contract
– even with his or her fellow Jews – naked and vulnerable to whatever use or
misuse those in political power hold in store. . . . Therefore, contrary to
Mendelssohn‟s convoluted notion of the covenant, only a covenantal life that
sufficiently intends its present and future as well as its past is both adequate to the
evidence of Scripture and Jewish tradition and sufficient to enable Jews to
honestly participate in and benefit from any social contract.53
(It is important to emphasize here that God also has rights under the covenant, and these rights
are more perfect than those exercised by the state. They are unconditional, unlike contract rights
which are negotiated and conditional.)
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Novak emphasizes morality as “positive commands” rather than simply “negative
commands.” The problem with the Noahide covenant is that it simply serves as a set of negative
commands. It sets limits and provides boundaries, but is not inherently relational.54 It provides
fear but not love. Only through positive commandments, which are expressions of love, is a
community created. Thus, while the Noahide law, which is the Biblical foundation of the divine
law, can guard against disorder and thus provide the minimal boundaries for a society, it cannot
be the basis for a community. Communities must be relational. Their interaction must transcend
merely guards against disorder – negative commandments. It must provide more than “thou shall
not.” Covenantal political theory is concerned with much more than simple justice or order. It
believes in the possibility of community. It must provide positive commands (what one ought to
do). These positive commands should be addressed not simply to individuals, but to persons
linked to one another by communal identity and revelation. In Novak‟s political theology, such a
possibility is confined only to the Jewish community because they alone are the object of direct
revelation.
But what if revelation is considered to be potentially extended to all - an evangelical
vision? What then is the consequence for political theory? This Christian view of revelation will
present its own set of challenges, as I will argue in future chapters. If God‟s particular revelation
can now be seen as extended to all persons, this will mean that it is possible to establish a much
larger political community – not merely the society of communities that Novak is bound by
exclusive Judaism to prescribe. But what happens when everyone within that political
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community does not subscribe to the particular revelation? This is the challenge taken up in later
chapters.
6.5 Rights and Duties
We come next to Novak‟s critique of natural rights – both ancient and modern. Novak
never denies the necessity of “natural rights” in the covenant. To the contrary, he argues that
because rights are not the achievement of modern politics, the Biblical tradition has much to
contribute to modern “rights talk.”55 This Biblical contribution can help to resolve differences
between “liberals” and “communitarians,” offering solutions where opposing ideologies can only
see part of the challenge.56 Liberalism emphasizes rights to a fault while communitarians
emphasize duties to a fault.57
Novak goes so far as to argue that a Biblical theory of rights is actually a means of
resuscitating and rescuing the better aspects of modern natural right from the critique of classical
natural law. Novak wants to argue that this notion of “rights” (which is historically a modern
phenomenon) has a place in the Jewish political tradition, though not as moderns have articulated
or justified them.58 Rights in the modern sense are inextricable from the personal subject and
object of a claim. This personal locus, Novak argues, makes the modern concept attractive to a
Biblically based theology. This is because the Biblical (and rabbinic) teaching sees persons as
irreducible entities. The Biblical natural law also keeps the person from becoming an idol, falling
into the trap of subjective autonomy (as in some variants of social contract theory) or self-
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transcendent creation (as in the case of Kantian ethics). This is what Novak criticizes as the
“ethics of aspiration.” Philosophically, one might ask the question this way: How does one
regulate oneself if the good, which must be justice in politics, is not external to the self and its
projects? Theologically, this justice must be transcendent (God). It cannot be the mere
hypostatization of abstract states of being. This includes, for example: self-fulfillment, moral
creativity, theoretical goods, or other things from which norms are deduced.
Novak argues that it is more philosophically cogent to see the source of rights as norms in
the “transactional claims of real persons to one another in the world.”59 Novak argues that the
Biblical view of justice restores balance to the ancient and modern views of natural right.60 He
writes, “This view of justice (mishpat) combines the strengths of the ancient notion of “Right”
(dike) with the modern notion of rights (droits). Like the ancient notion, its range is cosmic; like
the modern notion, its locus is personal.”61 The normative label “good” thus functions as a
qualification to describe transactions. It is not a proper name (the Good) nor is it the basis of a
heuristic desire for God. We do what is good, as God calls, because of a responsive desire for
God.62 It is not a function of our own striving for some individual condition.63
Novak‟s alternative is to look to two basic norms within Judaism: (1) What is hateful to
yourself, do not do to someone else; (2) You shall love your neighbor as yourself. He writes,
“Each norm prescribes the right I want others to dutifully fulfill for me, which in turn is the duty
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others want me to rightfully fulfill for them.”64 He also cites Maimonides, who argues for the
avoidance of mutual harm coupled with the pursuit of mutual benefit.65 Denying the right to do
harm is certainly not unique to Judaism, but there also exists the unique attachment to duties.
Novak argues that rights must be rooted in duties to others, including God. Rights are a means to
a dutiful end. What‟s more, the command to do no harm and to love one‟s neighbor should not
be conflated. Novak argues, “One, the desire to be loved is certainly deeper than the desire not to
be harmed. Two, the range of no harm is wider than the range of love.”66 That love is both
horizontal (toward others in the covenant) and vertical (toward God).67 Unlike minimalist social
contract thinking, which extends to what is at most goodwill and tolerance for the sake of safety,
the covenant is the way of shalom.
The key to a covenantal view of rights is to emphasize that God is the basis of authority
over all rights and duties. It is from neither the individual (autonomy) nor the community
(heteronomy) that one‟s rights are derived. It is from God that one learns to love.68 It is also in
response to God that one expresses one‟s love for others.69 It is our inequality before God that
emphasizes our equality with one another.70 It is God‟s rights which root any “rights talk” in
Judaism at all. Whereas basic rights are rooted in prior duties, those duties (in the covenant) are
based on God‟s primordial right as the Creator. That right has no duty underlying it. God‟s right
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creates our duties. Those duties create our rights. The duties that God asks, His covenantal
claims, are the basis of His response to us. By doing our duties and respecting God‟s claims on
us, we respect God‟s right. This gives legitimacy and dignity to our rights, Novak argues. A right
must be justified in a total scheme of things: initially, the created order of nature and, finally, the
covenantal order of the Torah. Covenantal rights are not coequal with one‟s will; Novak writes,
“This ignores the truth that there is much more to human life than human will can ever effect, let
alone accomplish.”71 Rights are gifts of God in the context of the covenanted community.72
Novak sees non-covenantal theories of natural right as being insufficient because they
lack the context of a voice, of a relationship. He writes,
In that view, there is no primary voice, but only a vision of a polity that might
conform to a higher paradigm in the heavens. It is duty without an originating
right/claim, for such a right/claim cannot be imagined, only heard. The Jewish
covenantal tradition, with its attendant legal system of Halakhah, is the best
example of a historical community where the correlation of rights and duties and
duties and rights seems to be without exception. As we shall see in greater detail,
rights generate duties inasmuch as claims generate responses in a way that duties
do not generate rights. For responses cannot generate the claims made prior to
them for them. However, we must see in far greater detail that the notion of rights
defended in this book is beholden neither to notions of social contract nor to
notions of moral creativity nor to notions of personal autonomy. Furthermore, if
one sees all three of these modern views as deconstructions of the Biblical
covenant, then one can very well retain the term and concept of rights by
returning to its original source and then develop the concept from that source and
not against it. The legacy of Athens is not the only alternative to the
individualistic and collectivist excesses of modernity. The voice from Jerusalem
makes its own alternative claims, claims that I am convinced are in truth
superior.73
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The Jewish theory is superior because it includes the rights not only of individuals, but also of
the community and God.74 All of these can be thought of as someone rather than something.
Only a someone can possess a right or a duty. Only persons have freedom to act and power to
make claims.75 In defining rights, Novak writes,
A right is not only a power; it is a politically structured claim that calls for duty
on the part of someone else. It is a power that cannot be directed to a totally inert
object. In order for there to be a right, there must be the possibility of an act of
duty in free response. A right can be exercised only in the context of a legal
system (Rechtsordnung), where both the rights holder and the duty holder are
active members, however much the rights holder is superior to the duty holder.76
The source of all rights and duties is thus the source of all power, God‟s absolute power. Unless
given a special status within Creation, persons would have no rights or duties. This is the
significance of persons being made in the image of God. Novak writes, “What does saying
„humans receive their reason or their will from God‟ add to the meaning of the proposition
„humans are rational or willful‟? These interpretations lose the intimacy of a relationship
between God and humans that is suggested by the opening words of God‟s creation of the human
being: „Let us make (na’aseh) humans in our image‟ (Genesis 1:26).”77 Thus, the political
prerogatives and obligations of persons are not merely extracted or derived from God. They are a
part of the divine-human relationship.
Covenantal political theory specifically asserts that communities have rights (and duties)
as well. This is not merely derived from a fallacy whereby something that inheres in a part
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inheres in the whole. There is no perpetual covenant with individuals from which such a
supposed community right could be assembled.78 Nor is the right of communities the result of a
democratic faith in “the people.” Rather, it is an expression of the anthropological principle
inherent in both experience and the Biblical narrative. It is a first principle of covenantal political
theory that though one can speak of individual persons in many legitimate and important senses,
there is no such thing as the individual having ontological priority before the community. That
implies a false dichotomy. Persons are always in community. More than this, the covenantal
relationship that persons have with God is a communal relationship. Novak writes,
The core of the covenant is not the relationship between God and the individual
human person; it is the relationship between God and the community he has
elected for this covenantal relationship. That is certainly clear from the teaching
of Scripture itself. Thus the covenant is what lies between God and us. But to
cogently retrieve the covenant at this point in history, we must be able to
intelligently explain how the covenant is not a diminution of the personal
relationship with God but, on the contrary, how it is the locus of a personal
relationship that far exceeds anything that could possibly transpire between God
and any lone individual.79
Part of Novak‟s justification for this claim concerns the role of both language and law. One
either sees language as the outer expression of thought or language internalized as thought. The
first is self-referential, and uses language only as a concession to the presence of other persons.
The second sees our life axiomatically as being in relationship with others and with God. In this
second understanding, thought is not simply a retreat away from the mundane character of social
existence. It is a necessary activity toward improving understanding and articulation. Self-retreat
is in the service of the social, not the reverse. To place things in a Biblical perspective and to
reduce the modern emphasis on individualized existence, Novak writes, “Human thought, unlike
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God‟s thought, is thus only deliberative, not creative. . . . The power of human thought – unlike
God‟s thought – is catalytic, not substantive.”80 Law then becomes related to the central
functions of language. It is both normative and communal. It is the language of a discursive and
moral community. It is also central to the covenant.81
The Biblical text speaks to the election of a people, not the election of individuals who
then join in a community.82 This means that the community has rights and correlative duties.
This avoids both the classical or modern suggestion of universal brotherhood (in which the
individual is lost) and the modern emphasis on individualism (in which the communal existence
of persons is lost). Novak is emphatic that this claim of a community right upon the individual is
not to be confused with collectivism, especially given the experience of Jews in collectivist
societies. He emphasizes that the community is the fulfillment of the definite need of her
members for her, not to see the community as the fulfillment of all human needs.83
The community does not assert its right in the same way that an individual might. The
community is not a “superperson.”84 Nor is the community merely an instrument for enforcing
the rights of individuals – an idea that would utilize the worst tendencies of both heteronomy and
autonomy. Returning to the idea of participation is the key. Insofar as human beings are natural
(and elected) participants in the community, the community has certain requirements that it must
impose upon its members. The rights of the community on the individual would include those
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things that concern the survival of the community, such as death (suicide, murder, war) or family
(including sexual relations and marriage).85 These are deeply communal concerns. In turn, the
individual may make claims on the community. These include protection from harm and public
assistance.86 Having rights and duties as a community also means being judged as a community,
particularly for the mistreatment of members. To be sure, the greatest indictment of the
covenanted community by the Biblical prophets was the perversion of rights and justice. This
was not a call only to uphold the rights of Jews, let alone Jews of status. It included the orphan,
widow, poor, and stranger.87 Compassion would extend to things such as the prohibition of
usury.88 What‟s more, the direction of community rights and duties is not only to God and the
fellow members. It is also to the other nations. The covenanted community is not just to conform
to key divine attributes of justice and compassion, but also to model these attributes for the other
nations. This extends beyond the general negative justice of the Noahide covenant. The
community must see justice as the source of greatness in the eyes of the world. Novak writes,
“Minimally, that would mean that God‟s relationship with this community results in a system of
law in which concern for human rights would impress anyone truly concerned with social justice.
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. . . Indeed, an important part of the messianic vision is that the nations of the world will
eventually come to Jerusalem for their claims to be adjudicated.”89
The final right to be considered, and it acknowledges rights of the individual, the
community, and God, is the right to civil disobedience. Cases of disobedience, resistance and
revolution vary in the traditions of Jewish and Christian Biblical theology. There is a wide range
of interpretations and applications of various Biblical episodes. (There is a diversity of historical
practice as well.) Novak addresses some of the Biblical episodes. In the prominent case of Moses
and the enslaved Israelites, Novak argues that this is a “power struggle,” wherein Pharaoh fails to
restore liberty previously taken from the Israelites. Novak argues, “Pharaoh‟s sin was not his
breach of the covenant with Israel but his interference in Israel‟s covenant with the Lord, its God.
But the Lord was fulfilling his own covenantal commitment – taken upon himself autonomously,
to be sure (Genesis 15:13-14) – to rescue his own people from Egyptian slavery. That slavery
was preventing them from responding to God‟s full covenantal claims on them.”90 A similar case
existed for Daniel. An important distinction, and one which will become very important during
the Reformation, is the question of political versus religious subordination. Novak argues that
Daniel was able to accept political subordination but not religious subordination. Whatever the
case, the covenanted people must avoid both idolatry and idolatrous sins even at the cost of
death. This means that they would rather die as martyrs than substitute the covenantal worship of
God with anything else. That also includes the practice of “idolatrous sins.”91
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The precise role of the covenant is important here. The obligations of the covenant are
what enable political insubordination. The Jews have both a right and a duty to serve God above
all others.92 But unlike the Christian interpreters, who may have worked from a position of
political majority or potential majority, the Jews almost always interpreted these passages from a
position of political subordination. Historically, their solutions were to pay lip service while
simultaneously subverting authority or to flee to more accommodating settlements. In only two
prominent cases was revolution attempted.93
6.6 Conclusion
Novak‟s study is a provocative presentation of how covenanted communities are
contrasted with both modern and ancient alternatives. In Novak‟s view, the covenant device is
limited to communities in the Biblical tradition, perhaps even just Jewish communities. God
creates the terms of the covenant and holds His covenanted communities accountable. This direct
revelation of God is morally superior to both natural law and natural right, though Novak argues
that natural law is a legitimate moral expression of the Noahide covenant and can serve as a
minimum for politics in social contract arrangements.
In Novak‟s view, covenants cannot be applied to civil polities at large. Civil polities can
utilize social contracts, which are very different than covenants. Social contracts are then made
up of communities and cannot supercede them. Individuals are first members of communities,
ideally covenanted communities, before they can be members of social contracts. It is in
communities that individuals become moral and mindful of their social obligations. Only through
the lens of community can individuals and political authorities be held accountable for the

92

That becomes especially problematic in nations with a divinized monarch. Novak, The Jewish Social Contract,
93-94
93

Ibid., 94-95

124

exercise of rights or the care of other members. Only through the lens of community can rights
and duties be properly understood.
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CHAPTER 7
REVIVAL OF THE COVENANT IN REFORMED THEOLOGY
7.1 Beginning with Theology
In Exodus and Revolution, Michael Walzer offers an insightful application of the Exodus
saga to various modern political movements, including the Puritans. Walzer is certainly right
when he argues that the themes of the Exodus – pharonic oppression, deliverance, Sinai and
Canaan - are at the foundation of many modern political movements.1 But his application to the
Puritans is inadequate. While it is largely true that one can call Puritan political theory
“judaized,” I don‟t think that the point of their judaizing is equivalent to other millenarian
movements nor can it be reduced to seeking a worldly kingdom.2 As I will argue in this and
succeeding chapters, the covenant was more than a vehicle for earthly dominion. Adhering to its
terms was a precondition for eternal life. Therefore, one must begin with their soteriology before
moving on to their eschatology. I offer an alternative in these chapters which considers their
theological commitments in the correct priority. In this chapter, my goal is to not only
summarize how one branch of the Protestant Reformation revived the Biblical idea of the
covenant, but how the various debates about theological covenants had both direct and indirect
implications for political theory.
7.2 Hebraic Christianity and Judaizers
For modern scholars like Walzer, the label “judaizer” may be simply a term of scholarly
classification. But during the Reformation, the charge of “judaizer” was a damning indictment.
When Samuel Rutherford‟s opponent, Bishop John Maxwell, wanted to heap scorn on the
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Puritans, he referred to them as “our Rabbis.”3 This was not just directed at the Puritans. “Judaizer”
was an insult commonly used by stripes of polemicist in the sixteenth century. Puckett quotes
Friedman as follows,
The Lutheran author Hunnius described John Calvin as a judaizer much as Calvin
believed Lutheran liturgy was highly judaistic. On the other hand, Roman Catholic
spokesmen thought Lutheran preoccupation with scriptural literalism was judaistic
while both Reformed and Lutheran thinkers assumed Roman Catholic interest in
ceremony and ritual reflected judaizing tendencies. Expressing a rare ecumenism,
all agreed that Michael Servetus was a severe judaizer by any and all standards. For
his part, Servetus lamented his being persecuted by judaizing Christians, Calvin in
particular.4
To appreciate the seriousness of the charge, one must recall the controversies in the Early Church,
whose leadership had to decide what to retain and what to reject from the longstanding Jewish
tradition. The resulting controversies are chronicled throughout the New Testament canon.5
In the minds of the Reformers, they were inspiring a break similar to the one between
Judaism to Christianity. That break obliged the Early Church to find new ways of interpreting the
Hebrew Scriptures. Those early Christians appearing to revive the Jewish traditions were
considered enemies to the new faith. Just as the first generations of Christians felt it necessary to
break with what they saw as an apostate and corrupt tradition, so the Reformers drew a parallel to
their own struggle with Roman Catholicism. Like the Early Church, the Reformers had canonical
texts but no clear hermeneutic. They no longer could implicitly trust the dogma that had governed
Biblical interpretation. No longer able to fully look to tradition to interpret the Biblical text, the
Protestants were now obliged to articulate a new hermeneutic and new theology.6 In the minds of
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its leaders, the Reformation was represented by its mottos Sola Gratia and Sola Fides. It meant
being freed, by grace, from works or from unnecessary rituals or intermediaries. Thus, anyone who
appeared to turn back the clock on this liberation could be charged with “judaizing.”
In the wake of the metaphysical and political revolution described by Voegelin, it was the
covenant, this Biblical model of “re-formation,” that filled the void for some of the Reformers. The
covenant succeeded by emphasizing both moral restoration (reform) and reconstituting (reforming)
political concepts. It helped that the covenant had fallen into disuse by the Medieval Church.7 The
Roman Catholic tradition‟s neglect of the covenant reinforced the Reformers‟ sense that they were
reviving the message of the Early Church and restoring the purity of Biblical Christianity.
7.3 The Sixteenth Century Covenant of Grace
It is often thought that the seminal figure in the development of Reformed covenant
theology was John Calvin. If one examines texts from mid-twentieth century scholarship, one sees
that it was quite common to label the movement of this non-Lutheran wing of the Reformation as
“Calvinism.” We forget that it is only in hindsight that we can speak of the “development” of
covenant or Reformed theology, let alone the “Reformation.” At the time, Calvin was but one
figure (however influential) in the simultaneous development of a movement that had no official
leader. Over the last thirty years, a multitude of studies have reconsidered the rightful place of
John Calvin and others. Controversies surround not only the origins of Reformed theology, but
also its trajectory. Some scholars assert that there were significant deviations from Calvin‟s
theology among his so-called successors in England, Scotland and America8 There is also
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controversy about the true root of Reformed political theology. Even Bishop Maxwell asserted that
Presbyterian political teaching went back to those who were “prior to Luther or Calvin.”9 In the
case of Scotland, for example, Burns writes, “It is far from easy to determine precisely when and
how Calvin‟s teaching was first known to Scottish Protestants.”10 Quentin Skinner, in an important
essay on predecessors to Reformed political theology, notes continuity with both Lutheran and
Medieval sources.11
I will follow custom and begin with a discussion of Calvin‟s view of the Hebrew Scriptures
and covenant theology; as the discussion unfolds in this and future chapters, however, it will be
demonstrated that Calvin is but one founder of Reformed theology and political theology.
Calvin had a hermeneutic of Biblical unity, believing there to be no substantial difference
(from a soteriological perspective) between the Old and New Testaments. This Reformed emphasis
upon the unity of the Old and New Testaments met with opposition.12 Puckett argues that Calvin‟s
emphasis upon unity of the Biblical canon was not really so radical. The more novel approach,
characteristic of the Anabaptists, was to argue for discontinuity between Old and New Testament.13
Under the Anabaptist‟s more radical view, Old Testament persons knew little of Christ, received
other controversies related to the atonement, such as double predestination, lapsarian theology, and the assurance for
believers. For a modern overview of some of these controversies surrounding Calvin, see Muller, The
Unaccomodated Calvin and After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition. For an example of
the disagreement about federal theologies place within Reformed theology, see Bell and Coffey. Bell, in Calvin and
Scottish Theology, argues that Calvin‟s legacy was abandoned by Scottish Reformers. But Coffey disagrees with
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an essentially inferior revelation, established their relationship with God based on works, and were
directed toward earthly prosperity.14 Calvin objected to this view both in his Institutes and in his
Old Testament commentaries. Calvin argued that Old Testament persons were indeed offered
immortality and salvation by faith, discontinuities in worship, ritual and other matters not
withstanding.15
Calvin stood with Bullinger in promoting a covenant-centric theology.16 According to
Calvin, Christ is clearly promised in the covenant with Abraham. This was understood by the
prophets, whose messages included essential promises of Christ‟s kingdom.17 This is not to say
that Calvin did not recognize differences between the Old and New Testaments. Calvin recognized
that there existed an Old Covenant (from the Fall to Christ) and a New Covenant (from Christ to
the Day of Judgment). But these were two manifestations of the same covenant – a covenant of
grace. The old was inferior to the new in terms of the quality of revelation. (Calvin, unlike later
Reformed theologians, did not assert a prelapsarian covenant or covenant of works.) Calvin
acknowledged that God used figures, images, and shadows of divine truth in the Old Testament but
argued Christ to be the reality of these things.18 Where the ceremonial law vanished, the gospel
now stands. It is in the inferiority of the Old Testament ceremonies and rituals that the superiority
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of the New Testament gospel becomes evident. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is given to the New
Testament Church and salvation is extended to persons of all nations.19
But even while he taught the unity of the Scriptures and the covenant, Calvin did not
attempt to co-opt the integrity of the Old Testament text, particularly its historical context and
literary reasoning. Whereas many Christians felt free to read the Old Testament non-historically,
Calvin believed that this approach needlessly invited legitimate criticism from Jews.20 Puckett sees
the root of Calvin‟s more historical and literary approach in his earliest significant scholarship, a
commentary on Seneca‟s De clementia. Puckett writes, “His approach to Seneca was very much
what one might expect of a humanist interpreting an ancient writer. He corrected the text; analyzed
the structure, vocabulary, idioms; and sought to understand the text in its original and historical and
cultural context. In short, he studied the text historically.”21 This, Puckett says, was part of a larger
sixteenth-century reorientation in Biblical studies that emphasized historical orientation. It stands
in contrast to a longstanding “proof text” approach wherein passages are separated from literary
intent or historical context.22 It was Calvin‟s insistence upon historical interpretation that earned
the aforementioned scorn from Aegidus Hunnius of “judaizing” the Bible. The Lutheran school of
interpretation, developed in Wittenberg, emphasized not only the sharp law-gospel distinction, but
also read theology of the New Testament into the Old. Historical context was not important.
Consistent with what Friedman calls the “Strassburg-Basel-Zurich school of Hebraica,” Calvin
favored an active but moderate use of rabbinic commentators, calling on them particularly in
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questions of lexicology or grammar.23 Bullinger, whose Decades may have been read by more
English clergy than Calvin‟s Institutes, shared Calvin‟s theology in respect to the unity of the Bible
and one covenant of grace.24 It is generally agreed that Bullinger, like Calvin, also made no
reference to a prelapsarian covenant of works.25 In this, Bullinger and Calvin are agreed, and this is
the strongest point of agreement among the early Reformers: the covenant of grace was considered
the golden thread with which to trace continuity and unity throughout the Bible. After this point of
agreement, however, the controversies multiply.
7.4 Covenantal Controversies
Controversies in covenantal theology center on articulating the proper interaction of human
responsibility and Divine sovereignty.26 Constituent controversies include predestination and
reprobation, the problem of evil, and the extent of the Atonement. I will take up two particular
means by which theologians attempted to address these problems. The first is to contrast a
unilateral approach to the covenant with a bilateral approach to the covenant. The second, which is
a more traditional and historical approach, suggests that there exist two covenants – a covenant of
law and a covenant of grace. Both approaches have consequences for political theology and present
tricky challenges. Distinguishing human cooperation in the covenant from what Reformed
theologians condemned as Arminianism or Pelagianism is difficult to explain in a short space. A
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similar quagmire is tempted by sorting out Divine sovereignty from Antinomianism.27 I shall try to
state the problems simply, together with their competing resolutions.
“Predestination,” the idea that God unilaterally selects persons for salvation, is arguably a
tradition as old as the Scriptures themselves. The Hebrew tradition does not necessarily teach that
the covenant is essentially and ultimately imposed. It is a hearkening. One is summoned to terms of
agreement. But there are also clear assertions of God‟s sovereignty in the Old Testament as well.28
For example, covenantal terms are dictated by God. They are not “negotiated” with the covenant
people. Furthermore, insofar as an everlasting covenant is discerned from the Hebrew Scriptures,
God Himself provides fulfillment of the covenantal terms. The result is an Old Testament
“predestination.” The Christian tradition repeats these Old Testament Scriptures in the New
Testament, and applies the same concepts to the new economy of salvation in Christ. While
mysteries of divine sovereignty always existed in the Church, the Reformation addresses them in a
way different from the medieval Church. Before the Reformers, questions of participation in the
covenant of salvation (though largely not expressed by that term) were answered through
sacramental participation and priestly intercession. But with the Reformation‟s significant
modifications to both institutions and its reactionary response to Roman traditions, (the Protestant
emphasis upon individual priesthood, Sola Fides, Sola Gratia, Sola Scriptura), these problems
have to be resolved again. No shortage of ink was spilt in the resulting controversy. As Reformed
theology developed, problems became quite thorny. Reformed theologians engaging divine
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sovereignty and human salvation had to navigate the parallel traps of fatalism and legalism. Von
Rohr, in his broad study of the covenant of grace, summarizes the challenge as follows:
Theologically, Puritanism faced essentially in two different directions. On the one
hand, as heir of the implicit, if not always explicit, voluntarism inherent in
Protestantism‟s call for faith and obedience as the believer‟s response to God‟s
proclaimed Word, it affirmed boldly the role of human responsibility and the
element of contingency in the divine-human relationship. On the other hand, as heir
of early Protestantism‟s somewhat more fully explicit emphasis on God‟s
sovereignty in relation to human affairs, it saw ultimate human destiny as divinely
and unconditionally determined by God‟s eternal decree.29
We turn now to the first way of addressing this challenge, which is the suggestion of a bilateral
covenant.
7.5 Covenant of Salvation: Unilateral versus Bilateral
The question in a bilateral covenantalism is not whether terms are set bilaterally or
unilaterally. All Reformed theologians would agree that the terms are set by God in His eternal
decree as communicated in the Scriptures. What is in question is whether the terms of the covenant
are fulfilled by God alone or whether there must be some cooperation on the part of persons who
desire to be part of the covenant of salvation. I should add that no Reformed theologian, regardless
of their other disagreements, would confuse a covenant with a contract (as understood in the feely
negotiated sense), even in the bilateral covenant. Von Rohr writes, “Both the predestinarianism and
the pietism of Puritan awareness can be seen as refusing a contractual quid pro quo.”30
Baker argues that there are two traditions within Reformed theology. Calvin‟s covenant
theology is classified as a more “unilateral” covenant; a “bilateral” covenant is associated with
Bullinger and some later continental theologians.31 On the risks of overstating the differences
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between the two theologies, Von Rohr writes, “The theology of Zurich was known, and although it
can hardly be represented as violently in contrast with that of Geneva, a difference of emphasis
concerning human participation in the covenant was conveyed.”32 In Calvin, for example,
predestination is asserted alongside human responsibility. Calvin emphasizes God‟s role in
graciously fulfilling the terms of the covenant through the work of the Holy Spirit. This is why he
deals only with a covenant of grace. Bullinger would not fundamentally disagree with Calvin, and
also emphasizes only one covenant of grace; but he emphasizes the need for faithfulness to the
terms of the covenant. The difference between the two types of covenant is sometimes expressed
as the difference between “testament“ and “covenant” respectively.33 A testament, which is
something bequeathed or disposed, is more unilateral. A covenant, implying something close but
not quite equal to a contract, is more bilateral.
Space and emphasis do not enable me to address what these differences may mean for
various facets of Protestant religious practice, but it is important to explore a few important
political applications. Calvin‟s unilateral covenant theology seems to be more sterile when it comes
to its powers of conceptual innovation for politics. Calvin did share the providential view of history
central to covenantalism. That much is clear from his sermons on Deuteronomy 27 and 28, for
example.34 But it is not clear from his political theology how this was to be applied to active
political life. As we shall see in the chapter summarizing Reformed political theology, Calvin did
not seem to share the radical application of covenantal faithfulness that seemed to inspire some of
his colleagues and successors. Indeed, Calvin seems to have taken a much more moderate view of
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applying the Old Testament covenant of national blessing and cursing. One of Calvin‟s less critical
modern interpreters admits as much when he writes,
Calvin is sensitive to the fact that in the New Covenant believers are under a more
„mature‟ system of rewards and punishments. Sometimes God rewards believers
with suffering, in order to make them more righteous and to help them lay up
treasures in heaven. Because of the greater „maturity‟ of the Church, God‟s
blessings and judgments may be postponed longer, or be slower in coming into
play. Because of the completion of the canon of Scripture, we are to live in terms of
the Bible and rely less upon providential blessings and curses for indications of
God‟s favor and displeasure. As a devotee of Augustine, Calvin reflects the classic
discussion of rewards and chastisements found in Augustine’s City of God, Book
1.35
Calvin instead takes a more traditional humanist “commonwealth” approach where others took a
more radical approach. Perhaps because Calvin did not essentially see the covenant of salvation to
be a set of active choices for the Christian, he did not see fit to apply the covenant model to
political theory. Weir seems to get at the problem of the unilateral covenant when he writes,
The crucial question is this: Is the covenant used as the basis for establishing one‟s
relationship with God and for the founding of society? Or is it used as an instrument
of redemption to save man from sin and restore him to that original state? It seems
that for Calvin the latter conception of covenant was the meaning of covenant in the
Scripture: the biblical covenant‟s function was redemptive and salvific, not original
and fundamental.36
But whereas the “unilateral” covenant has ambiguous implications for politics, Baker‟s and
McCoy‟s studies of Bullinger suggest explicit political implications for a bilateral covenant
theology.37
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Baker argues that Bullinger‟s theology was motivated by sensitivity toward what he
understood (correctly or incorrectly) as double predestination in Calvin. Bullinger‟s disagreement
with Calvin should not be understood as a desire to assert universalism or salvation by anything
other than grace alone.38 Neither did Bullinger believe that one could merit salvation. Bullinger
was quite sensitive to the charge that his bilateral covenant theology threatened sola gratia and
sola fide.39 Rather, one was presumed to be part of God‟s covenant by baptism unless the
individual later rejected the covenant by not keeping its conditions.40 Baker characterizes this as
“Election was a matter of inclusion within the covenant, not of exclusion.”41 The moral law was
important to this obligation, though it did not replace grace as the means to redemption.42
Bullinger‟s soteriology led to something more akin to a corporate view of Church and State
more often associated with medievalism, now blended with covenantalism.43 Church and state
were indeed separate entities, but they were two elements of the same organism.44 The civil
magistrate held a kind of supreme power over religion, and most of Bullinger‟s political theology
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is predicated on the magistrate being a Christian. Baker writes, “He believed that the Christian
magistrate, like the Old Testament rulers, is sovereign over all aspects of life, over the church as
well as the civil community. In fact, Bullinger hardly differentiated between the two spheres of
church and state.”45 This was not a clerical theocracy, however. Bullinger‟s clergy were actually
less empowered than clergy in other variations of Protestantism. The giving of the keys to the New
Testament Church, according to Bullinger, did not include excommunication or exclusion from
either church assembly or Lord‟s Supper.46 The pastor‟s role was to interpret the covenant and
preach, rebuke and exhort accordingly.47 Bullinger‟s requirement for the clergy to deliver Biblical
exhortation was especially important insofar as he held a dimmer view of natural law. Bullinger
conceded that natural law did coincide with some elements of God‟s law, and served to show
persons their sin. But his main criticism of natural law was that it was not accompanied by divine
grace. Grace was essential for any covenant relationship. The Christian magistrate should depend
only on divine law, particularly the two tables of the Decalogue. It was the Decalogue, Bullinger
argued, which was the only part of the Mosaic Law still essential for the covenant.48
It was the magistrate‟s duty to restrain, punish, or establish religion. He was to aid in the
condition of piety, not to force belief.49 Faith was a gift of God alone. But that did not confine
preaching to just Christians. All could benefit from hearing the Word with the goal of both moral
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restraint and belief.50 Pastors should encourage the magistrate in his duties, but they held no power
or sanction against a magistrate any more than against any Christian. The Christian magistrate held
the power of Christian discipline, which was limited to Christian conduct and community virtue. It
was the magistrate‟s duty to assist the people in carrying out the basic functions of political life:
public peace, property, business transactions, justice and equity.51 Baker summarizes Bullinger to
say, “All men needed the magistrate, and all government was ordained by God.”52 As Christians,
magistrates were bound by their baptismal oath. As Christian magistrates, they were further bound
to choose pious pastors to preach to the people and resist papal interference, abolish false worship,
renew democracy, and concern themselves with the general welfare. If not, they could expect
covenantal sanction. Zurich was no different than the ancient Hebrews.53 In this, one can clearly
see differences between Calvin and Bullinger. Whereas Calvin toned down the civil implications
of the covenant, Bullinger tied many political prescriptions to it. (The “City on a Hill” concept
begins with Bullinger rather than Calvin.)
Bullinger viewed Zurich as a Christian commonwealth, with the visible church being
coterminous with civil society.54 The church began with Adam, and experienced its high point
during the time of the patriarchs.55 Papal tyranny over the magistrate, and papal theological errors,
were a violation of the public covenant with God.56 Bullinger viewed the Reformation as a return
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to the ancient religion of the patriarchs and Christ – patterned in the Old Testament. If successful,
the Reformation would revive a properly covenanted civil order. Religious, moral and civil
reformation was central to the covenant, and Bullinger was quick to cite Josiah, Jehoshaphat, and
Hezekiah as models for rulers and prophets as models for pastors. As a republic, the magistrates
had an obligation to rule for the people according to the laws. This was a fulfillment of their
covenant. Bullinger writes to the magistrates, “Dear Confederates, remember now that in baptism
you have bound yourselves to me with an oath stronger than the one with which you have bound
one state to another among yourselves.”57
But though Bullinger aggressively tied many political prescriptions to the covenant, the
implications for revolution are unclear. Bullinger was perhaps even more reticent than Calvin to
prescribe resistance or revolution. On the one hand, Bullinger‟s theology was not a rubber stamp
for civil authority. In his Ermanung (1526) and Lucretia and Brutus (1533), for example, Bullinger
emphasized that those in authority were under the eternal justice of God.58 Bullinger‟s belief in
God‟s ultimate authority would not permit tyranny and neither would his clear goals for the ends of
a covenanted civic community. On the other hand, Bullinger believed in the virtues of the civil
magistrate and wrote as if the magistrate was a Christian participant in the covenanted
community.
As a historian of Switzerland, Bullinger praises the actions of the Swiss people that led to
independence and sees God‟s Providential hand in it. He believed that it would sometimes require
a clear urging of the people to make civil magistrates act in accordance with God‟s justice. This
may even extend to tyrannicide. In his Anklage und Ermahnung Gottes (1525), Bullinger cites
57
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Solomon‟s beheading of Joab as an example of what to do with unrepentant tyrants.59 But
praising acts in the past does not mean prescribing similar acts in the future. In a consultation
with John Knox on the question, Bullinger provided what are described by Burns as “cautious
responses” that cannot be considered encouragement. Concerning Mary‟s succession to the throne,
Bullinger would only say that these questions were particular to the realm and not abrogated by the
Gospel. Concerning Mary‟s proposed Spanish marriage and the potential transfer of power,
Bullinger deferred to the laws and customs of the realm. Bullinger would only say on the question
of resisting that “mandated idolatry” should be disobeyed whatever the price. And like Calvin,
Bullinger warned that the appearance of even pious revolutionary activity could conceal worldly
ends. When pressed by Knox as to which side the faithful should take if “religious nobles” took
action, Bullinger only repeated his warning and deferred the decision only to those fully apprised
of all relevant facts. This advice stands in contrast to that of Pierre Viret and other Reformers, for
example, who would have taken a more approving view of active resistance, particularly by the
nobles.60
7.6 Covenants of Works and Grace
The second most significant Reformed theological controversy concerns the substantial
difference between early Reformed covenant theology and its belief in one unified covenant (a
covenant of grace), and what is later called “federal theology” – a belief in two covenants. As
stated before, both Calvin and Bullinger appear to only assert one covenant. But their respective
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ways of addressing that covenant of grace eventually resulted in the later development of federal
theology.61
On the surface, from a philological standpoint, it would appear that there should be no
difference between a “federal theology” and a “covenant theology.” The very root of the word
“federal” comes from the Latin foedus, which was often translated from the Hebrew berith or
Greek diatheke (testament). Scholars often use the terms “covenant theology” and “federal
theology” interchangeably, but there is considerable difference between the two.62 And there is
much to federal theology that impacts political theology.
Federal theology argues that there are two covenants in Scripture.63 The first covenant
was a prelapsarian (pre-Fall) covenant. It is a covenant made with Adam. This is what federal
theologians called a “Covenant of Works.” Because Adam is seen as a “federal” head of the
whole human race, it is a covenant still binding on all men even after Adam‟s fall. The second
covenant is a “Covenant of Grace.” It is made with Jesus Christ, who is presented as a “second
Adam,” and also therefore a federal head. Christ, as a second Adam, keeps the original
prelapsarian covenant of works and takes upon himself the penalty associated with it.
Redemption is applied from this Atonement.64 Recall that Calvin and Bullinger argued for the
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existence of only one covenant, a covenant of grace. Noting this distinction, a distinction made
by other historians of the covenantal theology, Weir writes, “While John Calvin and the earlier
Reformers discussed the importance of the prelapsarian covenant of grace, they never taught the
federal theology with its prelapsarian covenant motif. Yet over eighty years after Calvin‟s death
(1564) the Westminster Confession of Faith stated that the federal theological system was part of
Reformed theology.”65 Early confessional statements emphasize grace, perhaps an indication of
the early Protestant reaction against what they understood to be works-righteousness in
Catholicism. Later confessional statements emphasize duty, emphasizing the development of
Reformed theology to a more corporate-minded and dual-covenant minded theology.
It can be safely said that the covenant of works concept originated outside Geneva.66 It
was first proposed in 1562 by Zacharias Ursinus.67 It can be traced to four other theologians who
can connections with Ursinus and the Palatinate church: Caspar Olevianus, Thomas Cartwright,
Dudley Fenner, and Franciscus Junius.68 After 1590, it spread throughout Europe and became
commonplace in Reformed theology. It was not, as Perry Miller‟s work seems to imply, a
controversy only within Anglo-American Puritanism.69
Weir argues that the federal covenantal scheme was a way to address an antinomy that
threatened to become a paradox. Calvin‟s theology stated both that God was utterly sovereign
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over human action and that man had retained full responsibility for his own conduct.70 As an
early Protestant, this was Calvin‟s way of protecting salvation against human attempts to explain
and codify it. Unlike the characterization of him offered by critics, Calvin was not trying to
unravel the mystery of grace.71 Unlike some of his successors, Calvin stated divine sovereignty
and responsibility in a fashion that was more creedal than syllogistic.72 In other words, Calvin
did not attempt to explain how these two statements (which he asserted from the Scriptures)
could be reconciled from logic or metaphysics.73 Neither does Calvin explicitly address, for
example, questions of infralapsarianism, sublapsarianism, or supralapsarianism. Although there
is much debate on this point, Calvin appears quite reticent to travel the road of the later so-called
“High Calvinists” (including some of his biographers and students) who force a logical and
explicit conclusion of double predestination from his work.74 If Calvin teaches double
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provided we shall confirm it to the Word of God. Let this, therefore, be our sacred rule, not to seek to know anything
about it except what Scripture teaches us. Where the Lord closes His holy mouth, let us also stop our minds from
going on further. Since, however, these foolish questions will come naturally to us, being what we are, let us hear
from Paul how they are to be met.” Calvin, Calvin's New Testament Commentaries (Romans and Thessalonians),
vol 8, 202-203.
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predestination, it is tame relative to where some later Reformed theology goes.75 This later “High
Calvinism” will make double predestination prominent, explicit and even paramount.76
But as one might expect when dealing with topics both iconoclastic and enormously
consequential, Calvin‟s colleagues and successors were not content to leave Calvin‟s assertions
alone. There was a great temptation to push the arguments further, using traditional logic and
syllogistic and metaphysical argument to go beyond where the Scriptures were arguably silent.
When Beza, Calvin‟s successor in Geneva, began to move this theology into a more probing
investigation into divine decrees, there was concern that the result would be to ascribe sin to
God.77 Prelapsarian Adamic human responsibility solution, argues Weir, was a means of
avoiding that problem. It gave moral responsibility to Adam while not softening the decree of
God.78
Perry Miller sees the problem in psychological terms, casting predestinarian theology as a
kind of fatalistic or legalistic straightjacket from which any good humanist had to find a
metaphysical or rhetorical escape. Miller argues that the idea of federal theology was a means for
Calvin‟s heirs to accommodate what Calvin had argued in a less explicit (and ironically, more
difficult) way. Von Rohr and Weir agree that there is a tension in the Reformed theology, but do
not agree with Miller.79 Taking Von Rohr‟s (and Hall‟s) advice, I do not want to emulate Miller
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and see Calvin as a false stereotype against which to play off later permutations of Reformed
theology.80 I defer to Weir and see this as a development of Reformed theology necessitated not
so much by Calvin as foil, but by the whole Reformed effort to redefine the economy of life and
salvation in terms of covenants.
The idea of a binding moral covenant on all persons gives the covenant of works
tremendous impetus for political theology. Because while the Fall guaranteed that no one would
perfectly keep the covenant of works, persons did not become released from its obligations
nevertheless. A prelapsarian covenant of works motivated the imprinting of the natural law upon
the human heart at Eden and supported both the Sinai and Noahide covenants. It was a means by
which, according to the Reformed reading of the Genesis account, God enabled moral (and
therefore political) order. One might go so far as to say that insofar as the covenant of works
proved to be a redemptive failure, enforcing it might have the additional benefit of showing
persons the superiority of the covenant of grace. The covenant of works could further justify a
theology of “preparation” (which became another controversy in Reformed theology).81 Like the
bilateral covenant of Bullinger, federal theology could justify a closer allegiance between church
and state. The covenant of works became a justification for civil action and the covenant of grace
became justification for ecclesiastical action. And just as these two covenants worked together in
the economy of salvation, so the civil and ecclesiastical could work together in the polity. On this
question of the State and the covenant of works, Weir cites the example of Sabbath laws applied
to all persons in civil law:
80
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Most federal theologians came to the conclusion that all people, both members
and non-members of the Church, must keep the sabbath and that this
commandment should be enforced by the State. Historians of Puritanism and
Presbyterianism have traced the growth of „hyper-Sabbatarianism‟ in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries among these groups. The sabbath issue
rises to the forefront concurrently with the rise of the federal theology between
1590 and 1640, and it seems that extreme Sabbatarianism had its roots in the
federal theology.82
The reason for having the magistrate preserve religious orthodoxy, even enforcing church
attendance, was to enable even unregenerate persons to live good lives under the provisions of
the covenant of works.
Both regenerate and unregenerate were in covenant with God - even if the latter were in a
failed covenant. The fact that it had failed was not a reason for the magistrate to discard it. The
civil magistrate did not mandate church attendance or moral conduct because Reformers believed
that they could force true belief. Nor did enforcing religious rules and religious orthodoxy
presume that all were under the covenant of grace. That would be equated to legalism. Rather,
such civil action demonstrated that all were under the covenant of works until graciously
transitioned to the covenant of grace.
Not only does federal theology invite a “joining” of church and state in many respects,
but the introduction of the covenant of works opens the door for a gracious accommodation of
natural law and natural theology in Reformed theology. Van Asselt even suggests that insofar as
Melanchthon‟s theology may have been a co-founder of the root of federal theology, natural law
was an essential part of it from the beginning.83 Weir agrees with Rolston, who argues that the
prelapsarian theology relies on the possibility of rational persons.84 Van Asselt goes so far as to
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argue that federal theology enabled a transition from orthodoxy to pietism to the Enlightenment.
The covenant of works emphasized the legitimacy of natural human reason as a faculty originally
given as part of a covenant (albeit failed covenant) of salvation. Though this covenant cannot
succeed because it is a prelapsarian covenant, the federal theology emphasized the historical
relationship of the two covenants in both the history of salvation and in the personal salvation of
the individual.
7.7 Conscience, Casuistry and Natural Law
Federal theologians became more interested in practical questions of salvation and
society. This meant moving away from what Reformers like Johannes Cocceius condemned as
“inane questions” of the medieval scholastics and toward practical theology, particularly the
manner in which one acquires the love of God (ratio percipiendi amoris Dei).85 That also meant
(selectively) recovering the medieval studies of action and will together with the study of
conscience. These developments are evident in the work of William Perkins and his student,
William Ames. Perkins, a moderate English Puritan, is thought to have outsold Calvin, Beza, and
Bullinger. His books, carried by William Ames‟s widow, were some of the first taken to New
England.86 The influence of Ames was practically without equal until the 1680s and reappears in
the mid-eighteenth century. Eusden writes, “Whenever a new interest occurred in the early
Puritan concern for religious experience and for covenant as an expression of grace, Ames once
again became a point of departure. Jonathan Edwards often began with the thought of the
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Franeker professor. In early American theological and intellectual history, William Ames was
without peer.”87 Ames also left a legacy in the work of Cocceius, his student.
Together, Ames and Perkins are responsible for a strain of Reformed thinking that is particularly
accommodating of natural law. Their influence continued in Reformed denominations,
particularly among Presbyterians.88
Perkins‟s theology included an emphasis on conscience, meant to console doubting
Christians. Perkins defined conscience as a control mechanism, a force of nature, placed midway
between God and man. It helped a troubled man know whether their actions were based on faith
or worldly considerations.89 For Perkins, ethics required more than merely the literal
interpretation of Scripture. Perkins did not believe that any one person‟s interpretation of
Scripture would be absolutely authentic. Thus, one had to judge the opinion that was most
probable.90 This required the application of reason and conscience.91 Perkins, like other Puritans,
developed casuistry (emphasizing prudence) with which to accommodate both Scripture and
political and social ethics. That was applied not just to the interpretation of controversial Biblical
cases such as the dissembling of Abraham or the Hebrew midwives.92 It appears to be used by
Perkins himself when addressing charges of attending a secret presbytery meeting at
Cambridge.93
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Ames updated the system of his teacher Perkins, extending the Reformed study of
conscience, will, law and casuistry. In his letter to the reader of his main work on the conscience,
Ames acknowledges his debt to medieval Roman Catholic authors.94 But Ames went beyond his
predecessors when carrying this tradition into Protestantism. Mosse characterizes Ames as
follows,
We can sum up Ames‟s doctrine of probabiliorism as follows: man‟s conscience,
guided by the law of God, is the court of appeal. This supreme authority takes
circumstance and necessities into consideration, though the „intention‟ with which
the word of God is interpreted, aided by the method of the [Ramist] syllogism. In
this way Ames‟s probabiliorism rests on the individual, and not on the authority
of the Church or of recognized interpreters of Scripture like the Church Fathers. It
can be argued that this Protestant probabiliorism permits an even greater latitude
of action than its Catholic counterpart. It can surely no longer be argued that
probabiliorism was either a Catholic monopoly or a Jesuit invention of the
seventeenth century.95
Ames‟s discussion is much more Ramist than Aristotelian. Conscience is neither a faculty (as
Perkins suggested) nor a habit. It is also divided into two parts, natural and enlightened. The
natural conscience is possessed by all men. The enlightened conscience is only possessed by
those in union with Christ. Like Perkins, Ames believed that the conscience is a man‟s mean of
judging himself in light of God‟s judgment.96 Using the Ramist syllogistic scheme, Ames taught
that one goal of the conscience and reason was to help the individual believer discern whether he
was a Christian by applying what the Scriptures said to his own particular experience.97 Parallel
with Ames‟s emphasis on will and conscience is a relatively subdued emphasis on
predestination. Though Ames rejected any notion of universal salvation, he was much more
94

Ames, “To the Reader” in Conscience with the Power and Cases thereof: Divided into Five Books. Cited in
Eusden, 17
95

Mosse, op. cit., 81

96

Eusden, op. cit., 42-43

97

Ibid., 44-47, 50-51

151

sensitive to criticisms of limited atonement and double predestination.98 Eusden notes that
Ames‟s treatment of predestination comes only two-thirds of the way through Book One,
following chapters on faith, the nature of God, sin, and the person and work of Christ.
Predestination is treated as a transitional theme between the work of Christ and the description of
the Christian life. In this, Ames even dissented from the work of his teacher, Perkins, who had
followed Beza in considering double predestination in the work of God.99 Of reprobation, Ames
had little use because he found it to be of little help in living a Christian life. Eusden summarizes
Ames to say, “All men should act as if they were members of the elect; they should not be
despondent over what they might feel to be a state of damnation. Despair over one‟s ultimate
condition is a sin for which one needs to ask God‟s forgiveness.”100
Ames also moved Reformed theology to a position more accommodating of Remonstrant
critics. Like his fellow Reformers, Ames was highly critical of the Remonstrants. He said of
them that their view on the will was a dangerous error in the faith and tended toward Pelagian
heresy.101 But he also argued that the Remonstrant insistence on man‟s response to the Gospel
was a needed corrective for Reformed theology. Though neither Ames‟s treatment of preparation
nor willed response in his theology would have been considered adequate from the Remonstrant
point of view, he turned Reformed theology back to the classical question of the will. Ames
wrote, “True Christian faith which has a place in the understanding always leans upon divine
testimony, as far as it is divine. But it cannot be received without a genuine turning of the will
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towards God.”102 Ames also wrote, “We refuse to subject our wills to the will of God and
attempt to make his will subject to our lust.”103 But Ames emphasized that this turning of the will
must be seen as the work of God.104 Eusden describes Ames to understand predestination not as
an inquiry into the divine mind and reason, but as a comforting doctrine that invites one to begin
a spiritual pilgrimage.105 This accounts for Ames‟s emphasis on “practical” theology.
Ames was particularly accommodating of natural law, identifying it with the Ten
Commandments and believing it to be the expression of the Divine teleology. Ames says in his
work on conscience, “Through the goodness of God the knowledge of many things which we
ought to do or shun are still conserved in man‟s mind even after his Fall.”106 He argued that the
natural law was the basis of both the law of nations and the civil law.107 All men, Ames argued,
are obliged to obey the natural moral law by the covenant made with Adam.108 The fact that the
prelapsarian covenant of works was inferior to the covenant of grace mattered only in the
economy of eternal salvation, not in politics. It was not abrogated by the Fall or by a person‟s
inability to keep it perfectly. The conclusion of this is that all persons possessed a conscience,
moral accountability, and an obligation to abide by them – regardless of spiritual condition.
Mayfield says of Ames,
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Ames, like his mentor Perkins and Rutherford after him, emphasized the common
ground occupied by both regenerate and unregenerate; though of course each, as
Protestants, recognized the distinction. The effect of this emphasis, again, was to
discourage the contrary emphasis of Calvin and Luther and play up the
possibilities (and on medieval assumptions, therefore the responsibilities) of
unregenerate men.109
Ames‟s influence on the development of Reformed political theology is often implicit
rather than explicit. Most of what he expresses in his works on politics is unoriginal, though the
continuity with his co-religionists is not insignificant. Like the other Reformers, he asserts God‟s
sovereignty and the will of the people as essential to sound government. Like his fellow
Reformers, he cites I Samuel 8 as a warning against the excesses of monarchy. He also charges
the Christian citizen to obey only when it is lawful and consistent with conscience.110 But he did
not offer explicit application of the covenant device to the political realm, as Bullinger or the
Scots did. Ames took what can be considered as a “commonwealth” approach. Eusden
characterizes him to say, “Governments are based rather on the commandments and precepts of
the Bible, rightly understood and applied, the principles of natural law, and the time-tested legal
customs of men, particularly the common law tradition of England.”111 That friendly approach to
natural law and common law may not seem important, but it will have important implications
during both the British Civil Wars (as we will see in Chapter Nine) and also for preserving both
common law and natural law in the Reformed political tradition.
7.8 Conclusion
The covenant device became a central tool of those Reformers who saw themselves as refocusing the Church on its Biblical first principles. But we saw in the previous three chapters, the
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interpretation of the covenant device is not easily or uniformly done. This became apparent
within the first 100 years of the Reformed tradition as theologians argued about how to apply the
covenant device to soteriology. Those disagreements over soteriology had inevitable and
important implications for political theology, too. Not everyone would be in a covenant of grace,
but every person was in the covenant of works unless graciously delivered to the covenant of
grace. Insofar as some persons had to respond to the covenant of grace (by seeking the means of
grace), or insofar as all persons were in a covenant of works, Church, theology and Scripture
became more important for political theory. But also, because of the federal theology, natural
law, common law, and general revelation also came to greater prominence than might otherwise
be expected in a theology otherwise so focused on postlapsarian condition and divine
sovereignty.
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CHAPTER 8
REFORMED POLITICAL THEOLOGY: THE COVENANT AS POLITICS
8.1 The Protestant Re-formation of Politics
This chapter provides a summary of Reformed political theology in the early modern era,
notably the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. My intent is to summarize the political theory of
prominent Reformers and discern variations of their political theory.1 That includes the ways in
which they explicitly integrate the covenant device into their political theology. Precisely
isolating the role of covenant theology in the political theory of the Reformers is not always
possible; the centuries in question are rich and diverse in influence - reflecting a multiplicity of
arguments and traditions. Because of the extensive humanist and legal training of the Reformers,
one must also remember the influence of medieval and classical political theory.2 Greaves, for
example, asserts that John Knox’s theory of tyrannicide in his The First Blast of the Trumpet
against the monstrous regiment of Women (1558) is virtually the one espoused by John of
Salisbury.3 The idea of a state of nature wherein men have a right to self-defense, which Samuel
Rutherford asserts quite clearly and substantially in Lex, Rex (1644), was originally formulated
by medieval scholars.4 McNeill asserts that concepts of representation and consent are found in
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the medieval provincial and diocesan organization of the Church and in monastic and friar orders
a few centuries prior.5
Even when the Reformers are not entirely original, however, they make an important
contribution. By articulating standing political theory in their own particular way, under these
historical circumstances, the Reformers enabled the passing of political theory to a Protestant
posterity. Hostility toward medieval scholarship (or at least some recognizably Catholic authors
and persons) sometimes made it necessary for political theories to be reformulated and made
palpable to new audiences. This required the voice, rhetoric, and argumentation of Protestants. It
also required accommodation to the new theology. The rhetorical revolution was necessitated by
something of a metaphysical revolution.6 That metaphysical revolution required more than a new
formulation of ideas to reflect a new political reality. Both revolutions required new justification
for political theory with new symbols, metanarratives, and forums for transmission. These “new”
Reformed premises were often rooted in old texts – Scriptural texts that predated Solon, Gaius,
or Justinian I. In the stream of the Western (and Anglo-American) legal conversation, the “old”
ideas became “new” when associated with Protestants and Reformation.7
Consider again from Chapter One the statement by John Adams about the sources of
American liberty. Technically, one could assert that Adams was wrong. The authors that he cites
were deeply influenced by a Western and Biblical tradition running back to time out of memory.
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But that isn’t Adams’s assertion. Rather, he is addressing how these ideas came to be known to
Americans. His attribution to Protestant scholars is what makes all the difference. As Adams’s
countrymen knew these ideas, they were learned from the Protestant (and Whig) sources and not
their distant classical or medieval ancestors. And that is why they must be studied for their own
sake – almost as if they began with the Reformation.
8.2 Passive and Aggressive Covenantalism
In considering the use of the covenant device in Reformed political theology, there is a
spectrum of application. In its most passive and subtle form, covenantal political theory largely
echoes the traditional “commonwealth” approach that goes back to the Roman law. This means
that the covenant becomes a “new” symbol to justify standing ideas and institutions. Given the
humanistic training of the Reformers, this is not surprising. In this more passive form of
covenantalism, the nation is viewed as a common pursuit of salus populi. This common good is
pursued, however, with two important caveats generally argued from Biblical premises. First, all
government is derived from God’s supreme authority. That does not equate to a divine right
argument. Rather, it holds magistrates accountable to the limits of authority interpreted from
Scripture. Second, the will of the people, even though not necessarily represented by direct
elections, is a means by which the authority of God is legitimately transferred to civil
magistrates.
With the additional force and warrant of the covenant device, tyranny is cast not simply
as the abuse of reason or freedom, it becomes the violation of both divine delegation and popular
trust. This opens the door for an aggressive doctrine of resistance or revolution. As inheritors of
this tradition, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin could say, “Resistance to tyrants is

158

obedience to God.”8 That is a much more aggressively theistic formula than “Resistance to
tyrants is the assertion of our natural rights” (as a French revolutionary might argue) or
“Resistance to tyrants is the restoration of nomos” (as the ancients might prescribe). One does
not want to dismiss any similarity between these last two arguments and the prescriptions of the
Reformers. Indeed, as I will argue in later chapters, there is both an ancient and modern thread
tied to the ends of the Reformers’ political theory. But it is important to emphasize the theistic
and providential elements in the Reformers. As I argued in Chapter Two, the notion of an
argument that is argued only from nature does not create the same kind of moral imperative as
one which is tied to personal revelation and eternal judgment. This makes the covenanted
commonwealth approach much more wary of power and much quicker to allow or prescribe
resistance.
When joined to the more aggressive and unique application of the covenant device,
political theory takes on radical implications. At the other end of the spectrum from
commonwealth thinking (what I’m calling passive covenantalism) is what I call active or
aggressive covenantalism. It often displays a more explicit Scriptural argumentation. If tied to
fundamentalism more than humanism, it eyes natural law or common law jurisprudence with
suspicion. If tied to humanism and federal theology, it readily accommodates natural law and
common law. As demonstrated in the chapters that follow, these two strains of active
covenantalism (one being more fundamentalist and the other more humanist) can be found in
opposing Reformed camps. Aggressive covenantalism does not reject the essential goals of
passive covenantalism: salus populi. It agrees with the need for appropriate resistance and limits
on civil authority. But it makes these a religious duty rather than a right. Active covenantalism
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may place burdens on the people for asserting the right of God over tyrants. For example,
Skinner characterizes Goodman, Ponet and Knox to argue that those who fail to resist tyrants
would be damned.9And while all covenantal political theologians argued, for example, that the
magistrate has some responsibility for the maintenance of true religion, the more aggressive form
of covenantalism emphasizes this as a means of obtaining divine corporate blessing or avoiding
covenantal sanction.
This spectrum of covenantalism can be applied in the subjects of the dissertation. Calvin
was reluctant to explicitly apply the covenant device to politics beyond simply asserting a
covenanted commonwealth approach. His disciple Beza had a more aggressive but vaguer
covenantalism. As I explained in Chapter Seven, Bullinger clearly saw the whole civil polity in
covenantal terms, but it led to a much more muted and almost medieval political theology. It
resembled a commonwealth approach and there was no clear prescription for resistance or
revolution.
It was Knox who first explicitly and radically applied the covenant device to politics,
though even he did so reluctantly.10 Knox’s was selective in his application of the civil covenant,
predicated largely on religious circumstances. His first assertion that a covenant had been
violated was during the accession of Mary Tudor. In 1554, Knox argued that to participate in the
Mass was to violate “the league and covenant of God” that forbade idolatry.11 This was
technically not a civil covenant. Knox was referring to the covenant between God and his elect,
but an important precedent was set by casting civil disobedience as necessary to avoid
9
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damnation. By 1558, in The Appellation to the Nobility and Estates, Knox is prepared to
articulate a doctrine of resistance that hinges on a more robust theory of covenanting. Knox
seems most clearly to have used the Appellation as a call to the inferior magistrates of England to
rebel against the monarchy. At no point did Knox call on the Scottish nobility to rebel. Whereas
England was a covenanted nation, having officially subscribed to Protestantism, Scotland was
not.12 After Scotland subscribed to Protestantism, however, Knox issued the same covenantal
warning and admonition. In a sermon to the General Assembly in 1564, Knox applied the same
arguments to the Scottish nobility.13
The most famous and robust development of a civil covenant was developed by Mornay
in the Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos (1579), which was published in the wake of three other
covenantal political theologies: Theodore Beza’s Of the Rights of Magistrates Upon Their
Subjects (1575), an anonymously published The Alarm-clock of Frenchmen and Their Neighbors
(1573-74) and Francis Hotman’s Franco Gallia (1575).14 According to Mornay, there are two
covenants of political significance. These covenants established the root of the monarch’s power
from both God and the people. The first covenant is between God, the king and the people. The
other is between the king and the people. The first enables the people to act should the king turn
away from God. The second obliges the king to act in the interests of the common good.15
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Rutherford argued that there exists a covenant between the king and the people, using
Old Testament examples to serve his case.16 God works through the people in this covenant, with
the people seen as a community rather than just consenting individuals.17 One could say that
there are three parties to this covenant, though the interests of God and the people are the same.
There also exists a covenant between the king and God.18 This obligates him to maintain religion
and civil piety. These covenants reflect both passive and active covenantalism. Passive
covenantalism is evident in Rutherford insofar as basic functions and obligations of the ruler
exist in a constitutional “commonwealth” sense. Active covenantalism is reflected in Rutherford
insofar as the work of God may be found in resistance against tyrants. Rutherford writes, “The
covenant is so mutual, that if the people break the covenant, God is loosed from his part of the
covenant, Zech. xi.10. The covenant giveth to the believer a sort of action of law, and jus
quoddam, to plead with God in respect of his fidelity to stand to that covenant that bindeth him
by reason of his fidelity, Isa. xliii.26; lxiii.16; Dan. ix. 4, 5.”19 In establishing these points,
Rutherford appeals widely to both natural law and the Old Testament together with acts of
parliament.20
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8.3 General Prescriptions for Civil Government
Consistent with their medieval and classical predecessors, the Reformers believed firmly
in the necessity of government as essential to political (and therefore human) happiness. They
asserted its importance for both church polity and civil polity, with discussion of one often
prompting and influencing discussion of the other. The Reformers varied in their approach to the
integration (or separation) of civil and ecclesiastical. They rarely confused ecclesiastical
authority with civil authority, but the state often played a role in giving aid and comfort to the
Church. The Reformers asserted their political philosophy against the backdrop of both contrary
political theologies (Anabaptist and Antinomian, for example) and chaos caused by the
Reformation (such as the Peasants’ War).21 Contrary to those who demeaned the office of the
civil magistrate or deemed civil government appropriate only for the unregenerate, the
Reformers argued that government was a blessing of God – meet, right and salutary for all.
Without it, there would be no commonwealth – no res publica. Rutherford, for example,
explicitly centered civil government on the great principle of Cicero (and later cited by Locke):
salus populi, suprema rex.22
Civil government was not just something for unregenerate persons or necessary as a
result of sin; it was a blessing for regenerate persons as well. At minimum, the civil magistrate
enabled the enjoyment of earthly goods such as property and good order. Ideally, magistrates
played a role in the preservation of the Church. Both roles were an important part of covenantal
political theology. Elizabethan Puritan Thomas Cartwright, for example, argued that God created
the civil magistrate for the temporal well-being of the citizens, just as the church was created for
21
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their spiritual well-being. He argued that neither institution could exist without the other.
Spiritual famine in the church produced material famine.23 Both realms were to see to the souls
of the people. The civil magistrate did this by securing wealth and quietness on earth; the church
concerned itself with eternal life.24 Calvin, who preceded and influenced Cartwright, had the
Anabaptists in mind when he argued that government was a blessing from God and intended for
all persons.25 He went so far as to assert the calling of civil authority as the highest station in
mortal life.26 Later Reformers took Calvin’s lead. American Puritan John Cotton, for example,
wrote that godly rulers would contribute to a just and blessed political order. God ordered the
commonwealth for purity in the church, liberty in the people, and authority in the magistrates.
Church and state worked together in providing liberty. Cotton wrote, “Purity preserved in the
church, will preserve well ordered liberty in the people, and both of them establish well-balanced
authority in the magistrates. God is the author of all these three.”27 Writing under the threat of
violent persecution, Mornay celebrated how a safe civil order would protect the Church and her
members. He writes, “To what purpose should the magistrates bear the sword, if it be not to serve
God, who has committed it to them, to defend the good and punish the bad? Can they do better
service than to preserve the church from the violence of the wicked and to deliver the flock of
Christ from the swords of murderers?”28
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Reformed theologians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries routinely charged the
magistrate with enforcing both tables of the Moral Law (Ten Commandments). In a statement
that both summarizes this principle and demonstrates Calvin’s reliance on secular sources to
confirm Scripture, he writes,
The duty of magistrates, its nature, as described by the word of God, and the
things in which it consists, I will here indicate in passing. That it extends to both
tables of the law, did Scripture not teach, we might learn from profane writers; for
no man has discoursed of the duty of magistrates, the enacting of law, and the
common weal, without beginning with religion and divine worship. Thus all have
confessed that no polity can be successfully established unless piety be its first
care, and that those laws are absurd which disregard the rights of God, and consult
only for men.29
The first table concerned religious matters – idols, false gods, blasphemy, and the Sabbath. The
second table required laws protecting life and property, consistent with commandments five
through ten in the Reformed (non-Lutheran and later non-Anglican) articulation of the Ten
Commandments. Concerning the second table, Calvin writes (in another passage demonstrating
his mixture of Biblical and secular sources),
Rulers . . . protect the good against the injuries of the bad, and give aid and
protection to the oppressed, they are armed with power to curb manifest evildoers and criminals, by whose misconduct the public tranquility is disturbed or
harassed. For we have the full experience of Solon’s saying, that all public
matters depend on reward and punishment.30
Marian exile Christopher Goodman, a colleague of both Calvin and Knox, commended the rule
of Edward VI by noting the comfortable enjoyment of both religion and property.31 Knox
likewise urged a “two table” duty on the civil magistrate.32 In regard to the first table, the nobility
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had a duty to safeguard the people from corrupt bishops. He wrote to the nobility, "For if your
bishops be proved to be no bishops but deceivable thieves and ravening wolves . . . then shall your
permission and defense of them be reputed before God a participation with their theft and
murder."33 Cartwright echoes his co-religionists when he writes, “The prince and the civil
magistrate hath to see that the laws of God, touching his worship, and touching all matters and
orders of the church, be executed and duly observed, and to see that every ecclesiastical person do
that office whereunto he is appointed, and to punish those which fail in their office accordingly.”34
While still aboard the Arabella, Winthrop says this to characterize the purpose of the colony, “The
end is to improve our lives to do more service to the Lord and the comfort and increase of the body
of Christ whereof we are members."35 Cotton echoes the same thing in his reply to Roger
Williams, The Bloody Tenent, Washed, and Made White in the Blood of the Lamb. Cotton argues
repeatedly that civil magistrates have an obligation to the souls under their care by remembering
that the spiritual condition of the people will affect their civil condition.36 None of these authors
presumed that civil law could be used to convert persons. These prescriptions were all rooted in
various manifestations of covenantal theorizing: to preserve persons from heresy, to preserve civil
order, to respect the covenant of works, etc.
As to the form of government, some general observations can be made. Reformed political
theorists argued that no one regime type is appropriate for every case. Consistent with their own
pessimism about human sinfulness, they were particularly distrustful of any regime that appeared

33

Knox, Appellation to the Nobility, 86. See also Knox, Letter to the Regent of Scotland, 57-58. Both are in Mason
(ed.), On Rebellion.
34

Quoted in Pearson, 30. See 29-35 for a fuller discussion of Cartwright’s prescription for the civil magistrate.

35

Winthrop, Christian Charitie, in Morgan, Puritan Political Ideas, 90

36

Cotton, Bloody Tenent Washed, 64, 66, 68, 71, 88, 89

166

to put too much faith in human nature.37 That distrust of human nature was extended to both
church polity and civil polity, as evidenced by Reformed fondness for Presbyterian or
Congregational forms of government.38 In civil polity, the problem of sinful human nature cast a
shadow over both monarchy and democracy. Monarchy placed too much power in one person and
threatened political federalism. When institutionalized as hereditary monarchy, it had the effect of
discounting election mechanisms.39 Knox, not surprisingly, prescribed the “election” of the
monarch and relentlessly attacked any claim to “divine right.” He writes in The Second Blast, “It is
not birth only nor propinquity of blood that maketh a king lawfully to reign above a people,
professing Christ Jesus and his eternal verity, but in his election must the ordinance which God
hath established in the election of inferior judges be observed.”40 Rutherford echoes Knox: "If his
first-born shall be born an idiot and a fool, they are not obliged to make him king."41 Reformers
critiqued democracy in the classical way: as majority or mob rule. This placed mainstream
Reformers at a distance from Anabaptists or Levellers. Furthermore, the Reformed theologians
argued that to rule (which meant to serve) required a calling. Democracy was especially bad at
confusing this notion of calling because it made men both ruler and ruled at the same time.42
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Despite their criticism of democracy, the idea of consent nevertheless figured prominently
in Reformed political theology. McNeill writes, “It was in Calvinism that a uniformly
representative polity appeared.”43 Both French Protestants (such as Mornay and Hotman) and
Scottish Reformers viewed their political histories in light of popular sovereignty and
representation.44 They also looked to Biblical and historical examples for instruction.45 Rutherford
wrote that, "The power of creating a man a king is from the people."46 Rutherford urged the
“election” of the king by the people.47 Goodman, tying election to the obligations of covenant,
wrote, "If we will be the people of God, let us then search and diligently follow the Laws of God,
especially in so weighty matters, as the election of kings and Princes."48 Winthrop wrote early in
1630 that the colony was established by both consent and Providence.49 Winthrop wrote in 1637,
“No man can have just interest in that which belongeth to another, without his consent."50 In
Winthrop’s colony, those within the franchise were required to take a Freeman's oath consenting to
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the colony's government.51 In Plymouth, the Governor was only allowed to welcome newcomers
with the consent of other members of the Company.52
What most of the Reformers meant by “consent” was done through narrow suffrage and
largely by local magistrates and nobility.53 Extremely limited suffrage and indirect representation
was a reflection of the time. But for the Reformers, working through the Estates or other lower
civil offices was not merely a device to limit suffrage or “mob rule.” The creation of these offices
mirrored the federalism of covenant theology. Smaller units could enjoy both community and
independence and play a prominent role in checking tyranny.54 Smaller and dispersed units of
sovereignty were also a reflection of a common Protestant imperative – the need for dialogue and
self-examination.55 Such institutional and rhetorical bulwarks were an important contribution of
covenant theology.
Most of the Reformers argued that circumstances dictated the best regime. Calvin argued,
The nature of the discussion depends on circumstances. And if you compare the
different states with each other, without regard to circumstances, it is not easy to
determine which of these has the advantage in point of utility, so equal are the terms
on which they meet. Monarchy is prone to tyranny. In aristocracy, again, the
tendency is not less to the faction of a few, while in popular ascendancy there is the
strongest tendency to sedition.56
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Calvin writes that of the three forms discussed by philosophers, “Aristocracy has demonstrated
itself better than monarchy, particularly given the indulgences of kings.”57 Calvin, Knox and
Rutherford all three agreed on the merits of a “mixed” regime if it could avoid the abuses of
unchecked rule.58 Fondness for the mixed regime also reflected (in the case of the Scots), a
fondness for Presbyterianism. Rutherford, reflecting on Presbyterian polity, called it the “sweetest
of all governments.”59
Resistance theory was the area of greatest controversy, so it is not surprising to find a
diversity of arguments and assertions on the matter. In the case of Bullinger, Baker writes, “The
limits that Bullinger placed on magisterial sovereignty were less clear and perhaps more difficult to
apply.”60 He adds that Bullinger’s prescription for passive resistance makes any supposed support
of republicanism sound “hollow” to modern ears.61 Calvin, for example, more closely resembled
the majority of his medieval predecessors by shying away from a clear advocacy of violent
resistance – at least in the early part of his career. In his Institutes, he cautions against taking up
arms in the face of persecution until care has been taken to discern God’s hand in that persecution.
He writes, "Verily Christians were to be a class of men born to endure affronts and injuries, and be
exposed to the iniquity, imposture, and derision of abandoned men, and not only so, but were
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tolerant of all these evils."62 He believed that tyrannical rulers were generally raised up by God to
punish the people for their iniquity.63 Calvin writes, “If, in short, we are persecuted for
righteousness’ sake by an impious and sacrilegious prince, let us first call up the remembrance of
our faults, which doubtless the Lord is chastising by such scourges.”64 According to Calvin, evil
rulers were God's call to self-examination and an admonishment against wickedness, particularly
among God's saints. Tyranny may therefore be no different from other earthly trials. Calvin also
warns those who would engage in “foolish” “superfluous” or “pernicious” resistance to check their
motives and remind themselves of the duty of Christians is to “obey and submit.”65 Calvin seems
to be much more comfortable prescribing passive disobedience (exemplified in the case of Daniel)
than active resistance.66
In examining Calvin’s prescription for resistance, it is important to note the dates of
publication and their circumstance. In Calvin’s early work, he is more reticent on the subject.
Kelly, for example, notes that if Calvin does extend an ambiguous call to private action, it is only
after his co-religionists faced active persecution.67 By the early 1560s, Calvin preached in a sermon
on I Samuel 8, "Since kings and princes are bound by covenant to the people, to administer the law
in truest equality, sincerity, and integrity; if they break faith and usurp tyrannical power . . . is it not
possible for the people to consider together taking measures in order to remedy the evil?"68 He
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eventually can only bring himself to offer a half-hearted condemnation of assassination in his
Institutes, striking a balance between godly resistance and anarchy.69
But whatever may be thought of the acts of men themselves, the Lord by their
means equally executed his own work, when he broke the bloody scepters of
insolent kings, and overthrew their intolerable dominations. Let princes hear and be
afraid; but let us at the same time guard most carefully against spurning or violating
the venerable and majestic authority of rulers, an authority which God has
sanctioned by the surest edicts . . . Although the Lord takes vengeance on unbridled
domination, let us not therefore suppose that that vengeance is committed to us, to
whom no command has been given but to obey and suffer. I speak only of private
men.70
But Reformed conservatism never forbid the lesser magistrates from “interposition.” That is, it was
still the right (and perhaps duty) of lesser magistrates to protect their citizens from tyrannical
kings.71 Protection is different than revolution. Calvin writes,
For when popular magistrates have been appointed to curb the tyranny of kings (as
the Ephori, who were opposed to kings among the Spartans, or Tribunes of the
people to consuls among the Romans, or Demarchs to the senate among the
Athenians; and, perhaps, there is something similar to this in the power exercised in
each kingdom by the three orders, when they hold their primary diets). So far am I
from forbidding these officially to check the undue license of kings, that if they
connive at kings when they tyrannize and insult over the humbler of the people, I
affirm that their dissimulation is not free from nefarious perfidy, because they
fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, while knowing that, by the ordinance
of God, they are its appointed guardians, from being impaired, far less violated.72
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He goes on to call the lower orders of rulers the God-ordained and appointed guardians of the
liberty of the people.73 Hancock questions whether Calvin’s endorsement of resistance by the
lesser magistrates cannot also be understood indirectly as an endorsement of private action. He
characterizes the relationship as follows, “God has given certain men power over other men, but
even private men must withdraw obedience from God’s supposed representatives when this would
require disobedience to God himself. Thus God’s ordination does not finally remove the political
responsibility of each individual.”74
Other Reformers also advocated resistance and revolution. Marian exile John Ponet
advocated resistance against Mary Tudor. The Scot George Buchanan justified the deposition of
Mary Queen of Scots. Hotman, like his Huguenot co-religionist Mornay, believed that the crown
was rooted in the consent of the Estates and could be deprived by the same. Knox believed an
ungodly ruler to be a judgment from God, but he also urged resistance.
But just and righteous, terrible and fearful, are thy judgments, O Lord! For as
sometimes thou didst so punish men for unthankfulness that man ashamed not to
commit villainy with man (and that because that knowing thee to be God, they
glorified thee not as God), even so has thou most justly now punished the proud
rebellion and horrible ingratitude of the realms of England and Scotland. For when
thou didst offer thyself most mercifully to them both, offering the means by the
which they might have been joined together forever in godly concord, then was the
one proud and cruel and the other unconstant and fickle of promise.75
Mary was God’s punishment. The church needed to repent. But repentance was not the last
remedy. Knox scolds the realms and estates for their election of Mary Tudor and urges them to
refuse submission to her commands. He adds, “She is a traitress and rebel against God. . . . They
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must study to repress her inordinate pride and tyranny to the uttermost of their power.”76 Should
the nobility or lesser magistrates fail in their duty, they would suffer under the wrath of God. Knox
wrote, "Now, if your king be a man ignorant of God, enemy to his true religion, blinded by
superstition, and a persecutor of Christ's members, shall ye be excused if with silence ye pass over
his iniquity?"77
Goodman, from whose more radical prescriptions both Calvin and Knox sought to distance
themselves, clearly advocated tyrannicide. Like his co-religionists, Goodman did believe that
citizens under tyranny should look first to their own sin. But if tyranny was a corporate sanction,
the only way out of it may be to depose an idolatrous ruler. In a textbook case of active
covenantalism (and popular revolution), Goodman writes to the people,
And therefore your study in this case, ought to be, to seek how you may dispose
and punish according to the Laws, such rebels against God, and oppressors of
yourself and your country: and not how to please them, obey them, and flatter them
as you do in their impiety. Which is not the way to obtain peace, and quietness, but
to fall into the hand of the Almighty God, and to be subject to His fearful plagues
and punishments.78
Using an argument that was to become more common in the development of Protestant resistance
theory, Goodman asserts that any magistrate who abandons his God-given duties forsakes
legitimacy altogether. They cease to be “public persons” with authority.79 He writes,
For this cause have you promised obedience to your Superiors, that they might
herein help you: and for the same intent have they taken it upon them. If they will
so do, and keep promise with you according to their office, then do you owe unto
them all humble obedience: If not, you are discharged, and no obedience belongeth
to them: because they are not obedient to God, nor be his ministers to punish the
evil, and to defend the good. And therefore your study in this case, ought to be, to
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seek how you may dispose and punish according to the Laws, such rebels against
God, and oppressors of your selves and your country: and not how to please them,
obey them.80
Goodman asked his reader why God would give civil government unlimited powers when he only
allowed other authorities (such as parents) specific liberties with those under their charge? God
alone was the primary chief and master, and he set the limits of masters under his charge.81
Goodman’s essay ties calls for revolution with admonitions to resist false religion.82 It is
the cornerstone of his resistance theory, indicting Mary as an idolatrous ruler. To profess a false
religion was equal to being a tyrant. Both were forms of rebellion against God. Disobedience to
such rulers was not only permissible, it was commanded. Goodman repeated throughout his work
that Christians were in rebellion to God if they obeyed a wicked ruler. Referring to the stoning of
false prophets by the people of Israel, for example, Goodman notes that the people were not led by
a civil magistrate.83 Hence, they did not need lesser magistrates to sanction their revolt. Against a
theology of obedience, or against persons who thought themselves above responsibility for a
tyrant, Goodman writes,
But as touching the common and simple people, they think them selves utterly
discharged, whither their Prince be godly or ungodly, wise or foolish, a preserver of
the common wealth or else a destroyer, all is one to them, they must be obedient,
because they are ignorant, and must be led themselves, not meet to lead others. . . .
Thus do all sorts of men from the highest to the lowest slip their heads out of the
collar: . . . giveth the bridle wholly to their Rulers till destruction remedies overflow
all.84
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Goodman promotes the example of Mattathias, a character from the Apocrypha.85 Mattathias not
only refused to sacrifice to the Greek gods but took up his sword against those who did - including
a government official. This initiated the War of the Maccabees and Jewish Independence.
For the French Calvinists, the question of legitimacy was explicitly tied to the covenant.
The king, by breaking his obligations contained in the second covenant between himself and the
people, became a tyrant.86 Mornay also added a whole litany of acts which defined a tyrant.87 This
list included ignoring counsel, abusing taxation to fund extravagance, and the lawless persecution
of subjects. Mornay not only gave permission for resistance, but considered it a duty. Resisting a
tyrant was to be done by those who were officers or lower magistrates, however. The three party
covenant in the Vindiciae not only described the legal structure of accountability, it also created
obligations punishable by covenantal sanction. If a tyrant was allowed to rule, the wrath of God
would be poured out not only upon the evil ruler, but also upon his surety, the people. If the lower
magistrates failed in their duty, the common people had no choice but to leave.88
Rutherford’s resistance theory is perhaps the most cosmopolitan of all. He not only
provides an exegesis of Romans 13 and the Reformed argument against the rights of a faithless
magistrate, he evinces a stream of continuity from the medieval natural rights theorists to the
political theory of the seventeenth century. He not only argues resistance based on Reformed
political theology, he complements this with an argument from popular consent and self-defense.89
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He writes, “We teach that any private man may kill a tyrant, void of all title . . .And if he have not
the consent of the people, he is an usurper, for we know no external lawful calling that kings have
now, or their family, to the crown, but only the call of the people.”90 Rutherford further develops
the political theology that resistance to tyrants is obedience to God. This was because tyranny was
the work of Satan.91 God therefore worked through the people to remove the ruler.92 Rutherford
believed that resisting was the duty of the common people as well as the lower magistrates.93 They
were not to engage in passive resistance only, but actively to resist the king by removing him from
power.94
8.4 Conclusion
The Reformers applied the covenant device to politics in various ways through the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The result was a political theology that was sometimes radical
and innovative, but never strayed too far from familiar and traditional political theory rooted in the
familiar and traditional. Their use of the covenant device resulted generally in a strengthening of
rights and duties for both magistrates (lesser and greater) and citizens, advocacy of a mixed regime
with some degree of popular consent, and a strengthening of arguments for resistance and
revolution.
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CHAPTER 9
THE CASE OF THE BRITISH WARS: COVENANT AND ESCHATOLOGY
9.1 Introduction
The last chapter began with the argument that it is not always possible precisely to
identify the contribution of covenant theology to the development of political theory. That is
especially true when dealing with theoretical articulations. If one is willing to delve more deeply
into the historical test of these theoretical applications, however, one can conclude more about
the vital role of theology. One begins to see how theological differences, the kinds of differences
discussed in Chapter Seven, become significant in the articulation of political theory.
In this chapter, I take up the case of the “Wars of the Three Kingdoms,” emphasizing
both the English Civil War and the conflict between the English and Scots.1 Though there were
certainly many non-religious aspects to these conflicts, the role of political theology in the
conflict is quite pronounced. I have already presented more famous Reformed theological
arguments for revolution in the previous chapter. Here, I will see how those arguments were put
to the test, and what the consequences were for the practice of politics in the seventeenth century.
I will look to see how Reformed political theology was applied in both Parliamentary sermons, in
the National Covenant and Solemn League and Covenant, and in debates over the Regicide.
What was considered as political theory in the previous chapter becomes political experience.
Second, I return to consider the eschatological dimension of theology and ask if millenarianism
is essential to covenantal political theology. If so, this then adds a new and previously ignored
dimension to the discussion.

1

For a discussion of whether or not these wars should be called “revolutions,” see Morrill “Introduction.”

178

9.2 Historical Overview of the British Reformation
To discuss “Reformed” political theology in the seventeenth century requires one to study
the Puritans. “Puritan” was originally a term of derision given to those who wanted to reform or
separate from the Church of England. Puritan disputes with the English Church revolved around
a host of theological and political disagreements, notably matters of liturgy and church-state
relations. Disputes over religious first principles reached even to Bible translation, as evidenced
by James I‟s providing an alternative to the Reformers‟ “Geneva Bible” and its seditious political
notes.2
Although the label “Puritan” is now broadly applied in hindsight to a host of discontented
Protestants throughout Great Britain, an important distinction must be made between English and
Scottish Reformers. The most obvious differences concern ecclesiogical or political positions.3
Though not all English were Congregationalists (or Independents) and not all Scots were
Presbyterian, general differences play an important role in understanding the geography and
political details of the English Civil War. English Puritanism, and to some degree all British
Puritanism, grew out of internal disputes within the Church of England. The Scottish
Reformation, however, enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in its development. English
Puritanism took its cues from the Marian exiles. The English, like the Scots, were thus
influenced by developments in the Continental Reformation. But the Scottish Reformation was
even more directly influenced by Continental developments. 4 The Scottish Reformation was also
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influenced by its own Renaissance and humanist traditions, including the work of John Mair.5
The result was something of a “miniature Reformation” of its own – particularly in matters of
political theory. One product of that miniature Reformation was the Scottish Kirk established by
Knox in 1560 on the Presbyterian model.
Presbyterian polity posed a considerable threat to Anglicanism, prompting Queen
Elizabeth to sponsor Richard Hooker‟s The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594, 1597) to refute
Presbyterianism and Puritanism in general. She wrote to James VI of Scotland:
There is risen both in your realm and mine a sect of perilous consequence, such as
would have no kings but a presbytery, and take our place while they enjoy our
privilege, with a shade of God‟s word, which none is judged to follow right
without by their censure they be so deemed. Yea, look we well unto them.6
Though Presbyterianism was technically an argument about church polity, the consequences for
civil polity were inescapable. As with much of the Reformation, the results were revolutionary.
Both Presbyterian and Congregational government encouraged more egalitarian approaches to
government. As British Protestants chafed under English monarchs their doctrines of resistance
and revolution became more pronounced and articulate, and arguments from church polity were
applied to civil disputes.
The ascendance of King James VI of Scotland to become James I of England in 1603 was
a crucible for both political theory and church-state relations. As James I, he hoped to
consolidate Scotland, England and Ireland under one civil and church polity, but he was
continually met with resistance – particularly in matters of religion. Upon taking the throne, he
was confronted almost immediately by Puritans with the Millenary Petition, demanding further
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reform of the Church of England. James made some concessions, but was unwilling to tamper
with the episcopal (bishop-led) system. He believed his kingship to be tied to the bishops and the
episcopal system, as summarized by his phrase, “No Bishop, no King.” Coupled with the
Presbyterian role in the persecution of his mother (Mary Queen of Scots) and what he rightly
suspected was antiroyalism inherent in their beliefs about church polity, James had ample reason
to neutralize Presbyterianism in Scotland. In 1617, he insisted on a series of reforms within the
Kirk in the Five Articles of Perth, reluctantly agreed to by the Scottish General Assembly in
1618 and ratified by the Scottish Parliament in 1621. But despite small successes such as this,
James was unable to accomplish much of his consolidation agenda both at home in dealings with
the Puritans and with the Scottish Presbyterians.
While James I appeared prudent and patient in his dealings with Puritans and
Presbyterians, the same cannot be said about his son and heir. Charles I ascended the throne in
1625 and provoked a catastrophe with attacks by both himself and Archbishop Laud on
Presbyterianism and Puritan worship.7 Morrill writes, “What is striking about Charles‟s policies
towards Scotland is not anglicisation but a naked authoritarianism.”8 The Scots categorical
rejection of bishops and liturgical worship led first to the making of the National Covenant
(1638) and then to the first of the wars, the Bishops‟ Wars of 1639-1640.9 Charles marched to
war against the Scots, who were led by Covenanters. War was averted through the Treaty of
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Berwick (or Pacification of Berwick). Charles conceded to allow a free parliament and church
assembly to Scotland and eventually struck a temporary peace with the Scots in 1641.
The greatest catalyst to civil war in England was the fear of many, particularly in
Parliament, that Charles‟s reforms institutionalized an unaccountable monarchy. Tensions with
Parliament also grew in the face of repeated (and unfulfilled) requests for taxes. This led to
debates about constitutional authority, legal right and sovereignty. Charles attempted on three
occasions to raise taxes for his wars against Spain and France. The issue of authority was forced
by the Petition of Right in 1628, which Parliament used to assert its ultimate right over taxation.
In response to the Three Resolutions in 1629, a call to merchants to refuse the King‟s collection
of tonnage and poundage and also a protest against both perceived doctrinal Arminianism,
Charles dissolved the Parliament and began an eleven year period of personal rule. He
reconvened Parliament to raise money for war against both the Scots and the Irish, but was
denied new taxes by the Short Parliament in 1640. The Long Parliament convened shortly
thereafter and engaged in a series of disputes with Charles that brought issues of constitutional
sovereignty to a head.
Religious controversies are always evident during this same period and they play an
important role in the milieu of conflict. For example, when Roger Manwaring‟s sermon
supporting absolute monarchy was printed in 1628, Parliamentarians protested and had
Manwaring arrested, imprisoned and fined.10 Perceived movement toward Arminianism in the
Church of England was read as the eventual establishment of Roman Catholicism. Any move
against the Kirk was perceived as tantamount to promotion of the Mass. That included even
changes in the Scottish liturgy, a point made quite bluntly by Jenny Geddes with her stool at the
10
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first reading of the Book of Common Prayer in 1637. Kenyon, contra Gardiner and almost 100
years of British history, argues that the “rolling stone” of the wars was not the state of the
monarchy or the ineptitude of Charles I and his advisers. Instead, he argues that the stone started
rolling with Jenny Geddes‟s stool and the accompanying protests against ecclesiastical
imposition.11
The English Civil War began in 1642 shortly after Charles attempted the arrest of five
members of the House of Commons on a charge of treason. The Scots, who had originally made
peace with Charles again in 1641, responded quickly to the appeals of his opponents when Irish
Catholics threaten to join the Royalists. The Scottish Covenanters (Presbyterians) joined the fight
against Charles after English allies agreed to the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643. The
Presbyterians hoped that this common allegiance to the Solemn League and Covenant would
lead to Presbyterian reform of church polity in the Church of England. Pressed by numerous
setbacks and the professional efficiency of the New Model Army, Charles I surrendered in 1646.
Tensions between British Protestants, considered later in this chapter, came to a head in
Charles I‟s trial and execution by the Rump Parliament in 1649. As evidenced by the absence of
Presbyterians in the Rump Parliament, a fatal division separated co-religionists on the question.
Charles II took advantage of the ensuing Scottish-English rivalry and established a foothold in
Scotland in 1650. He allied himself with both Scot Royalists and Covenanters by signing the
Solemn League and Covenant. Eventually, with the help of the Scots, Charles II regained the
throne and began persecuting both Puritans and Covenanters.
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9.3 The National Covenant, Solemn League and Covenant, and the Westminster Assembly
In the face of Charles I‟s early assaults on Presbyterianism, Scots Alexander Henderson
and Archibald Johnston drew up the National Covenant in 1638. It was based on the Confession
of Faith of 1581 (signed by James VI) and reflected both the Reformed theology of covenant and
the tradition of religious “banding” popular in Scotland since the late sixteenth century.12 This
document, and the succeeding one, the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), became literal and
legal expressions of political theology coupled with historical and cultural circumstance. The
National Covenant cited numerous Acts of Parliament to show that the Reformed faith had been
duly established in Scotland and bound its signatories to maintain freedom of Church and defend
Presbyterianism. This gave real birth to the Covenanter movement. It also provided legal warrant
for deposing and excommunicating bishops, in addition to condemning the Book of Canons, the
Liturgy and Perth Articles. The National Covenant was first signed by noblemen, gentry, clergy
and burgesses but was later distributed for what Steele calls a “direct, formal canvass of the
Scottish people for a loyalty oath.”13
The National Covenant not only asserted Presbyterianism as true church polity, it also
asserted Scottish nationalism, civic loyalty to the crown, and the supremacy of parliamentary
statute.14 Perhaps most significantly, it was also characteristic of earlier covenantal thought
because it emphasized the conditional nature of authority and allegiance.15 This is evidenced by
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the way in which the National Covenant‟s subscribers argued that the King, rather than any mere
discontent on their part, had driven them to articulate revolutionary principles.16 Johnston looked
to writings of prominent federal theologians for inspiration, researching the terms of resistance.17
This included the covenant theology of Ames, discussed in Chapter Seven. Johnston also
examined Althusius‟s Politica.18
The National Covenant did something quite radical in utilizing popular sentiment and
action. While the Scots remained committed to the preservation of monarchical government and
largely to revolution only by duly appointed representatives, there is a populist leap taken in the
National Covenant.19 First, “Tables,” (elected by nobility, gentry, burgesses and clergy) rather
than nobles themselves were to exercise the right of resistance.20 Second, popular persons were
now called upon to testify personally to their loyalty and to affirm popular support.21 Although
intimidation was no doubt used in some cases, popular support was evident. As scholars of the
period have noted, rank and file Scots would not have signed on if they themselves had not
subscribed earlier to the federal theology.22 Though not a fully populist step, the National
Covenant contributed to the significance of the individual conscience in resisting unjust
authority. Steele summarizes this when she writes,
With Covenant ideology, there was an explicit rejection of the collectivist,
sociopolitical obligation to obey out of natural deference to authority in favor of
16
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an individualistic responsibility to conscience based on religious conviction. As
the criterion for loyalty, the designation of conscience was recognized as a radical
choice with potentially serious political repercussions. Those opposed to Caroline
religious reforms were well aware that their activities bordered on sedition;
nonetheless, they believed that their faith provided the moral imperative. If
personal conviction replaced obligation, then the standard concept of natural,
collective loyalty and obedience owed to the established order no longer held.
With all of society bound by a covenant in subordination to God, conventional
social and political allegiance thus took a back seat to faith and the „Politick
Christian‟ was created.”23
This echoes what was discussed in the previous chapter, and in future chapters, about the role of
conscience in resistance and revolution.
In 1643, the help of the Scots against Charles I became conditional on Parliament‟s
approval of the Solemn League and Covenant. This covenant prominently included calls for both
political and religious reformation, and emphasized religious reformation. It also demonstrated
the royalist leanings of the Scots. For many reasons, the alliance enabled by the Solemn League
and Covenant was not a perfect one. The Scots were more concerned with religious matters
while the English were more concerned with constitutional matters such as taxation.24 A
selection from the Solemn League and Covenant follows:
(I) That we shall sincerely, really and constantly, through the grace of God,
endeavour in our several places and callings, the preservation of the reformed
religion in the Church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and
government, against our common enemies; the reformation of religion in the
kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and
government, according to the Word of God, and the example of the best reformed
Churches; and we shall endeavor to bring the Churches of God in the three
kingdoms to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of
faith, form of Church government, directory for worship and catechizing, that we,
and our posterity after us, may, as brethren, live in faith and love, and the Lord
may delight to dwell in the midst of us. (II) That we shall in like manner, without
respect of persons, endeavor the extirpation of Popery, prelacy (that is, Church
government by Archbishops, Bishops, their Chancellors and Commissaries,
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Deans, Deans and Chapters, Archdeacons, and all other ecclesiastical officers
depending on that hierarchy), superstition, heresy, schism, profaneness, and
whatsoever shall be found to be contrary to sound doctrine and the power of
godliness, lest we partake in other men's sins, and thereby be in danger to receive
of their plagues; and that the Lord may be one, and His name one in the three
kingdoms. (III) We shall with the same sincerity, reality and constancy, in our
several vocations, endeavor with our estates and lives mutually to preserve the
rights and privileges of the Parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and to
preserve and defend the King's Majesty's person and authority, in the preservation
and defense of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms, that the world may
bear witness with our consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts or
intentions to diminish His Majesty's just power and greatness.
The Parliaments of England and Scotland eventually required that all persons above the age of
eighteen in both countries swear allegiance the Solemn League and Covenant.
If there was agreement here among Reformed Britons, it is only on the surface. Dissent
over theology, and thus political theology, soon became apparent in the Westminster Confession.
The calling of the Westminster Assembly was approved by Parliamentary Ordinance on June 12,
1643 after five failed attempts to have it approved by Charles I. Most prominent in the Assembly
debates were Scot Presbyterians Alexander Henderson, Samuel Rutherford, and George
Gillespie.25 Other groups were also represented, including Independents and Erastians.
Originally charged with reforming the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, the
Westminster Assembly abandoned this work for a new charge from Parliament on October 12,
1643. The outcome was a public directory for worship (The Directory for the Public Worship of
God), catechisms for adults and children (Shorter and Larger Catechisms), and The Westminster
Confession of Faith.26
Different interpretations of the Solemn League and the Westminster Assembly came to
divide the British reformers. Presbyterians emphatically believed that the Assembly committed
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the nation to a Presbyterian reform, particularly after its work was completed.27 Hard-line
Presbyterian George Gillespie insisted on a kind of divine right Presbyterianism while other
Westminster divines were only willing to endorse the Presbyterian system on prudential
grounds.28 Some Independents such as William Burges agreed with the Covenant in 1641 but
dissented against its imposition in 1643.29 Presbyterians cited the Covenant against
Independents, who insisted that the spirit and function of it had been broken by the King and thus
was of no effect.30 Independents also appealed to the Noahide Covenant in response, which
obliged capital punishment for those who committed murder.31 Against Erastians, Gillespie
argued that there were distinct civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions.32 As the distance between
Presbyterians and others grew, the Covenant was discarded by Independents as “judicial
hardness.”33 Cromwell accused the Presbyterians with “pretenses of king and [the Solemn
League and] Covenant.”34
9.4 A Covenanted Nation: The Parliamentary Sermons
The application of covenant theology also becomes apparent in sermons preached to
Parliament during the Long Parliament. Beginning in November, 1640, the Long Parliament
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instituted the practice of regular sermons from Reformed clergy. These sermons were preached
until 1652. Many were printed. For most of this time, an ecumenical approach (within Reformed
theology) prevails. Clergy were not excluded because of their particular views on ecclesiastical
polity. Thus, these sermons become a window into the covenantalism common to both
Independents and Presbyterians. Clergy did not see themselves as having any authority over
Parliament. It is an important distinction that Wilson emphasizes as follows, “Their teaching was
basically derived from theological assumptions. They offered saving knowledge, rather than
political advice and counsel, at the humiliations and thanksgivings. In this manner the divines of
the brotherhood sought to shape a pious nation.”35 But even though legal authority was not
presumed by the clergy, these were sermons intended to have political consequence in one form
or another. Clergy mimicked the Old Testament prophets. The terms in which the clergy spoke
emphasized corporate entities, often the nation or the church. Their language was nationalist,
often taking ancient Israel as a model.36 Britain‟s history was reconstructed in light of a narrative
in which the people could enjoy security and purity through a close relationship between church
and state. This was ideally going to be fulfilled in the Westminster Assembly, whose members‟
sermons are frequently quoted and cited in studies of the Civil War.37
Before the war, the clergy sought a national church as the expression of a faithful people.
The Solemn League and Covenant was seen by both Scot Presbyterians (such as Alexander
Henderson) and English Independents (such as Philip Nye) as being the realization of these
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hopes.38 The League and Covenant also advanced federal conceptions of corporate and national
piety.39 Joseph Caryl (a Nonconformist and Independent) provided the fullest analysis of the
Solemn League and Covenant in his work The Nature, Solemnity, Grounds, Property, and
Benefits, of a Sacred Covenant, defining the end of a political covenant as “the glory of God and
their common good.”40 It would also enable a “holy and happy people.”41
As a covenanted nation, rulers were “appointed” by God – but not in any Divine Right
sense. Appointment justified accountability, and the vehicle for accountability was found in
human politics and clerical preaching. The people and the commonwealth were committed to
serving their governors, but they were also charged with reform of the church. This was
emphasized in the political sermons. Cornelius Burges told the Parliament in 1640, “My
businesses is, merely to persuade you into a Religious Covenant with God, as himself hath
prescribed and commanded; and his people, in the best times of Reformation, have readily
admitted: namely, every man to stir up himself and to lift up his Soul to take hold of God, to be
glued and united to him, in all faithfulness, sincerity, care, and diligence, to be only his for
ever.”42
Covenantal political theology said that righteous and religious leaders are a blessing. This
made government a divine office, but one which still required the tutoring of the preachers.43 The
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preachers often tutored through a prophetic narrative of the contemporary situation. Wilson
writes,
The preachers‟ interpretation of England‟s history as holy history, that is,
according to a course of covenanted salvation, contrasted starkly with the
ambiguous status of the parliamentary cause. Whereas the victories in the field
which led to conclusion of the first civil war, for example, could be framed within
their theological calculus (thereby serving to confirm it), defeats and divisions
were also experienced which, it might be thought, would have called that
framework into question. Thus there was an evident need to come to terms with
the times.”44
By 1645, the clergy were more explicit in attributing troubled times to the failure of the people
and nation to uphold covenant obligations. Stephen Marshall and Edmund Calamy (both
Presbyterians), for example, blamed divisions and faction. Others blamed heresy. With these
transgressions came both covenantal chastisement and deliverance.45 Wilson writes, “Eventually
the preachers‟ teaching came to be dominated by the thesis that the covenant people might well
provoke God, leading Him to take vengeance upon them, but that in the end He would not reject
them.”46 National repentance resembled individual repentance, with nation-wide prayer and
fasts.47 Wilson summarizes his study of the Parliamentary sermons by emphasizing their
eschatological content. He writes,
In certain respects emphasis upon the anticipated new „age‟ – explicitly
millenarian or not – was the most striking and fundamental characteristic of the
formal preaching before the Long Parliament, at least insofar as it is accessible
through published sermons. . . . Whatever else may be required to understand
them, it is necessary to recognize in the sermons at the humiliations and
thanksgivings an attempt on the part of the clerical puritans to establish a
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collective eschatological framework to confer historical meaning upon the
exercise of their piety.48
It is these differences in eschatology, and related theological differences, that will be considered
in the remainder of the chapter.
9.5 The Challenge of Millenarianism
Millenarianism, although not the subject of the dissertation, has clear and important
political implications. Millenarianism does not necessarily detach persons from politics. It often
threatens to turn them into political zealots. Lamont is right to argue that millenarianism,
especially in the case of seventeenth century England, is more about involvement with the world
than alienation from it.49 Mllenarianism‟s reputation for radicalism stands in sharp contrast to the
more prudent and anti-temporal influence of traditional Augustinian eschatology. Pocock
attributes this radicalism to “imminent transcendence,” something akin to Voegelin‟s description
of gnosticism. 50
But there are many eschatological theologies. Some are more spiritual and others more
literal and political.51 Calvin, so often considered the prototype of Reformed theology, was not
especially interested in eschatology. Lamont compares him to Augustine in this respect. 52 But
Calvin was never the inspiration for political religion in the Puritans. Lamont writes, “Goffe and
other seventeenth-century English Calvinists did not learn chiliasm from Calvin; in England it
was first Wyclif, then Bale and Bullinger, who developed the idea that the Book of Revelation
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foretold the destruction of the Roman Antichrist. But it was John Foxe who combined this belief
with the assumption that the Christian Emperor had a decisive part to play in the process.”53
To determine the status of millenarianism in Reformed political theology, it is important
to determine if co-covenantalists can be found to disagree in their application of millenarianism.
Ideally, a case is found wherein one group of covenantalists rejects the millennial radicalism of
their colleagues outright, especially on covenantal grounds. That probably best describes what
transpired between Independents and Presbyterians over the trial and execution of Charles I.
While the differences between the Regicides, largely Independents, and their opponents, largely
Presbyterians, has been attributed to a variety of factors, Mayfield is correct to focus on clergy
and theology and insist on a religious explanation of the differences.54
While both Presbyterians and Independents shared a common fondness for eschatological
exegesis and narratives, not all eschatology can be considered “millenarian.” Wilson describes
the division over eschatology as prophetic versus apocalyptic, appearing as early as 1642.55
Apocalyptic eschatology did not have an open future. God ruled the course of human events and
would bring things to pass in the context of a certain future. The vision of this future was
withheld from the worldly wise but delivered to faithful elite.56 Prophetic eschatology
emphasized the covenant relationship and the delivery of a “word” from God. It embodied both
judgment and mercy. Its vision of the future presented eventualities in context of an open future.
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This was a scriptural admonition to a covenanted people, not a prediction.57 Asserting a special
place in Providence, echoing the Old Testament cosmology of deliverance and judgment, is not
the same kind of utopianism and immanent earthly reign that found its way into the more radical
clergy and sects. Whereas prophetic preachers counseled reformation, apocalyptic preachers
exalted radical and destructive acts, violence and revolution.
9.6 Dissent over Regicide: Millenarianism and the Covenant
Though Scottish Presbyterians had provided some of the most articulate arguments for
resistance and revolution and supported the war against Charles I, they did not support his public
trial and execution. Rutherford denounced it. But given that proponents for the king‟s deposition
claimed to draw support from Knox, Goodman, Buchanan and even Rutherford, then where did
the differences lie? Underlying the disagreements about jurisprudence were significant
differences in theology.58 This included disagreements about the role of the church in the polity
and the right use of both reason and Scripture in constructing legal and political theory including the use of natural law.59 These resulted in two different views of the covenant. The
most significant question is whether the differences first began with disputes about polity and
practice, or whether those disputes were first begun and sustained by differing views of sacred
history and eschatology. According to Wilson‟s analysis, it is the latter.60 This is also Mayfield‟s
conclusion. Presbyterians, who were co-belligerents in the Revolution and co-religionists in
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many ways, disagreed with what they saw as hyper-millenarianism of the Independents.61 They
also had fundamental disagreements about covenant theology and the nature of the Fall. This
translated into a different approach to church-state relations.
The origins of the more radical English millennial thought have been traced to the Marian
exile of 1553-1559 and to the work of John Foxe.62 Foxe‟s Acts and Monuments provided an
impressive interpretation of contemporary events. But Foxe was conservative in many respects,
much more comfortable with interpreting the past than the future. He also supported the status
quo, including that of bishops and monarchy. Lamont judges Foxe‟s influence “more
ambivalent” than originally thought by Haller.63 He argues that Charles I succeeded in making
Foxe‟s faith in Crown and bishop implausible by 1641. The result was a loss of faith in Foxe but
not in the Book of Revelation. Many lost faith in a godly prince, but could not agree on the
alternative.64 What followed was a host of disputes about civil and church polity, eschatology,
religious establishment and toleration, and (most significant for our purposes) covenant theology.
While many disputed Foxe‟s answers, they did not dispute his questions or their
eschatological import.65 In the early part of the seventeenth century it fell to Thomas Brightman
and Joseph Mede to orient eschatology toward the future. This meant not simply interpreting the
future, but also transforming it.66 Brachlow writes,
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With Napier and Brightman‟s publication of commentaries on the eschatological
implications of the prophetic books of Daniel and Revelation at the turn of the
seventeenth century, as well as those of Joseph Mede in 1627, a new and radically
transformed understanding of the Parousia was, according to many modern
scholars, inaugurated in English Protestant thought. It was in their writings, and
not those of Foxe, that seventeenth-century apocalyptic expectations of the
millennium as a future golden age on earth were beginning to surface.67
This had a profound effect on British politics, particularly in terms of revolutionary rhetoric. 68
Mayfield writes,
It was the cumulative effect of a literalistic and futuristic eschatology, particularly
as regards the doctrine of the millennium, which proved especially useful to the
later radicals among the Independents. . . . Fitted with new prophetic spectacles
that looked forward instead of backward, a new excitement vivified contemporary
events for those truly spiritual men privileged, if not to all the precise details,
certainly to the glorious outlines of what God had in store for the family of the
saints.69
This new eschatology was championed early in the sermons of Richard Sibbes and Thomas
Goodwin.70 It is also found in the sermons of John Owen, Cromwell‟s chaplain, and in the
writings of John Milton.71 This millenarianism is consequential not only for England, but for
some in America. Indeed, Wilson casts American Puritan John Cotton as a millenarian.72 He was
a supporter of the execution of Charles I, and exerted influence through his correspondence with
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Cromwell.73 Independents most often provided a radical eschatological interpretation of
contemporary events. Some Independents came to view the trial and execution of Charles I as
prelude to the millennium. John Cooke, who became Solicitor General and chief prosecutor of
Charles I, anticipated the millennium‟s arrival in the wake of the King‟s execution (Cooke
continued to look for it even as he was condemned to die after the Restoration). When the radical
eschatology trickled down from the educated clergy to the army to Fifth Monarchists and
Levellers, the effect multiplied.74 Regardless of where they stood on the millennium, it can be
generally said that Independents were more likely to preach apocalyptic eschatology.75 Wilson
provides considerable evidence of this point.76
But this apocalyptic eschatology of the Independents is perhaps still not the most
important point of their political theology; rather, their eschatology provides a way to discern
important and fundamental differences in political theologies. Mayfield goes on to say, “This
[eschatological] view was intimately tied to the Independent view of the church and, generally,
to their doctrine of sin and grace which they distinguished from the views of their Presbyterian
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and Anglican counterparts, whom they believed to hold corrupt views.”77 Independents‟
apocalyptic eschatology invited a disdain for the more humane and earthy politics of their
opponents. As Independents increasingly asserted themselves as a separate party within the
Protestant movement, they condemned the “spiritual prostitution” that would result from either
Presbyterian supremacy or Erastianism.78 This was not a controversy that began with the British
civil wars. It revealed a long-standing and ever-expanding fissure in covenant theology.
Both Independents and Presbyterians believed that the church had to be protected against
heresy. But Independents believed that this protection did not need any head other than Christ
Himself, particularly if Britain was on the eve of the millennium. For some, this was an
argument about the efficacy of religious establishment and the dangers of persecuting the
righteous. Demonstrating his concern for the accidental persecutions of civil orthodoxy,
Goodwin declared, “rather [let] some beastly men be, than that their suffering should occasion
the . . . suffering of his [true] saints.”79 Other Independents focused on what they considered to
be a great difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate. While Independents were
evangelical in outlook, they did not believe that the visible church should be corrupted or
confused by the presence of the unregenerate. As far as the Independents saw things, natural law
and conscience (more prominent in certain strains of federal theology) could not justify the
broader and more inclusive ecclesiology sought by the Presbyterians.80
Presbyterians responded with criticism against what they deemed as chiliastic and
Antinomian eschatology. Millenarianism was condemned by Presbyterian Richard Baxter, who
77

Mayfield, op. cit., 101

78

Ibid., 186

79

Goodwin, Innocency and Truth, “Epistle to the Reader,” 9, 89, 134. Quoted in Mayfield, op. cit., 187

80

Mayfield, op. cit., 193

198

later opposed the execution and refused the oath of allegiance to the new Commonwealth under
Cromwell.81 Presbyterian Robert Baillie, representative of other Westminster Divines, rejected
the literalism of Cotton and other Independents – calling the Independents “Chiliasts.”82
Rutherford likewise took a position against what he saw as a kind of utopian eschatology on the
part of Independents.83 Alexander Henderson, the iconic Scottish Presbyterian, provided direct
criticism of millenarianism in a sermon to the House of Lords84
9.7 Presbyterians versus Independents: Applying Differences in the Covenant
Presbyterian conflicts with Independents not only turned on eschatological differences,
they also reflected disagreement about the political application of differences between regenerate
and unregenerate – the two covenants of federal theology. That had profound implications for
political theology and the relationship between church and state. Whereas Independents such as
Owen advocated toleration, Presbyterian resistance to separating church from state rested
ironically on their greater appreciation of natural law.85 By emphasizing the adequacy of natural
law in enabling the Covenant of Works, Presbyterians could hold all accountable for living a
moral life. This was to be supported by ecclesiastical methods. Mayfield writes, “Presbyterians
played up the continuity rather than the discontinuity between Law and Grace. And by their
application of Covenant Theology, they found a way to comprehend the unregenerate in a mixed,
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national church.”86 Presbyterians accommodated the Mosaic Covenant (equated with Covenant
of Law) to the Covenant of Grace. By contrast, Independents equated this with legalism and
confusion of the spiritual order with natural reason.87 Presbyterians, in turn, criticized
Independents as encouraging practical Antinomianism and neglecting the Mosaic Law in the
Covenant of Grace.88
Presbyterians stressed the bilateral rather than the unilateral nature of the Covenant of
Grace.89 The result of this emphasis on the bilateral covenant meant that Presbyterians lacked the
Independent obsession with the purity of the visible church. Mayfield writes, “The important
point is not that the conscience might be regenerated [by natural law]; that was not the emphasis
nor was it the really significant thing in the teaching of Perkins and his Presbyterian followers.
The salient feature of their message was instead that even the unregenerate man could (indeed he
must) be comprehended within the community of the elect, the invisible saints, in a mixed
national church.”90 Taking the long view, this Presbyterian civil theology looks more like that of
Anglicans and Catholics, comprehending all of society into one corpus Christianum.91 But to
Independents such as Owen and Milton (who differed still on other matters to be sure), this
Presbyterian regime of church and polity looked like spiritual tyranny. That is summarized in
Milton‟s last line of On the New Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament (1646):
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“New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large.” Independents insisted on a clearer distinction
between the regenerate and the unregenerate, thus denouncing any assertion of a “visible church”
and “national church.”92
These theological and ecclesiastical differences had significant impact on law and
political theory. Rutherford, Prynne, and Baillie viewed the Independent approach to the Mosaic
Law as detrimental to the social order. Participants in the King‟s trial (Independents) had
abandoned the Bible, the written Word, and the law of nature and were instead guided by
“impulses of the Spirit”93 Making the sharper distinction between the saints and the
unregenerate, the Independents took a dim view of both reason and the common law emphasis on
precedent. When Rutherford argued that man was absolutely free to use his reason to determine
the appropriate form of government and that no particular form was of divine origin, this
conflicted with the Independent‟s millenarian judgment of monarchy and its relationship to
Antichrist. Rutherford was quick to cite the law of nature sufficient for articulating political
theory. Neither he nor Prynne rejected monarchy as inherently evil.94 Independents like Milton,
by contrast, argued that monarchy was only a “type” preceding the monarchy of Jesus Christ
over the invisible church.95 Owen denounced the juridical ideas of Rutherford in 1653, criticizing
what he saw as the (Catholic) influence of Suarez on them.96
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Presbyterian covenant theology enabled accommodation of natural law and traditional
jurisprudence. Presbyterians like Prynne, for example, were more willing to make use of the new
common law method. Cooke, Milton and other Independents rejected it.97 Not only did the
Independent view mean rejecting the scholastic doctrine connecting law with reason, it also
meant a rejection of any “artificial reason” (taught by Coke) used to interpret law. Milton, for
example, placed justice above precedent and argued no contradiction since both came from the
same God. And whereas the Old Order venerated mixed monarchy, precedent, and statute law,
the New Age of the Spirit would see the frailties of human law and overturn their imperfection.98
This all came from the Independent‟s view of unregenerate reason and the Independents‟ belief
that the end of society was ultimately a spiritual one. Both Dell and Cooke, for example,
employed the current legal terminology: fundamental law, natural law, reason, and salus populi.
But these terms were merely hijacked to advance a revolutionary confusion of civil law and
theology insofar as the Independents rejected the standing (or progressive) jurisprudence as
“empty forms” corrupted by the natural reason of men who were not members of the invisible
church.99 Milton went so far as to lump lawyers and Presbyterians together and charged both
with non-spiritual motives.100
For Independents, religious orthodoxy was the basis of legal orthodoxy. Religious
orthodoxy was rooted in a firm emphasis on regeneration. The government ought to be
controlled only by regenerate men because only they could discern the will of God against mere
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human precedent.101 Cooke opposed contemporary legal theory, particularly as it was used by
Parliamentary-Presbyterianism as “spiritually obtuse and pedantic.” Previous cases and opinions
in law had to be reviewed in light of the imperative to destroy Antichrist‟s kingdom.
Furthermore, it was years of antichristian influence that had distorted and corrupted the law and
would soon be overthrown by Christ‟s kingdom.102 Owen went so far as to assert that dissenting
from the eschatological direction (which included the overthrow of Charles I as one of the ten
kings who conspired with Antichrist) was to sin in the ultimate sense, to commit amartanein.103
Peter Sterry, state chaplain, defended the Regicide in spiritual terms.104 Just as the ceremonial
law had been overthrown by Christ, so the laws of the Old Covenant reflected a view of the civil
magistrate that must give way to reign of the New Covenant.105
9.8 Conclusion
The “Wars of the Three Kingdoms” demonstrate how Reformed theology became
political theory. In the case of Scotland, covenant theology inspired two national covenants with
implications for popular government and interposition of lesser magistrates. The covenant also
had prophetic and moral implications in parliamentary sermons. The general support of
resistance and revolution in Reformed political theology inspired the overthrow and execution of
Charles I, though not all Reformers agreed on the Regicide
Disagreements over the Regicide demonstrate how theological differences between
Independents and Presbyterians created variations of the same political theology. Both camps
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articulated their case in the context of covenant theology. Independents were more akin to
“fundamentalists,” believed that traditional English jurisprudence was inferior to the explicit
application of Scripture seen through an apocalyptic lens. They believed that faithfulness to the
covenant would encourage (though not oblige) the coming of the millennium. Their
ecclesiastical focus was more divorced from an explicit civil-ecclesiastical partnership, focusing
instead on the moral benefits of purer churches and a broader (though hardly liberal) religious
toleration. Presbyterians, who had a more generous opinion of reason and natural law, defended
traditional English jurisprudence and opposed both the more radical apocalyptic narratives and
the Regicide. Their view of the covenant necessitated a close alliance between civil and
ecclesiastical, including a common British ecclesiastical polity. This would enable all persons to
be held accountable to either one or the other Biblical covenant – of Works or of Grace.
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CHAPTER 10
NATURAL LAW IN REFORMED POLITICAL THEOLOGY
10.1 Introduction
Having summarized some of the theory and practice of Reformed and covenantal
political theology, it now becomes appropriate to situate the Reformers further within the
mainstream of political theory. This will be done in these next two chapters using themes of
natural law and natural right. Studying the use of natural law and natural right is important for
arguments about historical (dis)continuity. Natural law is a longstanding argument in political
theory. It is therefore important to determine how the Reformers used natural law and how they
understood related arguments from reason and nature. The same is true with natural right, which
conceptually represents an important change in the language and theory of politics.
Discerning Reformed arguments from nature is important for the theoretical argument of
the dissertation as well. As I will address in the conclusion, it may be that more ecumenical
arguments will become increasingly important for the future if theological communities want to
participate in an increasingly diverse, secular, and pluralistic world. But will this inevitably lead
to tension between the use of natural and revealed sources? How much argument from nature can
be used before the argument becomes essentially un-theo-logical in the “revealed” sense of the
term? Does one approach have a tendency to undermine the significance of the other? These are
important debates within contemporary political theory.
The question of natural law becomes further complicated by what some perceive to be a
distinctively Protestant prejudice against natural law. This is reflected, for example, in a 1934
dispute between Emil Brunner and Karl Barth.1 Eusden summarizes the perception of an anti-
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natural law bias in Protestantism when he says, “Too often it is assumed that Roman Catholicism
draws openly on nature and reason and that Protestantism sanctimoniously does not.”2
What I will demonstrate is that natural law arguments have long been a part of the
historical record of Reformed political theology. Natural law and reason are both readily used by
Reformers, though not always in the same way as their classical and medieval ancestors. The
historical Reformed record, even the larger historical Protestant record, cannot be called
“fundamentalist.” A language and theory of natural right is also at home in the Reformed
tradition, though the arguments articulated by the Reformers in the sixteenth and seventeenth
century are better understood as a proto-natural right argument.
10.2 Reformers and Natural Law
There is good reason to ask about the status of natural law in the Reformed tradition. It
should be expected that the humanist training of the Reformers would lead them to make natural
law a major category of argument. But given Reformed theology‟s general emphasis on the
corruption of the postlapsarian condition and the need for electing grace, should this not
discourage them from relying on something as common and “earthly” as natural law?
Surprisingly, however, it may be Reformed theology‟s emphasis on election and divine
sovereignty that not only enables, but in fact encourages, attention to natural law.
Haller sees the way in which the natural law is both at the root and the end of the branch
of changes effected by the Reformation. When introducing his seminal set of Puritan political
tracts, Haller writes,
The religious doctrine of a supernatural law, and of a divine right vested in
established institutions, evoked the rational or quasi-rational doctrine of natural
law and of natural rights vested in the individual. Thus emerged the modern
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doctrine of liberty. But the religious and theological terms and images in which
that doctrine took form did much to obscure the source from which it sprang. 3
Wilson, writing on the sermons to the Long Parliament, argues,
The scriptures were held to be authoritative but also self-authenticating according
to the wisdom of the world rooted in the informed experience of rational men.
Like their spiritual father Calvin, and unlike many post-Enlightenment
Protestants, the puritans experienced no gulf between natural and revealed truth. .
. . The „doctrines‟ preceded the „reasons,‟ but the latter made the former principles
comprehensible and eminently rational.4
McNeill, another prominent scholar of Reformed political theory, argues not only that natural
law was an inherent part of the Reformed tradition; he argues it was essential because of the
central doctrine of election. Given that one did not know who was elected to salvation, one
needed to root the civil polity in natural law. McNeill writes,
In general [the Calvinist spirit] has asserted the basic authority of the people, and
conceived of this as divinely bestowed through natural law. Its proponents do not
assert that political rights are for the elect only; the approach to this in New
England was not typical. The Calvinist who tries in this way to be politically
exclusive is embarrassed by his own Calvinist affirmation that he does not know
who the elect are. God alone knows.5
This problem is echoed by Lamont. Writing of the problem that confronted English and Scottish
Protestants (how to pursue godliness in the civil polity during the middle of the seventeenth
century) Lamont writes,
“The idea of a „Godly Rule‟ has only been tenable on the assumption that God‟s
will was intelligible. The concept was to become debased in Cromwell‟s eyes
when Levellers such as Wildman and Rainborough invoked it, as it had already
become in Coleman‟s eyes when Presbyterian Scots such as Gillespie and Baillie
invoked it. But the alternative was not to disown Calvinism; rather, it was to
reinvent Calvinism more rigorously. For, although we have seen that the concept
is Calvinist, it is also in another sense truly non-Calvinist. For, although the
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identification of self with the workings of God‟s Purpose is a characteristic if the
Calvinist Elect, it runs counter to another Calvinist principle: that we do not know
who the Elect are; God is Inscrutable. There is in the Calvinist mind a constant
tension between the two impulses.”6
Thus, while it may seem that Reformed theology‟s emphasis on the fallen nature of postlapsarian
mankind would disincline them to arguments from natural law, the mystery of election and
divine sovereignty coupled with the universal need for government put them in the same place as
their predecessors. That is, they found themselves looking for some kind of general revelation to
inform politics.
Given their humanist training, it is predictable that the Reformers would turn to natural
law as a form of general revelation. Koetsier cites Tuck to say that Calvinists were much better
humanists than many Catholics.7 Beza was regarded by Montaigne as one of the greatest Latin
poets of the century. Thoroughly acquainted with classical texts, Beza saw to it that the Academy
of Geneva had a thoroughly classical foundation to its curriculum. He was responsible for a
return to Aristotle, personally insisting on this in a letter to Ramus.8 I have emphasized
previously in the dissertation the humanist training (and writing) of both Bullinger and Calvin.
Even Luther, who was known for his criticism of classical authors and for calling reason “the
devil‟s whore” also considered classical studies essential background for theology. The same
Luther who said of Erasmus, “[He] does not go beyond the light of nature, may like Moses die in
the plains of Moab without entering into the promised land of those higher studies that belong to
godliness” also said “I am persuaded that, without a skilled training in literary studies, no true
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theology can establish and maintain itself.”9 Rutherford, whom we will take up in more detail
later, also shared this commonly humanist and secular education. Coffey describes young
Rutherford‟s curriculum as “strikingly secular.” He cites Innes, who called Rutherford, “St.
Thomas and St. Francis under one hood.”10 Coffey also cites Zagorin and Tuck, who describe
Rutherford as a writer in the scholastic natural law tradition.11 Richards believes that
Rutherford‟s reliance upon arguments from nature merits an extended and favorable (though not
always close) comparison with Locke.12
The northern European humanism which characterized the Reformation and Puritanism
in particular was respectful of classical sources. Its proponents, influenced by the Renaissance,
believed that there was much to be learned from ancient societies. The Reformers complemented
that view with their high regard for Scripture. Within the northern European tradition is an
equally diverse Reformed tradition.13 Todd describes Puritan humanism as “biblical in its
apologetic, eclectic in its sources, mundane in its concerns but religious in its goals, practical in
its methodology, and activist in its approach.”14
To understand the Reformers, one cannot make scholasticism the equivalent of
humanism. The Reformers are better understood as humanists who wanted selectively to break
with scholasticism.15 This did not mean casting off the previous theological or philosophical
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system entirely, particularly its use of natural law. It did not mean breaking with scholasticism
on every point. There is more continuity in Reformed theology with Thomism and Scotism than
there is with nominalism.16 Grabill quotes Muller, who argues, “The Protestant orthodox were
intent upon establishing systematically the normative, catholic character of institutionalized
Protestantism, at times through the explicit use of those elements in patristic and medieval
theology not at odds with the teachings of the Reformation.”17
10.3 Calvin
Though Calvin was not the father or formulator of all Reformed theology, it is important
to start with Calvin, then turn to some of his contemporaries, and turn finally to the federal
theologians. Humanism defined Calvin‟s education and left a deep impression on his work.
Erasmus and Lefevre have even been credited with Calvin‟s conversion.18 Calvin was also
deeply influenced by the Renaissance‟s attention to both individualism and natural law.19 It is an
ironic testimony to Calvin‟s appeal to modern humanists, even “Enlightenment” humanists, that
Thomas Jefferson tried to purchase the Geneva Academy in 1795.20 But Calvin was also quite
emphatic about the failure of natural reason alone to discern the true nature of God or even what
was truly good.21 He developed a provocative category of something he calls Christian
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philosophy.22 Calvin argued that all theology apart from Christ would be fatally corrupted by
sin.23 This does not equate to “fundamentalism” however.
To understand Calvin better, one must separate (as much as Calvin will allow), the role of
nature in conversion and faith from the role of nature in all other matters. Like other Reformers,
Calvin believed that the Creation left secular philosophers without excuse if they did not see
God‟s hand and goodness in it.24 But this does not mean that nature was good only for leaving
persons without excuse for their apostasy or unbelief, or for giving believers another
confirmation of what they knew by Word and Spirit.25 In his Institutes, Calvin makes an
important distinction between earthly things and heavenly things. Note especially his discussion
of politics:
By earthly things, I mean those which relate not to God and his kingdom, to true
righteousness and future blessedness, but have some connection with the present
life, and are in a manner confined within its boundaries. By heavenly things, I
mean the pure knowledge of God, the method of true righteousness, and the
mysteries of the heavenly kingdom. To the former belong matters of policy and
economy, all mechanical arts and liberal studies. To the latter…belong the
knowledge of God and of his will, and the means of framing the life in accordance
with them. As to the former, the view to be taken is this: Since man is by nature a
social animal, he is disposed, from natural instinct, to cherish and preserve
society; and accordingly we see that the minds of all men have impressions of
civil order and honesty. Hence it is that every individual understands how human
societies must be regulated by laws, and also is able to comprehend the principles
of those laws. Hence the universal agreement in regard to such subjects, both
among nations and individuals, the seeds of them being implanted in the breasts
of all without a teacher or lawgiver.26
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So while Calvin was skeptical about the role of nature and traditional philosophy in reaching to
spiritual things, he did not extend that skepticism to earthly things and to politics in particular.
He frequently cited classical authors when outlining the civil magistrate‟s responsibilities.27
Calvin sometimes commends the degree of truth evident in secular writers.28 Partee summarizes
Calvin as follows, “Thus in spite of the pervasive influence of the sin of man, there remains a
kind of glory which belongs to the mind of man, and since all truth is from God, it should not be
denied.”29 There is an important difference between reason ruling the soul for earthly things and
reason ruling the soul for heavenly things. Natural law can have more than one function. For
moral instruction to Christians, for example, Calvin clearly believed natural law greatly inferior
to divine law.30 But what of earthly subjects that affect all men?
This distinction is not entirely clear to Hancock, for example, who seems confused by
Calvin‟s discussions of reason and sin. Despite his discussion of Calvin being fine on many
points, Hancock appears unable to accept Calvin on his own terms and instead insists on
imposing categories of investigation which Calvin would not recognize nor accept.31 Hancock
admits as much and reveals his own presuppositions about political theory, when he writes,
“Calvin‟s quite frequent appeal to natural law, despite his consistent emphasis on the depravity
of nature, has long presented an obstacle to efforts to provide a complete and coherent account of
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Calvin‟s political teaching.”32 Koetsier argues that Skinner makes a similar error, dedicating
himself to Calvin‟s theology while ignoring his use of natural law.33
It may perhaps be surprising to some that Calvin refers to the natural law every place that
moral questions are treated in his theology. Testifying to Calvin‟s broad familiarity with and use
of natural law, Hopfl writes, “References to natural law, then, are not confined to any one part of
Calvin‟s life or work or to any one issue, nor are they peripheral or casual, even if deficient in
precision. It can therefore hardly be denied that Calvin believed that there was a natural order of
moral laws to be discerned, and that men did discern it, at least when it did not cross their
interests.”34 To reference something does not necessarily imply that great stock is put in it,
however. On the question of emphasis, Grabill argues continuity in the Reformers‟ reference to
natural law, but argues discontinuity in the Reformers‟ understanding of man‟s ability to obey it:
The principal difference between Aquinas and Calvin may relate more to Calvin‟s
epistemological modifications to the realist theory of natural law, which he shares
with both Aquinas and Scotus, than to a fundamental difference in moral content
as mediated by either the lex naturalis or the lex divina. Calvin, in distinction to
Aquinas and Scotus, attributes greater priority to the post-lapsarian conscience
than to the pre-lapsarian reason as the defining characteristic of his doctrine of
natural law.35
Grabill goes on to argue that while Calvin does not exactly equate the Decalogue to be the same
as natural law, or vice versa, neither does he sever reason and conscience. Conscience, according
to Calvin, is more a function of the intellect than of the will.36 This is where lapsarian theological
distinctions become most important.
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The practical political application of all this can be confusing. Hopfl appears unwilling or
unable to sort out some of the finer distinctions in Calvin‟s categories, frustrated that clear legal
parallels cannot be drawn from Calvin‟s work. But he is probably correct in concluding that
Calvin asserted a hierarchy for political theory later Reformers could agree with.37 Scripture is
the best guide for the civil magistrate. This is not because the natural law provides no instruction
in justice and external righteousness. Rather, it is Scripture that best helps the magistrate to
accomplish his mission of Two Table enforcement (as presented in Chapter Eight). Marshall also
provides insight into the Reformers when he says (arguing in the context of Rutherford), that
natural law without a theological base can lead to a misreading of nature in general and of human
nature in particular.38 If nature is understood as being part of the covenantal order, then it ought
to reinforce the relational telos of God‟s covenants.39
10.4 Goodman, Knox and Mornay
Both Goodman and Knox referred to natural reason, though not as frequently or
systematically as Calvin. They both believed that it could be called upon to demonstrate some
plain points of political theory that were more clearly argued in Scripture. Speaking of the case
of Mattathias‟s rebellion, Goodman writes,
Yea and if there were neither example nor Scripture to prove his fact; yet would
natural reason compel ever man to allow the same, as most godly. And that
therein he did nothing but his duty, which thing was approved in the judgment of
that age, and as a lawful fact and monument write and left to be read by all
posterity, the law of nature so directing their judgments. But to put you out of all
doubt, we will confirm it with another testimony most surely authorized, and the
very same in effect, of that renowned and worthy captain Joshua, the son of Nun,
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whom God himself had chosen to succeed Moses in the government, and leading
of the people of Israel.40
Mattathias is an odd choice for a Protestant given his location in the Books of the Maccabees.
But Goodman argues that his case is not to be referenced because it is in a canonical book.
Rather, it is a case which demonstrates armed resistance to be justified by both reason and
Scripture.
Knox also relied on reason to reinforce clear points from Scripture. In his famous
polemic against female civil magistrates, Knox looked to Scripture and to Church Fathers.41 But
he also included quite a bit of arguing from non-Scriptural sources and from nature itself.42 Knox
references Aristotle and Cicero.43 Mason says of the work:
Writing in the style of the schools, but enlivening his scholastic reasoning with
outbursts of prophetic invective, Knox took as his starting point the wholly
unambiguous proposition that nature and the Scriptures, both of which were
revelations of the divine will, demanded the total exclusion of women from
power. He then proceeded to marshal an array of authorities, ranging from
Aristotle to Augustine, and from the civil law to secular history to support his
claim. But he was patently more at home when he turned to biblical „case law‟
and was able to exercise his exegetical talents.44
In his letter to Mary Queen of Scots, Knox references both Themistius and Democritus (whom
he calls “wise and fecund”).45
Neither did Mornay‟s Vindiciae shy away from secular sources, evidence of his
confidence in the light of reason and experience. Its language is perhaps the most secular of
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sixteenth century Reformed writers. Kelly suggests that this secular language may have even
been an effort to appeal to moderate Catholics in France.46 Mornay (“Brutus”) calls his
opponents “Machiavellians” and “slaves of tyrants.” Speaking of himself, he outlines his defense
as follows:
Let him rejoice that their injustice, crimes, thefts, and frauds are at least laid bare
through his diligence and care, to the most certain security of kings and peoples –
to which single end every effort should be devoted. If they say that he teaches
falsely, it is necessary for them to show it. But, I ask you, how will they prove
this? For whatever is asserted in these investigations is demonstrated to be the
case by the clear illustrations of Holy Scripture, not by twisted ones; confirmed by
the teachings of moral and political science, and of nature, and by the precepts of
law, the pronouncements of jurisconsults, and the rescripts of emperors;
supplemented by the customs and practices of diverse nations; and presented for
inspection as though in a mirror in the various striking examples furnished by
various historians.47
Mornay then makes good on his promise, providing a litany of secular sources joined to his
Biblical sources. This broad net of sources is also characteristic of Mornay‟s other writing.
Fuhrmann echoes McNeill and calls Mornay a founder of modern ecumenicity.48
10.5 Rutherford
Among Reformed theologians, we perhaps find the most generous and ecumenical view
of natural law in Samuel Rutherford. Rutherford‟s use of natural law is a reflection and result of
his broad education. Coffey notes that Rutherford refers to over seven hundred different authors
in the course of his works: “Spanish Jesuits, rabbinical commentators, Greek and Latin Fathers,
classical philosophers, contemporary Protestants, medieval scholastic theologians, and of course,
the sixteenth-century Reformers…roughly divided into five broad categories: classical, patristic,
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medieval, post-Reformation Catholics, and Protestants.”49 That list includes authors important
for late-medieval development of natural right theory: Aquinas, Gerson, Suarez, Almain,
Ockham, and Mair.50 Like many of his fellow Reformers, Rutherford was well-schooled in
Aristotle and even cited Aristotle as an authority against Hooker.51 He did not share the Ramist
preoccupations of some of his Reformed contemporaries.52
Rutherford also followed the lead of George Buchanan, who had previously justified
presbyterian government using a natural law argument.53 Another fellow Scot and contemporary,
George Gillespie, had cited the natural law in defending the human propensity to seek authority.
The Scottish (federal) emphasis on natural law alarms McKay, who argues that it strays from
earlier Reformed theology. McKay overstates the contrasts, but he is correct in noting a different
approach to postlapsarian reason in Scottish Presbyterianism.54 He writes, “It is significant too
that no mention is made of the noetic effects of sin with regard to man‟s perception of Natural
Law. [Rutherford] does…seem to be be remarkably confident that man can rightly perceive this
law, which is perhaps ironical in view of the Reformed estimate of the pervasive effects of sin.”55
Rutherford‟s federal theology is the most important explanation for his use of natural law.
The federal theology movement took flight after the era of Calvin, Goodman, Knox and Mornay.
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As I explained in Chapter Seven, this federal theology movement articulated the idea of a
prelapsarian covenant of works governed by natural law. Not only did this make natural law
binding on all men and a vehicle for articulating political theory, it was arguably a necessary
precursor to the divine law and spiritual conversion. This stood in direct opposition to those
lumped together by Rutherford as part of his opposition: Antinomians, Familists, and
Anabaptists. Each, Rutherford believed, held a contemptuous and heretical disregard for created
things as spiritual vehicles.56 Rutherford equated their disregard of nature to Manichaeism, and
like his co-religionists, saw its logical conclusion as the end of social order.57
Rutherford offers an integrated approach to natural law and Scripture. Like his fellow
Reformers, Rutherford gives priority to Scripture. But there is much acknowledged overlap with
natural law. Richards says of Rutherford‟s use of Christian and classical sources that they were
“braided together to form a durable cord of different strands.”58 This is evident, for example,
where Rutherford writes, "What is warranted by the direction of nature's light is warranted by the
law of nature, and consequently by a divine law; for who can deny the law of nature to be a divine
law."59 Both regenerate and unregenerate had moral power to submit to superiors, though the
divine law would make the conscience more subject to political authority in particular.60
Rutherford believes that to be human is to reason, and that human understanding of the world in
general contributed to correct understanding of the Scriptures. The corruption of reason by sin did
not result in its total annihilation. He did not agree with the Antinomian argument that because
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human logic could not lead to divine faith that it must be rejected altogether. This is why
Rutherford prized an educated ministry. To assert the abuses of intellect did not constitute a
categorical argument against its use.61
Rutherford was working against the contemporary gradual divorce of reason from a
theocentric and covenantal framework. Marshall writes, “A growing secularization of life that had
been set in motion in the sixteenth century and was gaining rapid momentum in the seventeenth
worked to liberate the human mind from the theology of the covenant. . . . Human reason was the
battleground.”62 Marshall argues that while Rutherford and Grotius share much in common,
Rutherford foresees in Grotius a move toward a political theory essentially free of theological
presuppositions.63
As with Calvin, one understands Rutherford by recognizing the contexts in which
Rutherford is speaking of nature and reason. When speaking of righteous and authentic Christian
conduct, Rutherford‟s discussion of nature must give way to grace. When speaking of reason‟s
ability to move the will, Rutherford adheres to the Reformed critique of what they saw as
Pelagianism in the Roman theology. Rutherford thus speaks of nature as at once both fallen and
broken when speaking of it in an ethical sense; it is corrupted by sin.64 But nature remains
unbroken and sinless in its metaphysical constitution. This includes things as God made them in
their nature. They still require grace, but this is not the same grace that is necessary to redeem from
sin.65 How this applies to reason is particularly interesting. Marshall writes,
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Reason is one of the means the use of which God commands. The metaphysical act
of using reason in considering the truth of the gospel is just as necessary as the
external means of attending church and listening to sermons. God draws human
reason in the same way that he moves other second causes, not as „passive lumps‟
to act against their „particular inclination of nature.‟ . . . [Quoting Rutherford] „The
Lord makes the suitable active concurrences of sinless nature and of grade stirring
in its influences to join together and accord friendly, connaturally, and without
jarring , or violence done to nature, and so carries on the supernatural and gracious
actings of obedience.‟66
Like Calvin, Rutherford concludes that Word and Spirit must work together in conversion. The
Word is reasonable, but requires Spirit. The Spirit moves only through the Word.67 But conversion
is a different matter than politics. Hence, as with Calvin, one must separate heavenly from earthly
things in order to understand Rutherford‟s use of natural law and reason.
10.6 The American Puritans
Across the ocean, American Puritans were also wrestling with the general question of
nature and reason, particularly the role of secular sources and natural law. The American Puritans
pursued neither an uncritical use of secular sources nor their blanket condemnation. Some
examples of their selective approach follow. Commenting on a local minister‟s use of secular
sources, Winthrop writes, “[He] delivered many useful things, but in a moral and political
discourse, grounding his propositions much upon the old Roman and Grecian governments, which
sure is an error, for if religion and the word of God makes men wiser than their neighbors, . . . we
may better frame rules of government for ourselves than to receive others upon the bare authority
of the wisdom, justice, etc. of those heathen commonwealths.”68 Praising human wisdom, John
Cotton said, “It is foolish vanity to ask a warrant in scripture for a form of government, for human
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wisdom may teach this.”69 After the Plymouth colony almost failed due to an experiment in
socialism, William Bradford famously condemned the “conceit” of ancient authors who appeared
to recommend common property.70 But like his fellow Reformers, Bradford would refer to the
natural law as a confirmation of Scripture. Recounting the execution of a young man convicted of
bestiality, for example, Bradford wrote that his punishment was based on the Mosaic law and
confirmed by the light of nature.71
It should be emphasized that American Puritanism, in many ways, developed differently
from British Puritanism. Seventeenth century American Puritans were mostly Independents and
Congregationalists in their view of church polity. But unlike English Independents, they did not
have the same distrust of common law. Rather, it was an important part of their legal
formulations and reasoning.72 Many also advocated moderation and prudence in the face of the
English Civil War.73 Scripture was used selectively. In many legal codes it was rarely employed
at all.74 In some cases, Scripture was seen merely as a principle which could only be applied
through English precedent.75 Whereas the legal theory of English Independents had to survive
the crucible of regicide, the legal theory of their American counterparts had to confront the
challenge of founding new political communities. The English became revolutionaries in their
legal theory in order to justify doing something radical and unprecedented. The Americans were
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trying to conserve existing institutions, and could not afford to challenge the standing legal
boundaries.
What becomes clear from Eusden‟s study of American Puritans is their integration of
reason, natural law, and covenant theology in a way that demonstrates both continuity with the
larger Reformed tradition and yet both continuity and discontinuity with historical natural law
theory. There is a surprising absence of explicit references to “covenanting” in many legal
documents. Eusden notes, for example, that neither “covenant” nor “contract” appeared at all in
the 1641 Body of Liberties or the 1660 Laws and Liberties. “Covenant” only appears twice in the
1648 Laws, and then only in the introductory epistle and in reference to the covenant of grace. 76
As Weir‟s exhaustive research into New England‟s town and church documents demonstrates,
communities were literally joined in covenants that mirrored covenant theology.77 But this did
not mean that there was significant theorizing about what those covenants meant for legal or
political structures. Those structures were partly a function of what was already known in
England and partly a function of practical expediency. There certainly was no proto-social
contract theory with its familiar “original position” of liberalism.78
What becomes notable about the American Puritans is how they applied standing
jurisprudence and political theory in the context of the covenant of grace to create a political
theology that was at once both new and still consistent with other Reformed political theologies.
As a nascent political community, the American Puritans realized the need for new political
institutions and laws. But they did not have many skilled common lawyers to enable them to
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precisely mimic the British institutions. Their solution was to turn to the natural law that lay
behind the common law.79 Eusden writes, “A precise answer to the problem of the „reception‟ of
English law is not easily given. On the one hand, the lawmakers of early New England turned
naturally to the common law; but, on the other, the ancient English legal customs and statutes
were not considered absolute, comprehensive authorities.”80
The American Puritans thus looked to the natural law, but it was an understanding of the
natural law that necessitated a theological basis. Like Rutherford, for example, the Puritans could
be comfortable looking to natural law as an expression of God‟s sovereignty. More importantly,
it was an expression of His covenant. While the Puritans had to believe in natural law for man
qua man (Adamic man), or in a covenant of works, they also articulated a political theology of
natural law for those in the covenant of grace. While this was not precisely articulated in a pure
systematic theology, it nevertheless can be discerned from their political theology. Contrary to
what one might expect, this political theology for a community of largely regenerate persons did
not mean creating a utopia of perfect persons and unlimited political power. It led instead to a more
pessimistic view of man‟s capacities in the covenanted community. The recognition of grace,
according to Eusden, led to three emphases. All are consistent with the Reformed political theology
discussed in this dissertation: 1) the limitation of political power with power vested in the people
and an obligation on them to vigilantly guard their liberty; 2) government power in the hands of
civil rather than ecclesiastical rulers; 3) the hearing and honoring of minority views in the
governing of the body politic. After all, who knew the depths of sin better than a redeemed person?
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The Puritans therefore had two categories of natural law. One was for unregenerate
persons (Adamic man) but applicable to the whole community for legal matters. The other was
for regenerate persons. Eusden summarizes the Adamic natural law principles to be salus populi
and self-preservation, moderate behavior, and an innate law of justice.81 But Adamic natural law
was not enough for those in the covenant of grace. Exemplifying the federal theology, for
example, Winthrop said of natural law, "The Law of Grace or the Gospel hath some difference
from the former as in these respects first the law of nature was given to man in the estate of
innocency; this of the gospel in the state of regeneracy."82 A political community of Christians had
to be dedicated to more than just the common goals of unregenerate, albeit rational, persons. The
1648 Laws and Liberties states this very thing when it says, “Now, if it might have been so with
the nations who were so much strangers to the covenant of grace, what advantage have they who
have interest in the covenant, and may enjoy the special presence of God in the purities and native
simplicity of all his ordinances by which he is so near to his own people?”83 To understand and
apply this second level of natural law, the Puritans looked to the Bible as well as to reason. This is
what is often meant in their writings as the “law of reason.”84 Sometimes “reason” refers to
Adamic natural law. But at other times, the Puritans are appealing to logic and reason in the same
way that other federal theologians meant it – as a means created by God for the direction of man to
his nature, and therefore both complementary and consistent with the Scriptures. This was
especially important for the American Puritans insofar as they had to create a political community
on their errand into the wilderness. Eusden writes,
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The Bible, the common law tradition, and the two forms of natural law were not
enough. Rulers and legislators had to reason their way to the laws required for the
new Israel. A law of reason became the supreme authority for the Puritans.
Immediately it should be said that this law of reason was not any objective, easily
discernable norm operating infallibly among all men. It was particular to Puritan
theology. The law of reason was for the early New Englanders part of covenant
natural law. Indeed, it was the highest part.85
This was why men had to be instructed by the Holy Spirit. Redeemed persons had to use both
reason and Scripture together, just as Calvin had taught them.86
Eusden concludes that the early New Englanders can be seen both as having a place in the
natural law tradition and also having no place in it. It is their emphasis on grace that makes all the
difference.87 It was then left to the descendants of the American Puritans to more gradually
secularize their natural law thinking and bring it more into conformity with both ancient precedents
and modern theory.
10.7 Althusius
Before turning to an explicit discussion of natural right, it is appropriate to consider the
case of Johannes Althusius. Though Althusius has been considered one of the greatest political
theorists in the Reformed tradition, not enough is said of his status as the first “modern” political
scientist. The substance of Althusius‟s political theory can be described as the joining of covenant
theology in the form of explicit federalism to humanist natural law. Althusius not only readily
embraces natural law and non-biblical sources; he criticizes the “sprinkling” of theology in the
study of politics. In the preface to the first edition of Politica (1603), Althusius promises an
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attempt to offer intelligence, judgment and memory to beginning students of “political doctrine.”
In discussing his sources, Althusius writes:
I have attempted…to restate in an appropriate order the many political precepts
that have been handed down in various writings . . . I have also added some
others, even though they do not handle the subject professionally. I have
discovered that as each of these other teachers of politics was devoted to this or
that discipline and profession, so he also brought from his own profession many
elements that are improper and alien to political doctrine….Theologians who have
been of this sort have sprinkled teachings on Christian piety and charity
throughout; in deed, I should have even said that they have prescribed a certain
use of the Decalogue for the instruction of the statesman. I have considered that
elements of this sort that are alien and useless in this art ought to be rejected and,
by the dictate of justice, returned to the positions that they properly hold in other
sciences.88
He writes in the preface to the third edition (1614):
By no means, however, do I appropriate those matters that are proper to theology
or jurisprudence. The political scientist is concerned with the fact and sources of
sovereignty…Insofar as the substance of sovereignty or of the Decalogue is
theological, ethical or juridical, and accords with the purpose and form of those
arts, so far do those arts claim as proper to themselves what they take for their use
from the Decalogue and the rights of sovereignty. I claim the Decalogue as proper
to political science insofar as it breathes a vital spirit into symbiotic life and gives
form to it and conserves it.89
In other words, Althusius sees a role for the Decalogue as a metaethic for the political
community, but he does not see Scripture as essential to developing a science of politics.
Althusius‟s unique position has been interpreted in many different ways. Gierke asserted
deist and rationalist elements insofar as Althusius had sequestered religious beliefs from political
theory. Friedrich argued something similar, and ranked him among Bodin and Hobbes in terms
of his significance.90 By the middle of the twentieth century, scholars began to pay more
attention to the role of natural law in Althusius. After surveying the many secondary studies
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about Althusius, Grabill concludes, “For Althusius, like Reformed orthodoxy in general, the
moral law of the Decalogue is simply a renewed and re-enforced form of the logically prior lex
naturalis, the universal knowledge of morality God originally implanted in the mind at creation,
but which after the fall has become obscure and difficult to discern with precision and
reliability.”91 Grabill argues that the key to Althusius‟s understanding of natural law is Girolamo
Zanchi, an Italian Reformer who became a professor of theology at Heidelberg and wrote
extensively on law and utilized Aquinas‟s ideas at length. As with the other Reformers in this
chapter, the result is a synthesis that neither disregards the natural or common law nor the
Decalogue. Grabill concludes, “The duty of the magistrate . . . is to administer the
commonwealth according to the proper law of Moses „so far as moral equity or common law are
expressed therein.‟ As Althusius describes it, the magistrate is required to conform to everything
in the Mosaic law that is in harmony with common law, but is „by no means required to conform
in those things in which the proper law of Moses, in order to be accommodated to the polity of
the Jews, differs from common law.‟” In other words, this is neither a pure natural law nor
theonomic political theory.92
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10.8 Conclusion
While some commentators misunderstand the Reformers‟ appreciation for natural law,
this chapter demonstrates that Reformed theologians were able and willing to utilize natural law
in their political theology. Three explanations are prominent. First, their humanist education
made it almost inevitable. Second, their theology cast nature as God‟s creation and man‟s reason
as a reflection of the divine nature and therefore part of God‟s sovereign plan for mankind.
Third, given that they could never truly discern the work of God in the human heart, one could
never presume that a political (or perhaps even an ecclesiastical) community was purely
regenerate. Even if it was, that did not mean that its members were without sin or the need for
general moral instruction. Thus, broad moral and political instruction could be expected from the
natural law.
But the Reformers could not simply accept the scholastic presentation as delivered.
Though not monolithic in their approach, they sometimes reformulated or adapted natural law
theory to reflect their view of the postlapsarian condition, covenantal political teleology, and
what they considered to be theological, metaphysical, and rhetorical excesses of scholasticism.
The result is that they were prepared to use the traditional principles of reason and natural law
for more general political prescriptions. When considering the case of largely regenerate
covenanted communities, however, natural law had to be more clearly rooted in Biblical
theology.
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CHAPTER 11
NATURAL RIGHT IN REFORMED POLITICAL THEOLOGY
11.1 The Significance of Natural Rights Language in the Reformers
If one is going to examine continuity and the place of Reformed political theology in the
development of political theory, it becomes important to determine if and how natural right
theory and language is used. Whereas natural law theory is longstanding in political theory,
natural right is considered a more modern idea. Briefly summarized, natural right theory argues
that certain universal human rights are found in the “natural” condition of human beings. The
“natural” condition is cast as an “original position.” This original position exists prior to the
creation of any formal civil authority, but not necessarily prior to any pre-political (social)
human existence. Whatever pre-political rights can be discerned or posited in the original
position then prescribe the creation and limit of civil authority. Natural right theorists defend
fundamental liberty and equality, property rights, and the right of resistance or revolution.
Perhaps most importantly, civil power is described as a trust with magistrates cast as fiduciaries.
Controversies surrounding the origin and basis of natural right get to the root of modern politics,
especially liberalism. This includes philosophical justification, institutional requirements, and
political rights and obligations. Contemporary constitutionalism also rests on certain core
presuppositions about natural right.
I have chosen as my subjects Mornay‟s Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos and Rutherford‟s
Lex, Rex. Both are sometimes cited by Whiggish interpreters of the covenanting movement as
being important to the development of representative government and modern constitutionalism.
Both texts predate Locke, an important natural rights theorist, and both have been compared to
Locke (though any implied influence on Locke is circumstantial). Peardon, in his introduction to
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Locke's Second Treatise, writes, "It can safely be supposed that Locke was familiar with the
celebrated treatise, Vindiciae contra tyrannos, published anonymously in 1579 and republished in
Leyden in 1648." Peardon asserts that Locke had contact with Huguenot thinkers when he was in
exile on the Continent.1 Becker rejects the idea of Huguenot influence on Locke, but Amos retorts
that Becker understood neither Mornay‟s covenant theology nor Locke‟s theism.2 Locke‟s father, a
Puritan, fought as an officer with Parliamentary forces during the English Civil War. Lex, Rex was
published just three years before Locke came to Westminster as a student and The Westminster
Assembly met while Locke was engaged in his studies.3
11.2 Elazar as Starting Point
Because Reformed political theology can be distinguished from other Protestant
traditions by the presence of the covenant device, one should have a precedent and model for
approaching political covenanting and natural right. Elazar‟s studies invite more questions than
they answer on the question of natural rights and the covenant device. Elazar contrasts political
covenanting with both organic and hierarchical political arrangements and those founded on
1
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2

Becker, The Declaration of Independence, 33-39 and Amos, Defending the Declaration, 50-55
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It is tempting to overreach in the articulation of natural law and natural right in Rutherford. That includes making
too many parallels with Locke, for example. The two sound very similar in many respects, but Richards offers an
important caveat when he writes, “Rutherford‟s extended discussion of nature, and of its laws, provides a helpful
index for roughly contemporary Puritan thinking on the subject. By the mid-seventeenth century, the question as to
what principles should orient the establishment of political community had a long and convoluted history.”
Richards, “The Law Written on Their Hearts,” 184-185. While I do agree with Richards‟s essential conclusions
about Rutherford and Locke, and their important differences, I do not necessarily agree with his conclusions about
Locke having an essentially minimalist or rationalist natural law theory. Seventeenth century political theory is
particularly difficult to untangle with precision, particularly in categorizing arguments from nature. Christian
apologist Francis Schaeffer captured the imagination of some American Protestants when he claimed that Rutherford‟s
imprint is evident on Locke; but Coffey rejects the idea of any clear influence. See Coffey, Politics, Religion and the
British Revolutions, 12. Coffey adds that there is no evidence that Locke owned a copy of Lex, Rex. The intersection
of Locke and the Puritan movement would require a much longer discussion than is appropriate for the dissertation. As
far as Rutherford‟s influence, it is appropriate to remember that Locke sat under the preaching of Owen, an
Independent. While both Rutherford and Owen were “Calvinists,” the point of this dissertation is to demonstrate that
this isn‟t indicative of anything until one demonstrates the type of political Calvinism one has in view. Presbyterians
and Independents differed in their political theology.
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natural law or natural right. Elazar writes, “Covenant is an idea whose importance is akin to
natural law in defining justice and to natural right in delineating the origins and proper
constitution of political society.”4 He routinely asserts that these are ultimately different
traditions that eventually become intertwined: “The connections between covenant and natural
law go back to the seventeenth-century revolution of Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza, which
transformed ancient natural law into modern natural law or natural right.”5 Complicating the
analysis is the fact that Elazar‟s approach is somewhat Straussian. This essentially means that he
disqualifies a revealed politico-theology of politics from accommodating either natural law or
natural right. Like many commentators, Straussian and otherwise, Elazar presupposes that
natural rights politics is individualistic and perhaps even amoral at its core.6
Given the almost unlimited cross-fertilization of new and traditional ideas in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one can certainly sympathize with Elazar‟s inability to
locate political covenanting within the tradition of modern political thought. But perhaps this is
due to Elazar‟s narrow conceptualization of the origins of covenanting. He omits almost all preReformation instances of Christian covenanting which could account for their continuation
within Reformed political theology. (That is, Elazar presumes natural right to be a postReformation or extra-Reformation phenomenon.) For example, there may be a pre-Reformation

4

Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, 19

5

Ibid., 26-27

6

Ibid., 27; Elazar, Covenant & Commonwealth, 12. Tuck indirectly asserts the significance of discerning a moral
theory for natural right theory when he states, “If it is true that the difficulties of modern liberal-democratic theory
are attributable to the possessive quality of the individualism at its heart (a belief which I do not share), then those
difficulties cannot be solved by seeing how we stand in relationship to the classic seventeenth-century texts; they are
far more fundamental and long-standing.” See Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 3.

231

connection to covenant theology in the work of Gerson.7 Elazar offers only one passing mention
of him.8 Despite the problems with Elazar‟s analysis, however, it invites important questions.
11.3 Strauss’s Omission of Reformers
In his concluding remarks on St. Thomas‟s theory of natural rights in Natural Right and
History, Leo Strauss makes some curious remarks. He appears to praise the Thomistic doctrine
of natural right, noting its definiteness, its noble simplicity and its universal application. He
attributes this improvement to Aquinas‟s use of revealed theology to transcend the classical
doctrine of natural law. But he also seems to reassert a qualification that any argument from
nature, in order to have integrity, must be wholly secular:
It is reasonable to assume that these profound changes were due to the influence
of the belief in biblical revelation. If this assumption should prove to be correct,
one would be forced to wonder, however, whether the natural law as Thomas
Aquinas understands it is natural law strictly speaking, i.e., a law knowable to the
unassisted human mind, to the human mind which is not illumined by divine
revelation…. At any rate, the ultimate consequence of the Thomistic view of
natural law is that natural law is practically inseparable not only from natural
theology – i.e., from a natural theology which is, in fact, based on belief in
biblical revelation – but even from revealed theology.9
Strauss then offers a definition of modern natural law and natural right which is reactionary
against the Thomistic formulation. The famed authors of modern natural right (Montesquieu,
Hobbes or Locke, for example) are then cast as asserting the epistemological moral superiority of
secular natural law against revealed theology. Strauss draws battle lines between Classic Natural
Right and Modern Natural Right – a dichotomy that is axiomatic for contemporary neoStraussian work. And Strauss does this in a relatively short space, leaving it to the reader to
7
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discern exactly what he means by this dichotomous presentation, and to seek out histories of
natural law and natural right that do not fit Strauss‟s model.
Strauss‟s opening salvo against Locke makes his analysis even more intriguing. In
addition to sustaining his influential assertions about esoteric (secretive) writing, this passage
could perhaps be called the shortest history of natural right ever offered:
Locke had the good sense to quote only the right kind of writers and to be silent
about the wrong kind, although he had more in common, in the last analysis, with
the wrong kind than the right. His authority seems to be Richard Hooker…Now
Hooker‟s conception of natural right is the Thomistic conception, and the
Thomistic conception, in its turn, goes back to the Church Fathers, who, in their
turn, were pupils of the Stoics, of the pupils of the pupils of Socrates. We are then
apparently confronted with an unbroken tradition of perfect respectability that
stretches from Socrates to Locke. But . . . we become aware that Locke‟s
conception of natural right is fundamentally different from Hooker‟s.10
However oversimplified that history of natural right may be, Strauss‟s explanation for this
change from Hooker to Locke is certainly worth serious attention. He is asserting the emergence
of a supposedly nonteleological political theory exemplified in Hobbes. Many scholars have seen
fit to explore Strauss‟s comparison between Locke and Hobbes at length: affirming, dissenting or
refuting. But what should be made of Strauss‟s praise of St. Thomas‟s natural law theory
together with his assertion that modern natural right is nonteleological? Must we choose between
a teleological or a nonteleological theory of natural rights? Is this choice more aptly described as
a theological or non-theological theory of natural rights? Strauss‟s Natural Right and History
could perhaps answer that question were it not for its silence on the Reformation! A crucial
episode is missing in Strauss‟s history of natural right; the solution requires attention to
Protestant theology. Discerning and studying a Protestant theory of natural right and natural law

10
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would provide responses to Strauss‟s charges that Locke, for example, sympathized with the
„bad‟ (secular) authors, notably: his understanding of the relationship between the law of nature
and divine revelation; his approval of revolution in the face of Romans 13; his reference to a
state of nature; and his revolutionary doctrine of property.
11.4 Tuck and Tierney Contrasted
Tuck‟s important Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, provides only
an inconclusive and disappointingly terse discussion of Reformed theorists. Like Strauss, Tuck
appears to presume that relevant natural right theory must be an essentially secular theory. He
does not see any significant development of the idea of natural right between the medieval period
and the seventeenth Century. Reformation political theorists earn either a passing mention or are
else yoked with others who “pulled the foundations out from underneath the theory” developed
during the Middle Ages.11 Tuck yokes the Reformers with Renaissance thinkers who draw a
sharp dichotomy between natural man and civilized, socialized man. Tuck also does not see any
significant state of nature theory in the Calvinists.
While one is reluctant to question Tuck‟s authority in the study of natural rights theory,
his conception of the “natural” part of natural rights theory seems to preclude any significant
theological content without justification. That becomes evident early in Tuck‟s study when he
takes up the question of how man leaves the state of nature and enters his political state. Could
God have rescued natural man in a way that still does not disregard his natural condition? No,
states Tuck, as evidenced by his short consideration of Scottish Calvinist George Buchanan.
Buchanan has one of his interlocutors ask whether natural man was civilized by an orator or a
jurist. (This was a popular theory of Renaissance thinkers, according to Tuck. Natural man had to
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be rescued by law or rhetoric.) Buchanan‟s reply, according to Tuck, disqualifies him from being
part of the natural right tradition: “God told them to.”12 To Tuck, this excludes Calvinist theorists
from any role in the development of natural right theory. He writes, “The De Iure Regni denies
that men construct political institutions for their own benefit; their political life is a direct gift
from God, without being fully natural to them…. This was to remain a fundamental feature of
Calvinist political thinking, to recur in the great works of the seventeenth-century British
Calvinists such as Rutherford.”13 While Buchanan is not a central figure in this dissertation, Tuck
sees him as representative as all British Calvinists and discounts them accordingly. But Tuck‟s
characterization is not entirely correct. His interpretation is too narrowly conceived and his
details do not present a satisfactory outline. Plus, he misunderstands the role of natural law in
Reformed resistance theory.14 Tuck dismisses the entire group of authors by saying,
Calvinists were not putting forward a theory of natural rights, and indeed were not
particularly concerned with the notion of a right at all. Like the humanists,
specific constitutional remedies were at the focus of their concern. If we are to
understand the developments in rights theories during the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, then we must group the Calvinist theorists with such men
as Alciato, and see them all as engaged in a retreat from the position where the
natural law and natural rights enjoyed primacy to one where the major concern
was human law designed by men for common utility either under their own
initiative or under the command of God.15
This is an oversimplification, but Tuck doesn‟t provide much more of a detailed or substantive
analysis of the Reformers in his seminal study of natural right.
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Tuck‟s taxonomy of natural rights theories is further complicated by his medieval
dichotomy in which natural right is either bordered by natural law and divine law (a more
Thomistic approach) or rooted in divine grace as the source of property (which Tuck associates
with Wycliffe and Luther). This reduces natural rights theories to being based either on power
and liberty or else on human welfare.16 One is tempted to ask not only if this is historically
accurate but also if it is conceptually and politically a workable model of natural right. Must
natural right theory be ultimately grounded in the notion of an unlimited natural right?
Tierney‟s work should be introduced here as a moderating influence on Tuck‟s
dichotomies of natural law vs. divine law or limited versus unlimited natural right. Responding
against Villey, whose thesis appears similar to Tuck‟s, Tierney writes,
We need to recall the widely accepted view of Michel Villey that William of
Ockham was the first philosopher to understand the word ius in the sense of a
subjective right and, further, that the semantic breakthrough came precisely when
Ockham “resolutely twisted” the idea of “right” to the meaning of “power”….
Villey maintained that a new philosophy was needed to justify such scattered
usages before they could form the basis of a new jurisprudence. In his view,
Ockham provided the necessary philosophical foundation; his nominalism was the
“mother” of subjective right. And this meant further that the modern concept of
individual rights was derived from a philosophy radically inconsistent with the
teaching of Aquinas…. For Villey the idea of subjective natural rights was
logically incompatible with the objective “classical natural right” that we find in
Aristotle and Aquinas.17
Tierney offers two refutations. First, Hervaeus Natalis equated ius with power ten years before
Ockham. Second (and more important for refuting Tuck‟s dichotomy), Hervaeus was a faithful
Thomist and relied on Aquinas‟s philosophical framework.18 More to the point of Tuck‟s own
thesis about what a natural right is, Tierney rejects Tuck‟s emphasis on Gerson. He also disputes
16
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predicating the study of natural right on a division between passive and active rights – a division
that would tend to see natural rights as unlimited. According to Tierney, Tuck sees modern
natural right erroneously as an active rights theory - “Gersonian” or “anti-Gersonian.” Tierney
rejects this dichotomy altogether, asserting that the late medieval rights arguments did not
respect such a dichotomy at all.19 In short, natural right theory can be placed in the Christian
natural law tradition without compromise. Insofar as the Reformers adopted key parts of that
natural law tradition, the natural right tradition continued with them.
11.5 Conventional Natural Right Language in Rutherford
An examination of Rutherford‟s Lex, Rex reveals a strong echo with the themes of
modern natural right: natural liberty and equality, government by consent, magistrates as
fiduciaries, the right of resistance, and an emphasis on property rights. For Rutherford, the origin
of civil power is both divinely ordained and natural. It is ordained insofar as God is the author of
human nature. But this makes individual persons no less the authors of civil power.
All civil power is immediately from God in its root; in that, 1st, God hath made man
a social creature, and one who inclineth to be governed by man, then certainly he
must have put this power in man‟s nature: so are we, by good reason, taught by
Aristotle. 2d, God and nature intendeth the policy and peace of mankind, then must
God and nature have given to mankind a power to compass this end; and this must
be the power of government….As domestic society is by nature‟s instinct, so is
civil society natural in radice, in the root, and voluntary in modo, in the manner of
coalescing. . . . [I]t is natural that they join in a civil society.20
As we shall see, “inclineth to be governed by man” in no way denies natural equality. The political
state is preceded by a state of nature with only domestic (familial) power, not civil power: “Now,
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the people were a people many years before there was a government, (save domestic)”21 For
Rutherford, this state of nature is a state of both freedom and equality.
Contrary to the criticisms of Zuckert and others that Reformers supported a divine-right-ofkings approach to civil government, Rutherford asserts something very “Lockean” at the outset of
Lex, Rex: “If all men be born equally free, as I hope to prove, there is no reason in nature why one
man should be king and lord over another. . . . I conceive all jurisdiction of man over man to be as
it were artificial and positive, and that it inferreth some servitude whereof nature from the womb
hath freed us.”22 Later he argues, “Freedom is natural to all, except freedom from subjection to
parents; and subjection politic is merely accidental, coming from some positive laws of men, as
they are in a politic society…. Man is born by nature free from all subjection, except of that which
is most kindly and natural, and that is fatherly or filial subjection.”23 Rutherford says later in the
text, “No man is born a king, as no man is born a subject.”24
Rutherford‟s jurisprudence is neither radically theonomic nor positivist. His jurisprudence
is natural law jurisprudence, arguing that the natural law must found the civil law. He writes,
“There is intrinsical worth in the law prior to the act of the will of lawgivers for which it meriteth
to be enacted; and, therefore, because it is authorisable as good and just, the king putteth on it this
stamp of a politic law. God formeth being and moral aptitude to the end in all laws, to wit, the
safety of the people, and the king‟s will is neither the measure nor the cause of the goodness of
21
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kings.”25 Why do men submit to this law? Rutherford‟s answer is not rooted in a Divine Command
theory but instead insofar as the divine intent is instilled in the natural inclinations of his human
creatures. On this point, Rutherford is indistinguishable from other natural rights theorists. Men
submit to civil law because of their natural inclinations toward self-love and self-preservation.26
It is in human nature to be political, and to form political societies. That instinct comes not
from any divine intervention. The desire to be in a political society, again, comes from what both
medieval and modern natural right theorists would agree are men‟s “natural right” inclinations,
self-love and self-preservation. Rutherford emphasizes neither a solitary nor an inevitably social
human nature. Furthermore, freedom and equality require the safety of one‟s material goods:
All the goods of the subjects belongeth not to the king….it is morally impossible
that there should not be a distinction of meum et tuum, mine and thine; and the
Decalogue forbidding theft, and coveting the wife of another man… doth evidence
to us, that the division of things is so far forth (men now being in the state of sin) of
the law of nature, that it hath evident ground in the law of nations…And the reasons
why private men are just lords and proprietors of their own goods, are, 1. Because,
by order of nature, division of goods cometh nearer to nature‟s law and necessity
than any king or magistrate in the world; and because it is agreeable to nature that
every man be warmed by his own fleece- nourished by his own meat…and to
preserve a community from the violence of rapine and theft, a magistrate and king
was devised. So it is clear, men are just owners of their own goods…What is a
character and note of a tyrant, and an oppressing king as a tyrant, is not the just due
of a king as a king; but to take the proper goods of his subjects and use them as his
own.27
Rutherford‟s interplay of nature and divine appointment in establishing political society is not
nearly as simplistic as Tuck or others might suggest.28 Instead, Rutherford presents a thoughtful
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relationship between human law, natural law, divine law, and eternal law. Human law is the
product of political association – necessitated by the inconveniences of the state of nature. The
natural law, defined as men‟s reason, drives man to political society. That is all in the work of the
eternal law, operating through the natural law and supplementing it by the divine law.29
From where does political authority originate? Early in Lex, Rex, Rutherford writes,
“Therefore I see not but Govarruvias, Soto and Suarez, have rightly said, that power of government
is immediately from God, and this or that definite power is mediately from God, proceeding from
God by the mediation of the consent of a community, which resigneth their power to one or more
rulers”30 While this is certainly not an argument that asserts that power is derived directly from the
people alone, neither is it a divine right argument. The power of the government is from God but
mediated by the people; it is the same power that they held in the state of nature.31 Rutherford will
later argue, prefiguring Locke and his natural right theory, that civil power devolves back to the
people. It is therefore God‟s plan that the people are the essential creators of political rule. Political
rule is necessitated only by political agreement – a kind of proto-social contract. Political authority
is not something divinely ordained in any way that would undermine popular consent. Rutherford
writes, “For kingly government is no more of the law of nature than aristocracy or democracy; nor
are any born judges or subjects at all.”32
If Rutherford had not initially posited what we now view as a “Lockean” state of nature,
one could see him winding up at the same absolutist conclusions as Suarez or Hobbes. But unlike
29
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Suarez, the natural right of persons for Rutherford cannot be surrendered to absolute political rule.
(This has to be kept in mind when reading Rutherford‟s argument that the community “resigneth”
their power to civil rulers.) Rule requires consent, necessitated by man‟s natural liberty and
equality. Rutherford writes, “As a man may not take away his liberty without his own consent, so
can he not, without his own consent, give his liberty to be subject to penal laws under a prince,
without his own consent.”33 And this consent is not only for the original contract. Should the king
betray his trust, the people are no longer bound to obey. There is no obligation to stand by a “bad
bargain” as there is in Suarez.34 Rutherford writes, “A power to destruction was never given, nor
can it, by rational nature, be given…. A people free may not, and ought not, totally surrender their
liberty to a prince, confiding in his goodness.”35 For Rutherford, liberty is a gift of God because it
is a gift evident in nature. He writes, “It is false that the people doth, or can by the law of nature,
resign their whole liberty into the hand of a king…. They cannot resign to others that which they
have not in themselves…but the people hath not an absolute power in themselves to destroy
themselves, or to exercise those tyrannous acts spoken of, 1 Sam.viii. 11-15, &c for neither God
nor nature‟s law hath given any such power.”36
It is on the subject of resistance that Reformed political theorists make their greatest
contribution, giving teeth and theological grit to later natural right theory. Rutherford‟s citizens are
free to withdraw their consent and also to resist. The same God who mediates rule through the
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people is also capable of contesting political rulers through acts of the people.37 Rutherford writes,
“God doth not take the authority of the king from him immediately, but mediately, by people‟s
hating and despising him, when they see his wickedness, as the people see Nero a monster…. And
this proveth that God gave him the authority mediately, by the consent of man.”38 Consistent with
the arguments of other British Calvinists – especially Presbyterians, Rutherford demonstrates no
equivocation on the subject of resistance. The argument in Rutherford is clear. To live under
tyranny is to lose the benefits sought by leaving the state of nature in the first place. He writes,
If to one man an absolute and unlimited power be given of God, whereby, at his
pleasure, he may obstruct the fountains of justice, and command lawyers and laws
to speak not God‟s mind, that is justice, righteousness, safety, true religion, but the
sole lust and pleasure of one man. And this one having absolute and irresistible
influence…may, by this power, turn all into anarchy, and put the people into a
worse condition than if there were no judge at all in the land.39
More than forty years prior to Locke, Rutherford articulates ruling as a “fiduciary” responsibility.40
To betray the responsibility that the ruler has to God and man, mediated through the will of the
people, is to be a tyrant. And on this question, Rutherford is the clearest of the Reformed authors:
Tyranny is not from God.41
One of the points that appears to confuse both Strauss and Zuckert is the handling of
Romans 13 – a text interpreted by some political theologians to command essentially unconditional
political obedience.42 Rutherford, like many other Reformed authors, goes to great lengths in
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addressing this question. This is a crucial step in the development of resistance theory in a culture
that was still compelled by previous Biblical exposition to offer perhaps only passive resistance.
Rutherford writes, “It is evident from Rom xiii. that all subjection and obedience to higher powers
commanded there, is subjection to the power and office of the magistrate in abstracto, or, which is
all one, to the person using the power lawfully, and that no subjection is due by that text, or any
word of God, to the abused and tyrannical power of the king, which I evince from the text, and
from other Scriptures.”43 Rutherford is saying that by establishing political authority for good, God
denies the license usurped by tyrants. Rutherford directs his reader to the phrase “of God,” in
Romans 13:1, thus denying the tyrant any legitimate claim to rule against the express commands of
God. Rutherford writes,
Tyranny being a work of Satan, is not from God, because sin, either habitual or
actual, is not from God; the magistrate, as magistrate, is good in nature of office,
and the intrinsic end of his office, (Rom. xiii.4) for he is the minister of God for
thy good; and, therefore, a power ethical, politic, or moral, to oppress, is not from
God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power; and is no more
from God, but from sinful nature and the old serpent, than a license to sin.44
To resist tyrants is to obey God – an idea warmly embraced by Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin
Franklin. There is neither natural authority in the tyrant (who denies men the benefit of political
society for which they left the state of nature) nor is there divine authority (having denied his
responsibility to do the good implicit in anything done “of God”). Rutherford writes,

not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of
God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the
minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only
for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending
continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom
custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor. (KJV)
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When the magistrate doth anything by violence, and without law, in so far doing
against his office, he is not a magistrate. Then, say I, that power by which he doth,
is not of God. None doth, then, resist the ordinance of God who resist the king in
tyrannous acts. If the power, as it cannot be punished by the subject nor
restrained, be from God, therefore the tyrannical power itself, and without this
accident – that it can be punished by men – it must be from God also. But the
conclusion is absurd, and denied by royalists. I prove the connection: If the king
have such a power above all restraint, the power itself, to wit, king David‟s power
to kill innocent Uriah, and deflower Bathsheba, without the accident of being
restrained or punished by men, it is either from God or not from God. If it be from
God, it must be a power against the sixth and seventh commandments, which God
gave to David, and not to any subject; and so David lied when he confessed this
sin, and this sin cannot be pardoned because it was no sin: and kings, because
kings, are under no tie of duties of mercy, and truth and justice to their subjects,
contrary to that which God‟s law requireth of all judges (Deut. i.15-17; xvii. 1520; 2 Chron. xix 6, 7; Rom. xiii. 3, 4)”45
Against the notion, advocated by some, that tyranny is a deserved punishment of God,
Rutherford offers plain logic. If Christians are meant only to suffer under tyranny, then no
recourse to end its suffering could be Biblically justified. The scourge of tyranny, while certainly
painful, would necessitate obligate passivity and willful suffering. There could not be any
Biblical remedy to avoid it, including self-exile. To do so would attempt escaping from the
justice of God. Against those who cite tyranny as ordained of God and requiring passivity
Rutherford argues,
Truly it is a silly argument. The Assyrians coming against the people of God for
their sins, is a punishment of God. (Isa. x.5; xii.13) But doth it follow that it is
unlawful for Israel to fight and resist the Assyrians, and that they had warrant to
do no other thing but lay down arms and pray to God, and fight none at all? Is
there no lawful resisting of ills of punishment, but mere prayers and
patience?…Famine is often a punishment of God in a land (Amos iv.7, 8) is it
therefore in famine unlawful to till the earth, and seek bread by our industry, and
are we to do nothing but to pray for daily bread? It is a vain argument.46
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Much of Lex, Rex is dedicated to engaging political arguments, secular or theological, that
obligate unconditional obedience.
11.6 Conventional Natural Right Language in Mornay
The Vindiciae is divided into four questions about civil government. The third question,
“Whether it be lawful to resist a prince who doth oppress or ruin a public state, and how far such
resistance may be extended: by whom, how, and by what right or law it is permitted” provides
the greatest evidence of natural right language in Mornay. It is directed to tyrants – those Mornay
described as “deaf unto the voice of that law which is grounded upon reason.”47 As Rutherford
did some seventy years afterward, Mornay argues that “the people establish kings, puts the
scepter into their hands, and who with their sufferages, approves the election.” Mornay is more
explicit than Rutherford about the people acting only as intermediary for God, but the basis of
the magistrate‟s popular obligation is sometimes presented in language even more forceful.
Mornay emphasizes natural equality and popular sovereignty in passages such as this:
God would have it done in this manner, to the end that the kings should
acknowledge, that after God, they hold their power and sovereignty from the
people, and that it might the rather induce them, to apply and address the utmost
of their care and thoughts for the profit of the people, without being puffed with
any vain imagination, and that they were formed of any matter more excellent
than other men, for which they were raised so high above others; as if they were
to command our flocks of sheep, or herds of cattle.48
Like Rutherford, Mornay argues against hereditary monarchy - though his discussion of regime
types is not as lengthy as Rutherford‟s.49 Mornay‟s acceptance of hereditary monarchy
conditional on its being an “elected system” would strike most moderns as absurd. Nevertheless,
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there is a clear natural right idea evident in that discussion. Mornay writes, “Those who have
been raised to moral dignity were…made out of the same mass with the rest of the people, they
should acknowledge that for them, they, as it were, borrow their power and authority.”50 Mornay
argues that the “whole body” of the people is above the king and readily cites many “sacred and
profane” examples to demonstrate his point.51 And like Rutherford, the power of consent that lies
in the people is undiminished by time or succession.52
Mornay‟s discussion of the origin of political power is less rooted than Rutherford‟s in a
clear “state of nature” argument. Mornay‟s pre-political persons are described as equally free. He
writes, “In the first place every one consents, that men by nature loving liberty, and hating
servitude, born rather to command, than obey, have not willingly admitted to be governed by
another, and renounced as it were the privilege of nature, by submitting themselves to the
command of others, but for some special and great profit they expected from it.”53 And in
passages that Skinner finds indicative of modern natural right language, Mornay dwells at length
on the civil justice applied to person and property.54
There is less emphasis on the religious or moral benefits of rule in the Vindiciae than one
might expect from a covenanter. He includes a defense of private property, asserting against
kings that “Every man loves and cherishes his own.”55 Citing both the Old Testament and
classical histories, Mornay asserts something even found in natural right arguments of Locke and
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Rousseau - property is the foundation of government. He writes, “When, therefore, that these
words of mine and thine entered into the world, and differences fell amongst fellow citizens,
touching the propriety of goods, and wars amongst neighboring people about the right of their
confines…kings were created in the first ages; to wit, to administer justice at home and to be
leaders in the wars abroad.”56
Mornay‟s text prefigures Rutherford‟s constitutionalism: The law is king, and the king is
not the source of law. Mornay writes, “The law is the soul of a good king, it gives him motion,
sense and life.”57 And as in Rutherford, there is a connection between the divine law and the civil
law. “Certainly, all that which God wills is just, and therefore, suppose it is God‟s will; but that
must be just with the king‟s will, before it is his will. For it is not just because the king has
appointed it; but that king is just, which appoints that to be held for just, which is so of itself.”58
According to Mornay, both magistrates (including kings) and the people are governed by law.59
Referencing St. Augustine, he argues that those who enjoy political rule are similar to husbands
or fathers only insofar as they serve those that they command.60 Mornay‟s argument here is very
traditional and goes back even to Plato: To command is to serve.61 The king‟s power over life
and death is tied to his responsibility for the “benefit and profit of the public state.” To submit to
a cutthroat as king is to deny the benefit of political association and to violate the basis of that
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association: self-preservation.62 The same can be said for the king‟s power over goods. Mornay
writes, “If then, therefore, in the creation of kings, men gave not their own proper goods unto
them, but only recommended them to their protection; by what other right then, but that of
freebooters, can they challenge the property of other men‟s goods to themselves?” Preceding
Rutherford and Locke, Mornay calls the king a fiduciary.63
Mornay is emphatic that resistance to tyranny is just. Mornay defines tyrants, eligible for
“suppression and expulsion”, as those who “seek to captivate the minds and souls of the people
with an erroneous and superstitious opinion in matter of religion, or, those who would enthrall
their bodies and estates with miserable servitude and excessive impositions.”64 His first argument
for resistance is drawn from natural law! Mornay writes, “First, the law of nature teaches and
commands us to maintain and defend our lives and liberties, without which life is scant worth the
enjoying, against all injury and violence. Nature has imprinted this by instinct…yet much more
in man against man himself, if man become a beast: and therefore he who questions the
lawfulness of defending oneself, does, as much as in him lies, question the law of nature.”65
Mornay argues that this is also commanded by civil laws, oaths, and the law of nations.
Emphasizing the role of government for secular purposes, Mornay writes, “Whereby it plainly
appears, that not for religion only, but even for our country and our possessions, we may fight
and take arms against a tyrant.”66
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11.7 Conclusion
Political ideas associated with modern “natural right” include asserting natural liberty and
equality, the civil magistrate as a fiduciary, government as the creation of popular consent,
property rights as a core motivation for civil society, and the right of active or violent resistance
to tyranny. Natural right arguments are often associated with liberalism, arguing that society and
government begin from an “original position” of humanity. All of these positions can be
discerned in Mornay and Rutherford, who provide the most explicit and detailed presentations of
covenantal political theology. This chapter demonstrates that what is now considered a largely
“modern” and essentially “secular” argument is quite at home in a covenantal political theology.
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CHAPTER 12
THE COVENANT DEVICE IN AMERICA
12.1 The Covenant Background to America
Because of its association with Puritanism, covenantal political theology met with
persecution in Old England; but New Englanders were able to pursue its development freely. The
Americans saw themselves in a situation parallel to the Jews who fled Egypt and established the
covenant at Sinai. Believing that God had called them to continue the work of Reformation, the
Americans gave the covenant its fullest and most extensive application. New England became a
laboratory for a unique kind of civil-religious covenant. Noll writes, “New England Puritans
followed English precedent and consistently viewed their whole society as standing in covenant
with God. Since the head (magistracy) and heart (clergy) of society participated together in the
covenant of grace, New Englanders did not doubt that the society they constructed was also a
sacredly covenanted community.”1 This was not simply one covenant, or two covenants, but a
series of covenants that joined church, town, and commonwealth. No person or segment of
society was left out of the series of covenants.2
The New England experience began with two prominent articulations of covenanting.
The first example is John Winthrop‟s sermon, “Modell of Christian Charity,” delivered aboard
the Arrabella in 1630. The second example is the “Mayflower Compact” of 1620.3 These
political covenants preceded the work of either Hobbes or Locke by a generation or more.4 Many
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of the settling groups that followed in succeeding waves came from areas of Europe already
familiar with covenanting.5 Over the next one-hundred years, Americans devised a variety of
covenant-like civil documents.6 Echoes of the covenant tradition linger even today in presidential
proclamations, holiday proclamations, and political rhetoric.7
Covenantal political theory is reflected in the American invention of modern political
federalism.8 Elazar argues that the governments of America resemble the political systems
proposed by federal theologians and implemented in church polities more than they resemble the
political systems of prominent political theorists.9 Moreover, while it is tempting to study
American political thought through the lens of classic texts by Locke or Hobbes, for example,
that approach neglects the role of everyday theological and ecclesiastical experience. Most
political institutions were founded from the ground up and not by intellectuals or an aristocracy
following the prescriptions of intellectuals. Political theory was articulated to the average
American through the church pulpit. Covenanting provided a means for the earliest American
settlers, who left home to establish religious and commercial communities, to reconcile
individualism and community, commerce and charity, self-interest and conscience, conservatism
and radicalism.10
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“Natural rights” for early Americans were understood not just in the philosophical
tradition but also in the covenant tradition.11 Elazar argues that Reformed theology is preLockean but no less consequential on questions of consent, social compact and the right of
emigration.12 He writes, “Indeed, one might say that the apotheosis of the modern experience in
the United States was based upon the synthesis of and tension between biblical covenantalism as
filtered through Reformed Protestantism and modern ideas of political compact and civil
society.”13 Summarizing this hybrid creation, Elazar writes,
The generation that achieved the Declaration of Independence, fought the
Revolutionary War, and established the United States under its new constitution
was led by two groups: one coming out of the older religious tradition, primarily
the covenantal tradition of Reformed Protestantism who saw the imperatives of
their tradition leading in the direction of a federal democratic republic under God,
and the second group who came out of the Enlightenment, influenced primarily
by the Scottish Enlightenment which was part of the covenantal tradition one step
removed, who sought a federal democratic republic in North America as the way
to actualize civil society.14
Even Zuckert, who asserts an essentially Lockean America, concedes significant influence of
Protestant political theology. He argues that the rhetoric of revolution is an “amalgam” of
Protestantism and modern natural right.15
In the chapter that follows, I provide an overview of how the covenant device was
adopted and modified by Americans during the first two centuries of their history, primarily in
New England. The subject of the colonies, the Revolution and Founding merits a dissertation of
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its own. Rather than engage that subject fully, I will instead demonstrate how the covenant motif
can be discerned in America, and how it changed at key points in the history of the American
colonies. My particular focus is the civil-religious covenant of New England, where
denominations adhered largely to Reformed theology.16
12.2 Discerning Religious Content in Civil and Church Covenants, Compacts and Charters
When exploring the civil-religious covenant of New England, it is important to first
explore the documents that founded both civil and religious communities. While the “Mayflower
Compact” and Winthrop‟s speeches have been extensively studied, only recently have systematic
approaches to the vast scope of original documents been attempted.
There were two different categories of covenant in New England. Ecclesiastical
covenants were used for the founding of churches. Civil covenants transferred or awarded the
power of governance and law enforcement to a local town, plantation, or colony.17 Weir argues
that civil covenants were more diverse prior to the Restoration (1660) and borrowed more
heavily from the church covenant model. After the Restoration, civil covenants became more
uniform and reflected the common law tradition.18 By contrast, church covenants were more
standard before the Restoration and more diverse thereafter. Weir‟s conclusions add to the
extensive body of literature challenging Perry Miller‟s conclusions about a unified “New
England Mind.”19
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Charters were the bedrock of civil authority in the colonies, and provided foundations for
the civil covenants. Jamestown and the Colony of Virginia were founded in 1607 on the model
of the 1606 Charter of Virginia. There is no record of a Jamestown compact or combination
supplementing the 1606 Charter. The Mayflower Pilgrims secured permission in 1619 from the
London Company and from the Plymouth Company. The Pilgrims, who were Separatists,
supplemented the 1606 Charter with the Mayflower Compact.20 There were many additional
political charters. Some established new colonies while others consolidated existing ones or
revised the terms of authority. Before 1660, most covenants were established by male members
of the community as combination or compact. The second generation moved away from the
communal approach and allowed a committee system to articulate the covenantal vision.
Whereas ecclesiastical covenants were seen as a very solemn and significant occasion, civil
covenants were a more mundane affair.21 This may have something to do with a minimalist view
of government in Reformed anthropology and a higher view of the Church.22
Weir discerns three approaches to Christianity in the civil patents and charters. One
approach is to address God as the sustainer of life and foundation of the civil state. This may
have included recognizing God‟s grace as the source of the monarch‟s power or looking for and
acknowledging divine assistance in the work of the colony. The second approach is to treat
Christianity as a set of beliefs that are to be shared with those outside the faith. This second
approach is prominent in the 1629 Massachusetts Bay Charter. Both of these first two
approaches can be found in the 1606 Virginia Charter, which Weir calls a baseline model for the
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other charters issued by the English Crown over the next eighty five years. A third approach
recognizes the significance of the church as an important civil institution.23
Perhaps the most interesting discovery in Weir‟s comprehensive examination is not what
the patents and charters do say about religion but rather what they do not say about religion.
There is little in the civil compacts that can be called christocentric. The covenants most centered
on Christ were written for Native Americans.24 There isn‟t even much that can be called
theocentric or religious in the charters. There is surprisingly little mention of ecclesiastical
provision in these charters, even in the 1606 Virginia Charter. Even the Anglican vision found in
the 1639 Gorges Grant is quite rare.25 None of the three approaches to religion confuses
ecclesiastical with civil authority. The 1662 Connecticut Charter is silent on matters of religion,
except to note Charles II being king “by the grace of God.”26 The New Haven Colony was the
strictest in matters of religion, but lasted only 25 years and was soon merged with the
Connecticut Colony in 1665. Some of its disciples went to New Jersey and their descendants
merged with the Presbyterians in the eighteenth century.27
It can generally be said that later charters often assume a more implicit Christian
commitment rather than explicit dedication to God or Christ.28 But even when confessional
documents become joined to the church covenants later in the seventeenth century, neither
covenant theology nor federal theology in particular are “controlling templates” for these local
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confessions. The millennium is rarely mentioned in either church or civil covenant. Neither is the
threat of Arminianism mentioned in the church or civil covenants.29 Why was there not more
explicit discussion of religion, given the intense religious commitment of the Puritans? Weir asks
and answers this question in part when he writes,
Why is it that a nation so intensely religious as seventeenth-century England
would not articulate that religious vision more explicitly within these charter
documents? The answer can be found within the question. While England was
intensely religious, that intensity led to bitter division, and any clearly articulated
theocentric – or christocentric – vision could possibly fan the flames of
controversy.30
There was already enough controversy in the granting of charters. William Bradford‟s
Separatists (Pilgrims) had to get their charter from the Council for New England. Charles I was
willing to give only the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay a royal charter.
The 1663 Rhode Island Charter marks a change in religious tone of the royal charters in
New England. While it acknowledges religious motivations of its members and the conversion of
the Native Americans, it reflects standing dissent in both Old and New England. It also explicitly
separates the civil magistrate from religious matters and an established state church. In Rhode
Island, civil religion was to be sustained by private religious commitments and not by a state
church. This, the charter assures the Crown, would lead to greater public morality and patriotic
commitment.31
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The Restoration marks a considerable change in the civil and church covenants. Much
more freedom is given to dissenters. With the exception of the Andros episode, the trend is
toward liberty in matters of religion and to other matters more generally. The Massachusetts Bay
Province Charter of 1691, which united New Plymouth Colony and Massachusetts Bay Colony,
extended the franchise to property owners: from “Freeman” (church member) to “Freeholder”
(property owner).32 But the move toward religious toleration, even denominational pluralism,
should not be overstated. Dissenters often remained second-class citizens. Weir writes, “It should
be noted, however, that freedom of worship did not entail disestablishment of religion and
secularization of institutional life, nor did it prohibit each colony from making life difficult for
dissenters to the established church: Baptists, Quakers, and Anglicans still had to pay the
compulsory tithes, and there were no laws protecting dissenting religious groups from bias.”33
Charters are only part of the picture of civil covenanting; given the distance from
England, it was often left to the colonists to establish their own local governments by
combination or compact, charter, patent, and legislative action.34 Though much is made of the
Mayflower Compact, for example, it was never presumed by its authors to grant political
authority. That was established by the 1606 Charter of Virginia. Instead, the Mayflower Compact
was a civil covenant conceived for survival of the local government. Weir argues that the
Mayflower Compact reflects the three priorities of the Separatists: God, religion, and national
identity. It is both christocentric and reflective of “commonwealth” political theory. 35 The
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut are another example of a civil covenant. The New Haven
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Plantation covenant, articulated in 1639, is the most deliberately religious of the civil covenants.
It was the most traditionally covenantal and theocratic. “The Articles of Confederation of the
United Colonies of New England,” which established a military defense for four colonies,
asserted a rare christocentric vision for New England (excluding Providence Plantation and
Rhode Island).36
Massachusetts Bay Colony civil covenants were like the charters: mundane and without a
theoretical or theological vision.37 They were rarely theocentric or christocentric. Their
Christianity was implicit, presuming the larger religious vision to be worked out at lower levels
of the polity.38 The civil covenant of Providence Plantation, an exceptional case, makes no
provision for an established church, limits the role of religion in the operation of the state, and
confines civil power to economics and politics. But as if to validate the fears of toleration‟s
critics, sectarian pluralism did not come easy. Weir writes, “The Providence Plantation was the
first secularized government in the Western world. Its degree of secularization, however, was
limited. Along with its reputation for a more secularized state, Providence had a reputation for
being one of the most argumentative plantations in New England, and within a period of ten
years it signed at least five more civil covenants in an attempt to draw its various factions
together.”39 Another way of handling the civil-ecclesiastical tangle is reflected in the work of the
general court of the New Plymouth Colony. It required a broadly uniform Christianity at the
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colonial level, but required religious uniformity at the local level. This could have included a
Baptist church, for example, supported with compulsory tithes.40
12.3 Theological Dissent in Church Covenants
Over time, theological changes in New England meant changes in the understanding of
the covenant itself. Independents in England composed and adopted a revised version of the
(Presbyterian) Westminster Confession in 1658, the Savoy Declaration. The Savoy Declaration
rewrote paragraphs on the civil magistracy that dealt with the church-state relationship. Though
the Restoration made the revisions of little importance in Old England, the New England
Puritans made use of it. In 1680, the Reforming Synod adopted it (with some modification) for
the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which was soon to merge with the New Plymouth Colony. The
Saybrook Platform adopted the Savoy Declaration in 1708 for Connecticut and New Haven.41
While both give the magistrate justification to promote the Gospel and suppress blasphemy, there
was no longer an ecclesiastical monopoly. Latitude is prescribed for non-established churches.
The errors of dissent and heresy, once discouraged for fear of covenantal judgment and religious
backsliding, are now discouraged mainly because of the effect on civil peace and good order.42
Baptists covenanted in their churches, but not in the same way as Congregationalists.
Reflecting their belief that church members were already converted (and baptized as believers),
and not having to contend with the problem of unconverted members (Congregational covenant
children and unregenerate adults), Baptist covenants were more focused on the horizontal
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relationship between members. Baptist church government was not expected to establish a
relationship with God.43 The covenant was the closing of a relationship, not the first step of that
relationship.44 The Baptist covenants were also more democratic; a reflection of Baptist
ecclesiastical polity, and members pledged themselves to participate in church governance.45
Baptist covenants also expressed their more tolerant attitude toward other Christians, extending a
“judgment of charity” to Congregationalists and Anglicans.46
There may be a bit of weakening in Reformed orthodoxy evident in confessions tied to
particular church covenants. The Marblehead (Massachusetts Bay Colony) First Church
(gathered in 1689), may be read to diminish the extent of the Fall in human nature.47 The Brattle
Street Congregational Church (1699-1700) is also notable. Their pastor was ordained by the
Presbyterian Board at London and adopted the Westminster Confession but had received only
lukewarm endorsement from other Congregational churches. The church did not apply for or
receive civil recognition.48 In sections XIII and XIV there is a discussion of ecclesiastical
commitments that reads as follows,
We Comprehend that a particular Church, as such, is a Society of Christians by
mutual agreement, usually meeting together for Public Worship in the same place,
and under the same Ministry, attending on the Ordinances of God there. In every
such Society, the Law of nature dictates to us, that there is implied a mutual
promise and engagement of being faithful to the Relations they bear to each other,
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whither as private Christians, or as Pastor and Flock, so long as the Providence of
God continues them in those Relations.49
Similar use of natural revelation is found in the statements of the Reforming Synod (1679) and
Saybrook Platform (1708) in their statement on the Civil Magistrate (Chapter XXXIV, Paragraph
III):
They who upon pretense of Christian liberty shall oppose any lawful power, or the
lawful exercises of it, resist the Ordinance of God, and for their publishing of such
opinions, or maintaining of such practices as are contrary to the Light of Nature,
or to the known Principles of Christianity…they may lawfully be called to
account, and proceeded against by the censures of the Church, and by the power
of the civil Magistrate.50
Based on what is argued in Chapter Ten, one cannot read the references to nature here as a
desertion of Reformed political theology. But in Weir‟s research, such an explicit and
foundational reference to nature within a church covenant is certainly the exception rather than
the norm.
12.4 Williams’ Reinterpretation of the Covenant Device
In tracing the evolution of the covenant device in America, it is important to also consider
the dissenting political theology of Roger Williams, a Separatist Puritan. Williams arrived at
Nantasket in 1631 and was warmly greeted by Winthrop.51 But he soon distinguished himself as
a radical Separatist, rejecting his first church call and failing to stay long at his second on the
grounds that neither church adequately renounced their fellowship with the Church of England.
By 1633, Bradford believed him to have unstable judgment.52
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Williams rejected the standing New England network of civil and religious covenants and
instead confined covenanting in the fully Biblical sense only to a body of examined believers.
Despite admonishment by other clergy, rejection of a land petition within Marblehead Neck for
his church, and betrayal by some within his own church (possibly to gain the land petition in
spite of him) Williams held fast to his opinions. In 1635, Williams was sentenced to exile from
the colony. From 1643 to 1652, Williams debated religious persecution with John Cotton. Their
lengthy letters were published as texts in England during the Puritan Revolution.
Williams employed the typology of his co-religionists to undermine their civil-religious
covenant.53 Using the “typology” theology of his co-religionists, wherein Old Testament
passages become figures rather than literal lessons for New Testament believers, Williams
argued that the physical punishment for heretics in the Old Testament was only a figure for
spiritual punishment experienced under the New Testament.54 The civil sword of the Old
Testament becomes the spiritual sword of the Church. State patronage, the civil sword, would
lull the church to sleep. The church advanced through persecution, not protection.55 Under
Williams‟s leadership Rhode Island became a center for religious toleration. The only exceptions
to this rule were Catholics and Quakers. Williams excluded Catholics from toleration on the
common Protestant justification that they swore allegiance to a foreign power. He allowed
Quakers to worship, but disarmed them and required them to wear distinctive clothing. Williams,
like many others, suspected the Quakers of incivility and contempt for authority.56
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Williams carried on the commonwealth strain of Reformed political theology, but
reinterpreted the Bible to diminish the more activist political prescriptions.57 Williams told the
members of Parliament that their duty as Christians is to save souls, but their duty as magistrates
was only to secure the bodies and goods of others.58 Insensitive to the subtleties of federal
theology, Williams argued that Christian ordinances could not convert the people. It could only
civilize them.59 Citing early Church history, Williams argued that Roman rulers were not
appointed as guardians of the church. That was a task given only to the apostles.60 Returning to
Scripture, Williams did not believe that the enforcement of orthodoxy was prescribed after the
coming of Christ. Romans 12 and 13 dealt only with external matters, not with spiritual
matters.61 Further complicating the civil picture, Williams argued that both the magistrates and
the people (from whom the magistrates derived their civil authority) may be in error. Thus,
persecution could shed the blood of saints.62
What makes Williams important is not necessarily his dissent on matters of religious
orthodoxy and civil enforcement of religious doctrine. Many English Independents would have
agreed with him concerning the perils of religious intolerance. The most significant contribution
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of Williams was to push the civil consequence of election and predestination, two essential
Reformed doctrines, to the point where they challenge the parallel theology of the civil-religious
covenant. In the face of arguments that heresy would challenge the spiritual health of believers,
Williams resorted to the sovereignty of God‟s grace to preserve them from error.63 God‟s Spirit,
Williams argued, did not require the help of the civil magistrate.64 Those who tried to use the
civil sword to encourage belief, or discourage heresy, were charged by Williams with the error of
Arminianism.65 Furthermore, Williams argued, mandatory church attendance encouraged
hypocrisy and divine condemnation in addition to changing the character of preaching and
worship.66 Unregenerate persons might even have their fate sealed by church attendance, giving
them a false sense of security.67 All of this was argued by Williams on the basis of divine
sovereignty and election.68
12.5 The Half-Way Covenant
The New England civil-religious covenantal vision was threatened not only by dissenters
like Williams, but by internal ecclesiastical challenges. Some of these challenges were prompted
by gradual changes in the intellectual landscape. Others were forced by the inevitable clash of
the Puritan desire for ecclesiastical purity with the demographics of immigration and rising birth
rates. Though one could argue that both Congregationalists and Presbyterians articulated
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something akin to the medieval synthesis of church and state, Presbyterians never viewed church
covenants in the same way that Congregationalists did.69 Presbyterians were content to allow
access to the sacraments based only on a Christian profession free from scandal.70 For
Presbyterians, the church-state synthesis was accomplished largely by broad participation in
worship. They resembled the parish system of the English Church more than the ecclesiastical
purity sought by the Independents.
The Congregationalists, essentially Independents, viewed churches in a way that required
a much higher degree of purity. For them, church covenants were not just theological or political
expressions, but literal compacts by believers who erected a community based on their common
conversion experience.71 While the civil magistrate was actively involved with the goals of the
civil-religious covenant, American Congregationalists never presumed that any civil action could
fully secure the goals of the civil-religious covenant. The magistrate could punish blasphemy or
heresy, and Congregational churches often enjoyed the support of compulsory tithes. But no one
thought that the civil magistrate could fill the churches with sincere believers or ensure their
sincerity. This was the work of the Holy Spirit as discerned by the church leadership.
Guarding the visible purity of the churches was ultimately the responsibility of church
elders. The vehicle for this became the cross examination of conversion narratives. One could be
a member by baptism but full membership (including access to the communion table, baptism for
one‟s children, and voting rights) required a generally unimpeachable demonstration of
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conversion.72 For example, when the townspeople of Dedham, Massachusetts began to organize
a congregation in 1637, they needed some means of discerning the saints among themselves.
They employed a criterion used by nearby congregations since 1636. Candidates would have to
demonstrate moral conduct and soundness in doctrine. They would also have to confess the work
of grace experienced in their regeneration. To the Congregationalists, this did not undermine but
rather strengthened the civil-religious covenant. Strong and sincere churches meant a coherent,
godly, and orderly society together with covenantal blessing. Weak or hypocritical churches
meant civil disorder and covenantal sanction.
Presbyterians did not agree with this approach, and the Congregationalists were
inevitably at odds with their co-religionists on the matter. In the 1640s, Presbyterians in England
and Scotland complained that thousands of persons otherwise reputed as Christians were
excluded in New England. Some even suggested that three-fourths of the community were
excluded. In Dedham, at least 70 percent of the adults became members, with women
outnumbering men in most churches. Discontent worried the ministers, as evidenced by one
minister‟s comment to John Cotton: “Many [are] murmuring that we come to make Heathens
rather than convert Heathens to Christianity.”73
Faced with a rising generation of baptized persons who could not provide a sufficient
conversion narrative as adults, the churches had to decide how to address the question of the
sacraments - specifically baptism for the children of those parents. Ideally, baptism would be
administered only to children of regenerate parents. But as the population and individuals
struggled with the demands of piety, fewer parents could or would withstand the rigors of cross
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examination. The Half-Way covenant solution was reached by specially-called synods in 1657
and 1662.74 It allowed the children or grandchildren of full members to enjoy partial membership
by baptism. It also enabled baptism to serve as sufficient for the civil benefits of church
membership. The conversion crisis, and the accompanying reformulation of baptism, meant a
crisis for covenant theology – political and ecclesiastical. Some churches, as demonstrated by the
Brattle Street Manifesto, would later address this problem by distinguishing between adherence
to “historical faith” and adherence to “saving faith,” (giving preference to the former over the
latter in deciding membership).75
By the mid-eighteenth century, when Jonathan Edwards fully and famously rejected the
Half-Way Covenant, this was less of a political crisis and more of an ecclesiastical crisis. The
civil-religious integration had already largely disintegrated. But in the middle of the seventeenth
century, when the civil vision was so clearly integrated with the religious vision, the Half-Way
solution was a major threat to the “City on a Hill.” If fewer and fewer persons could give
convincing testimony of divine sanctification, what would this eventually mean for public
morality and orthodoxy? The civil-religious covenant network relied on every institution
fulfilling its proper role, especially the Church.
12.6 Covenant and Sacrament Revisited
Though controversial because of its treatment of personal salvation, the Half-Way
Covenant solution was generally accepted by the New England clergy. But it was not long before
crisis flared up again over the issue of communion. At the center of controversy was Solomon
Stoddard, grandfather of Jonathan Edwards. Stoddard recommended a more Presbyterian
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approach, opening the communion table to those who professed belief and lived free of moral
scandal.76 Stoddard wrote in 1700 that the Congregational understanding of church covenants
was wrong and shut too many out from church privileges.77 In doing this, Stoddard was asserting
the sacrament as a means of grace open to all professing Christians participating in the (implicit)
national covenant. Furthermore, if one was not in fact converted, the grace available in the
sacrament might foster their conversion.
Stoddard, like Williams, was using an essential aspect of Reformed theology to
undermine standing political theology held by co-religionists. In this case, Stoddard was
appealing to Reformed pessimism of human nature to question the sincerity of conversion
narratives. The difficulty of discerning sincerity made the cross examination of conversion
narratives of little real value. And like Williams, Stoddard was offering a new (yet orthodox)
approach to the political vision of Scripture. Both views centered on the role of the Old
Testament. Both were trying to guard the proper place of the church in society and the just
claims of Christ‟s elect. Williams attempted to create a church free of confusion with the broad
civil-religious covenant of the Old Testament because he believed that the integrated version
fostered hypocrisy and threatened sincere piety and practice. Stoddard was reviving an Old
Testament vision on the grounds that deserving persons might be shut out in the face of scriptural
arguments to the contrary. Williams‟s high view of the covenant meant excluding all but the
most evidently deserving. Stoddard‟s high view of the covenant meant including all but the most
undeserving.
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There was more to Stoddard‟s argument, however. Opening communicant membership
would strengthen the church and the clergy. That was important for the preservation of New
England‟s civil-religious covenant. Virtually everyone would be in a parish and baptized, hence
under the discipline of the church. Marsden characterizes him to say, “Not only were the people
under a national covenant, but the church and the people of the nation (or, in this case, a
province,) should be, more or less, coextensive. In other words, the essence of a nation should be
a true national church.”78 Some of Stoddard‟s opponents, such as Reverend Edward Taylor of
Westfield, Massachusetts, protested on grounds that open access to the sacrament would
diminish its importance. Privately, Taylor compared Stoddard‟s vision with the degeneracy of
the Church of England and criticized the implicit Presbyterianism as “Prelacy at best.” Increase
and Cotton Mather suggested that Stoddard would become a Congregational Pope.79
12.7 Pluralism, Secularism, Revivalism and Covenant
New England clergy also struggled with rising secularism and religious pluralism. The
Restoration put politics on a more traditional legal footing. Religious dissent, not originally
accepted by the old covenantal vision, was an unavoidable reality in the late seventeenth century.
Stout‟s study of political sermons shows how clergy struggled to accommodate the covenant to
an increasingly multi-denominational society and the revival of secular constitutionalism. Stout
summarizes the problem as follows,
For over fifty years, ministers had routinely identified New England‟s covenant
with an exclusive state-enforced orthodoxy. But the new government accorded
with none of the inherited verities. Its origins lay in London, far removed from the
body of the faithful; its laws were derived from the English “constitution,” not
Scripture; and its rulers were answerable to the crown, not the visible saints. To
all outward appearances, New England had become just one more appendage to a
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vast and sprawling imperial network. Why then were they still a peculiar
people?80
The resulting legal and political reconstitution of New England forced an important selfexamination.
The solution articulated by Cotton Mather was to reestablish the covenantal vision on the
bedrock of English constitutional law. Stout writes, “These new rhetorical requirements pushed
the vocabulary and style of provincial oratory (and public knowledge) in a more secular
direction, even as it was invoked to defend traditional religious goals and practices.”81 In
Mather‟s 1692 election sermon, he avoided the typological identification with Israel and praised
royal governors concerned with secular interests. That included an expectation that the ruler
should uphold every person‟s “Right unto his Life, his Estate, his Liberty, and his Family.”
While the new government was not commissioned by God to promote Congregationalism, it did
protect life, liberty, property, self-government in the popular assembly and the privilege of
electing the Governor‟s Council. Christians should rejoice that there was no taxation without
consent and that their worship was unmolested. But this commonwealth and proto-liberal
approach did not abandon the traditional covenantal vision. Rather, Mather argues that it was in
the context of this political liberty that New England was able to pursue its covenantal vision.
The people must still lean upon God; it was God‟s covenantal faithfulness that enabled economic
prosperity and political liberty.82 This fusion of English law and covenant logic became a theme
of election sermons for the next seventy-five years.
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Covenant-minded clergy thus found a way to deal with political secularism and religious
pluralism; but they had much more difficulty with revivalism. Secularism may have appeared the
most threatening challenge, but it was simply the more explicit threat. The faithful could
obviously band together in the face of such a challenge. Revivalism was a much more subtle and
serious threat. It made policing the borders of the covenant network more difficult. It created rifts
and dissent which threatened to tear the covenanted community apart. Not only did revivalism
undermine ecclesiastical hierarchy, it threatened religious orthodoxy. Theology defined the
borders between church and society, and served a cosmological purpose. Noll argues that both
secularism and revivalism imperiled the Reformers‟ integrated approach to life in the world by
undermining central control of theology.83
Ironically, revivals were originally intended to strengthen the covenant vision. They were
a logical outgrowth of the internal tension of Reformed theology whereby true divine grace and
faith must be evident in the believer‟s life. One could not rely on the “works righteousness” of
Rome and instead had to experience the “new birth.” Revivals would strengthen emphasis on
spiritual regeneration and rouse church members from dull piety; they would emphasize the
important difference between the visible and invisible churches.84 As population increased in the
eighteenth century, revivals became an important covenantal function; but they soon grew out of
control. Population growth not only forced parish splits and new civil incorporations, it also
pushed a new class of persons out to the frontier. Revival served the same function for rural areas
that formal and ceremonial covenant renewal did for churches in the cities.85 But as broad
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interest in revival and “awakening” grew, clergy began to lose their control over its use.
Occasional revivals gave way to revivalism, and revivalism posed three important threats to the
standing political order. First, it transitioned many churches and regions from clerical religion to
lay religion. This meant that there were no longer designated guardians of the covenant vision.86
Second, it moved American Christianity from an emphasis on doctrine to an emphasis on piety.
Third, it resolved a longstanding tension within Congregational New England. The definition of
a church went from its dual role in the national covenant (as a guardian of civil piety and
gatekeeper of full civil membership through baptism) to a solitary and insulated role as a
covenanted community of the converted.87
Critics equated revivalism with “enthusiasm,” a pejorative term for false and irrational
religious experience.88 Some equated revivalism with libertinism. Concerning the American
anticipation of famous revivalist George Whitefield, Lambert writes, “On the eve of Whitefield‟s
arrival in the colonies, Americans awaited him as either the instrument God had chosen for a
great awakening or the harbinger of malevolence threatening social, economic, and political
order.”89 The effect of revivalism on social order and the development of the Middle Colonies
was particularly devastating. By 1743, opponents on both sides of the Atlantic formed networks
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to coordinate their attacks on the revivalists.90 Charles Chauncey, a prominent New England
critic of the revivals, denounced Whitefield as a slick promoter and engaged in an exchange of
polemics with Jonathan Edwards. Edwards generally defended the revivals while cautioning
against their excesses. Stephen Williams, another New England-based critic, objected to the
itinerant revivalist practice of bypassing duly constituted ecclesiastical structures and preaching
directly to the masses.91
Ironically, Stoddard is both the champion of the national covenant and one of the figures
most responsible for nurturing its revivalist opponents. At the same time that he was embracing a
national covenant by opening wide the church doors and sacrament table, Stoddard was also
lamenting the loss of heartfelt religion. He did not see any contradiction between a national
covenant with open communion and an emphasis on revival. Stoddard was a pioneer of
revivalism. He complained that while fashion, merchandise and learning had been promoted in
the colonies with great zeal, sermons, laws governing morality, and the making of covenants had
“miscarried.” Stoddard and others also feared the rise of the Enlightenment, Deism, and
latitudinarianism.92 Stoddard‟s answer to this was religious revival. The success of Stoddard‟s
pioneering revivalism contributed to his effectively undermining the civil-religious covenant he
had tried to uphold. An ironic testimony to his emphasis on both national covenant and true piety
is that he was later cited by both proponents and opponents of revivalism.93 Stoddard paved the
way for the revivalism of his grandson, Jonathan Edwards. Lambert writes, “No one could match
Solomon Stoddard as a revivalist. The „harvests‟ of 1679, 1683, 1696, 1712, and 1718 attest to
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the effectiveness of his evangelistic preaching. Edwards arrived in time to participate in one last
great revival under Stoddard‟s leadership, an awakening in 1727 triggered by an earthquake.
Edwards, then, was well equipped to continue the revival tradition when he assumed the
pastorate upon his grandfather‟s death in 1729.”94 Indeed, it may be in Edwards that the fate of
the civil-religious synthesis is sealed.
12.8 Jonathan Edwards and the Covenant Device
Edwards presented the most articulate and systematic opposition to the longstanding and
broad view of church membership and any institutional synthesis of civil and ecclesiastical. Noll
writes, “Edwards‟s key move was to repudiate a long history of New England thought by shifting
emphasis on covenant away from the complex nexus of person, church and society to a simpler
bond between the converted individual and the church.”95 Against a broad view of the church
covenant, Edwards presents a very high standard for full membership in his Distinguishing
Marks (1741) and Lectures on the Qualifications for Full Communion in the Church of Christ
(1749). Against the idea that sacraments and preaching could inspire broad civic virtue,
Edwards‟s Freedom of the Will (1754) and Nature of True Virtue (1765) undermined any basis
of morality other than the Spirit-led morality of the regenerate. Edwards took a number of
unpopular positions, including a very narrow and strict view of church membership. He
abandoned his grandfather Stoddard‟s practice of open communion. He rejected a distinction
between the visible and invisible church. Sacraments were covenant privileges for regenerate
persons only. Edwards was particularly sensitive to the treatment of children under the covenant,
believing that they should essentially be treated as unregenerate persons who must seek salvation
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just as if they were lost in sin.96 This position, and the accompanying controversies about
immoral behavior among covenant children, eventually cost Edwards his church in
Northampton.97 Edwards‟s cousin, Solomon Williams engaged him in a dispute on the matter,
arguing that both external and internal covenants were valid (the first not being conditional on
the second) and that Edwards confused entering into covenant with keeping covenant. Williams
argued that the Lord‟s Supper was not a means of sealing the covenant but was instead
professing one‟s engagement to fulfill it. Furthermore, despite Edwards‟s best efforts, there
remained the undisputed reality of hypocrisy in Christian professions.98
In matters of political theology, Edwards held to a commonwealth approach. In listing the
proper functions of government, Edwards declared the first function to be securing property and
protecting rights. The next three included the maintenance of order, ensuring justice, and national
defense. In short, government did its job best by preventing an assortment of evils. The fifth duty
was to make laws against immorality for the sake of public virtue. The sixth responsibility was to
help the poor. The seventh function of the magistrate was to give indirect support to true religion.
For Edwards, this meant calling a day of prayer or thanksgiving, though Edwards warned against
hypocrisy in such things.99

96

For a discussion of this controversy in the larger context of Reformed theology, see Gerstner, The Rational
Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, vol. II, 115-138.
97

See Marsden, op. cit., 291-305 for a discussion of the controversies surrounding the conduct of youth in
Northampton.
98

Noll, op. cit., 46-47. Here again is the problem of postlapsarian humanity creating internal tension in Reformed
theology. The same postlapsarian corruption that inspired a narrow view of the church covenant also challenges the
mechanism of enforcing it: conversion narratives. It is interesting to note that Williams‟s friends advised him not to
respond to Edwards‟s refutation of arguments. It is also interesting to note that Edwards appeals to his Northampton
parish by reminding them of the doctrines of grace learned from Stoddard. See Gerstner, op. cit., 132-136.
99

This was in a sermon on Ezekiel 23:37-39, for example. This is an unpublished sermon cited in Gerstner, op. cit.,
141.

276

Magistrates should not have anything more to do with ecclesiastical matters, nor were they
qualified for civil service as a result of their personal piety.100
Edwards did not abandon the idea of a national covenant altogether; but he modified it
significantly. McDermott calls Edwards‟s doctrine of the national covenant “neither tribalist nor
provincial.”101 Edwards remained concerned with national piety and corporate responsibility
before God.102 This is exemplified in a 1729 sermon on Proverbs 14:34: “Sin and Wickedness
Bring Calamity and Misery on a People.”103 Edwards still saw New England as being in
covenant with God insofar as particular events could be interpreted as acts of covenantal blessing
or sanction.104 In a 1737 sermon on II Chronicles 23:16, Edwards wrote, “We have been greatly
distinguished by God as a covenant people. The land of our forefathers has been a land of such
light . . . You are a people that have been distinguished of God as a covenant people for a long
time and have been distinguished in the means that God has used with you.”105 But Edwards‟s
view of that national covenant was similar to his view of many covenant children. They were
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neither “confirmed” in their faith nor “excommunicated” for gross desertion of the covenant.106
(His view on children also became controversial.) Edwards saw the covenant mainly as a device
for the church, which if properly constituted and directed could then inspire civil piety. If there
was a civil covenant, it relied entirely on the success of covenantal faithfulness in churches. In
1742, for example, Edwards tried to channel the fading fires of revival into the stability of an
elaborate church covenant. This included a day of fasting, prayer and owning the covenant on
March 16, 1742. All members of the congregation over fourteen years of age assented to the
covenant. Edwards hoped that this would serve to make Northampton a model town. The
Northampton covenant was a formal contract, cataloged past moral failings, set forth provision
for restitution and required extensive promises for moral behavior in the future. Marsden writes,
“The most evident aspect of Edwards‟ outlook revealed in the Northampton Covenant is that he
was attempting to institutionalize the spirit of the revival.”107 This would make Northampton not
just a model parish, but a model civil community. But Edwards‟s experiment in Northampton
failed, perhaps because of his strict Congregational approach to conversion and membership. In
short, the tensions within Reformed theology could not seem to hold the covenant device
together in practice.
12.9 The Revolution: Reviving the Covenant Device
During the decades that followed, particularly during the Revolution, the covenant device
enjoyed resurgence. Colonial Americans remained a devout people who saw things in
providential terms. Of the twenty-nine sermons published by Massachusetts clergy from 1777 to
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1783, twenty-two reminded the listeners of the covenant and called them to virtue and piety.108
Clergy in the middle colonies were also conversant in the use of covenantal political theology. 109
The American Revolution becomes a repeat of the politico-theological rhetoric of the Puritan
Revolution.
In the 1770s, at least 50 percent of American colonial churches subscribed to key aspects
of Reformed theology regardless of denomination.110 The Book of Deuteronomy, the most
political book of the Bible and a narrative of Israelite nationality, is the most cited source for
American political writings between 1765 and 1805.111 At the time of America‟s war with
England, Horace Walpole is alleged to have said, “Cousin America has run off with a
Presbyterian parson, and that is the end of it.”112 Crises enabled a heightened sense of
nationalism and religious piety. Clergy used the occasion of political sermons and jeremiads to
provide leadership and encouragement by framing crises in Biblical terms. There is much in the
sermons that one might recognize as covenantal in theme and symbol: moral declension,
providential interpretation of history, corporate responsibility, and millennialism.
Precisely discerning the role of Reformed political theology and the covenant device,
including its modifications and variations, would require a much longer and concentrated study.
During the last half of the eighteenth century, and particularly during the Revolution, other
political and legal arguments also enjoyed resurgence.113 The rebellious colonists required
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justifications for their resistance, and longstanding arguments from the Reformed tradition
became an easy source of aid and comfort. But there also now existed the arguments of political
philosophers like Locke, Pufendorf, or Sidney.114 There were also the long-important classical
sources.115 Longstanding legal arguments were provided by Coke or Blackstone. The clergy,
especially the university-educated Reformed clergy, were well-schooled in these arguments as
well. Secularism and revivalism continued to expand in influence. Republicanism and religious
rhetoric became almost inseparably fused together.116 Social contract theory and its
accompanying proto-liberalism, identified by some as a stepchild of the covenant device, are
evident in the political sermons.117
These arguments should be carefully untangled where possible; new and entrepreneurial
syntheses will have to be carefully identified and categorized. Theology and secular theory
would have to be accurately and fairly sorted out from one another. While this dissertation
provides a needed background to such an untangling and categorizing, adequate treatment of the
Revolution and Founding would require a study of much greater length.
12.10 Conclusion
In the 150 years of colonial American experience, the covenant device as a political
theology resurges and then fades. Even the relative security of having one particular Reformed
approach, the Congregational approach, could not save the covenant device.
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This American experience demonstrates both the flexibility and rigor demanded by
covenants constructed on a Biblical model. Theological disputes, new populations, loss of
traditions, and commercial interests changed the homogeneous community of Reformed
Christians in New England beginning in the seventeenth century. Revivals, perhaps an inevitable
feature of Protestantism, gave way to revivalism. While the covenant device proved able to
accommodate many circumstantial and theoretical challenges, the internal logic of the Biblical
covenant, its parallel theologies, and its high regard for strict community standards, was also its
downfall.
America seems to demonstrate, more so than other nations, this synthesis of variations of
the covenant and its main themes. But covenantal political theory eventually gave way to other
political theories and they became dominant. Elazar says of Americans,
As moderns living at the time of the Enlightenment, they did not seek Divine rule,
only Divine guidance and grace. They proclaimed the people politically sovereign
on this earth under the authority of Heaven. God became the great governor of the
universe instead of its king. Due attention was paid to His governorship, but
stewardship was entrusted to the people. Under either system, in the polity God
came to reign but not rule.118
Many of the lessons of the covenantal tradition were learned by Americans, but they were not
retained in their original formulation.
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SECTION V
CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSION
13.1 Reforming Politics
The Reformation necessitated a reformation of politics. This reformation had a significant
impact on the Anglo-American political theory on two important levels. First, the very idea of
political society had to be re-conceptualized from its theoretical starting points. Many Reformers
looked to the covenant device of the Bible, prominent in the ancient Hebrew tradition, to inform
that re-conceptualization of government. Second, Reformers reacted against what they viewed as
corruption of authority in both the political and the ecclesiastical realms. They responded to that
corruption by calling for a moral reformation in the use of authority. They again looked to the
Bible and to the covenant device in particular. Insofar as the covenant device presented authority
as a delegated trust from God, that trust had to be used in accordance with clear Biblical
prescriptions and proscriptions. As a result of this, the default position for Christians went from
obedience to the civil magistrate (with few conditions) to making every Christian, especially
every lesser magistrate, a watchman against the abuse of authority. In some Reformed
arguments, the right of resistance and revolution became a duty.
The covenant device was applied to church and civil government from both the Biblical
text itself and from articulations of systematic theology. Political theory thus became political
theology. Renewed emphasis on the covenant device was itself a kind of reformation within
theology. Seeing themselves in a similar situation as the Hebrews, the earliest Reformers were
especially attentive to the Hebrew political and social narrative. This interest was passed to their
successors.
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Many of the Reformers cast the origins of civil society from the standpoint of an almost
proto-liberal original position, decades or more before this was done by the more readily
identifiable liberal theorists. This meant that civil government and political society was not
simply something already pre-existing from time out of memory. Nor was it something created
by the will of God alone or by some organic process. Rather, it was something that came from
the will of God as expressed by the indirect consent of the people. One cannot cast all the
Reformers in the same way on this question, but none of them were prepared to fully accept the
conceptual articulations of politics handed to them by their ancestors.
Covenant theology played a vital role in discerning the appropriate terms of civil society.
Churches and their members were in the covenant of grace. In a unilateral understanding of this
covenant of grace, the believer could only seek divine grace that would enable him to fulfill the
terms of that covenant. This did not mean that salvation was merited by that faithfulness, only
that faithfulness itself was evidence of having truly been a recipient of sanctifying grace. In a
bilateral understanding of the covenant of grace, the experience of that sanctifying grace became
something that one would deliberately respond to. This would technically not merit salvation
either. It meant instead a more literal reading of the Biblical covenant: God was indeed faithful
to his covenant people. But they were nevertheless obligated to hearken to the gracious call of
God. In both interpretations of the covenant of grace, the Church and its mission were
paramount. But the details of that mission, and the prescriptions that followed, differed among
Reformed theologians and political thinkers.
Even while they were reforming the conceptual picture of where civil government came
from, however, the Reformers demonstrated themselves to be largely conservative. They retained
much of the political theory that went before them. As humanists in the commonwealth tradition,
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salus populi remained an important foundation for their overall political theory. Some also made
varying accommodations for natural law and reason as tools of legitimate political orientation
and argument. Their implementation of the Biblical narrative was often done through the lens of
standing legal institutions and jurisprudence. Some largely recast natural law and shunned
common law, but retained the commonwealth tradition.
All Reformers agreed that politics succeeded when it enabled faithfulness on the part of
both the ruler and the ruled. Faithfulness consisted in three things: religion, morality, and
political authority. Religious faithfulness minimally required a broad adherence to Protestant
orthodoxy, perhaps with some narrow toleration for other believers. At most it required a close
civil-ecclesiastical partnership, prophetic witness to civil rulers by the clergy, and/or close
attention to true piety and religious sincerity in the churches. Moral faithfulness required an
attendance to the moral prescriptions of the Bible, reflected in both the narrative of the Old
Testament and its apostolic commentaries. This was accomplished most often by the grace
imparted in worship, preaching, and sacraments. Only secondarily was it accomplished by civil
sanction against immorality. When these two kinds of faithfulness, moral and religious, were
secured so far as the postlapsarian condition would allow, providential promises of blessing or
cursing would follow. The third category of political faithfulness was the one on which the other
two hinged, however. This required that the civil polity not only be rightly conceived of (often
through the device of the covenant and always as something ordained by God), but also that its
authority had to be rightly bounded. This was an idea also viewed through the lens of the
covenant device. Neither the civil magistrate nor the people could misuse the authority or right
delegated to them. All authority, magisterial or popular, had to be properly bounded. Abuses of
power were violations of covenant faithfulness. Abuses or neglect would not only bring a
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disordering of political (or ecclesiastical) societies, it would invite providential sanction.
Resistance thus took on a moral dimension.
Faithfulness of all kinds would bring liberty, and Reformed political theology is often
centered on liberty. One could perhaps be a cynic about this and argue that such an interest was
insincere. After all, most Reformers did not believe in wide tolerance for religious dissenters.
Admittedly, the Reformers were not classical liberals. Nor would most of them have agreed even
with the prescription of freedom articulated by proto-liberals in the Republic of Letters. But they
merit criticism only in hindsight. The Reformers’ emphasis on liberty is an important shift in the
rhetoric and theory of politics.
13.2 Variations in Covenantal Politics: Disagreements and Tensions
No political tradition of consequence, the covenant tradition included, is monolithic. The
covenant device is a conceptual device, much like the original position or social contract device
in liberalism. All conceptual devices can be quite troublesome in their interpretation and
application. Furthermore, diversities of Biblical hermeneutic and systematic theology underlying
the covenant device account for variations and tensions. The resulting disagreements and
tensions merit a short summary and analysis.
The covenant device provided a comprehensive vision of society. In some ways this
vision was not much different from the medieval vision of society wherein church and state
worked together to attend to all aspects of the human life and soul. For the Reformers, their
break with Rome dissolved any hope of a unified Christendom on the standing model. They
retained a catholic outlook nevertheless. The new comprehensive vision was inspired by their
view of corporate accountability under the covenants. Societies, and the corporate bodies that
comprised them, were in a covenant with God. This was not because every member of the
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society subscribed to the Christian faith. The “invisible church,” the imperfectly discernable
body of true believers, was not the basis of the covenant. As with the ancient Hebrews, God saw
Britain and America in terms of corporate responsibility. Moral faithfulness, even to the
universal terms of the human conscience, was the minimum that God expected. Beyond that,
pagan societies could only operate according to the wisdom of nature. Much more was expected
of those to whom God had given His revealed Word. The Bible, and a Biblical model of natural
law, further enabled political and religious faithfulness. God had great things in store for faithful
societies. Many clergy applied that case to America and Britain, implicitly if not explicitly. Only
the more radical Separatists dissented from the application of that Old Testament covenant to
their own societies.1
In the medieval conception of society, faithfulness to God was accomplished through
faithfulness in church attendance and sacraments. So long as there was broad subscription to
these practices, there was wide latitude for secular society. This was a model largely adopted by
the Anglicans. The Reformers took a much different view of grace and faith. That first meant a
much different view of the Church than the view held by Catholic or Anglican theology.
Anglicans and Catholics were criticized by the Reformers for eclipsing true faith with works
(church attendance and the sacraments). (Though the Reformers also required faithfulness in
both, they believed that the Anglican-Catholic practice clouded sincere piety with ritual.)
Reformers in Zurich and Geneva emphasized preaching and what they considered to be heartfelt
worship over sacraments. The question that had to be sorted out in Anglo-American Reformed
practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth century was whether the church was to primarily serve
members of the covenant of grace or the covenant of works, or whether it was to serve both
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equally. With this new approach to the Church came a new approach to society at large and also
to the domain of secular thinking and practice. Theological changes obligated a different political
theology.
Independents and Congregationalists, more so than Presbyterians, emphasized the
importance of faithfulness and sincere profession within the church. Only within a sincere
church, made more pure by the discerning eye of elders and clergy, could true piety be enabled.
True piety would enable moral and religious faithfulness in the society at large. Independents
thought that the parish model, more attractive to Presbyterians, confused tares with wheat and
gave unbelievers and hypocrites a false sense of security. But Independents could not simply
leave unbelievers to their own devices. Unbelievers were still obligated to heed the minimal
moral law known to them in their nature and discernable (to some degree even to the
unregenerate) from Scripture. The Churches could do little for them on this score. The covenant
of works was vastly inferior to the covenant of grace, and they practically emphasized the latter
to the former. For Independents, there remained a tension in their political theology as they
strove to accommodate the covenant of grace while guarding the purity of the church. Political
society remained, by definition, in covenant with God. (Most Independents and
Congregationalists implicitly believed this. Only the more radical Separatists explicitly denied
it.) But the terms of that covenant depended largely on the faithfulness of churches and their
members. Heresy still had to be avoided and church attendance encouraged.
The political theology resulting from the Independents’ theology, particularly in England,
emphasized rule by church members and a more explicitly Biblical jurisprudence. By modern
standards, this appears primitive. But Independents such as John Owen and Roger Williams
provided tremendous momentum for liberty of conscience in their arguments for church purity
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and the necessity of sincere belief. It is no coincidence that the ideas of John Owen, who
preached at Westminster while Locke was a student there, can be discerned in early liberal
arguments about religious toleration.
Presbyterians took the covenant of works more seriously and focused on national
faithfulness across the lines of Church and society. As Reformed believers, they could not have
believed that the covenant of works would result in salvation. At best, the futility of works could
be used by God to direct one to the perfect covenant of grace in His economy of salvation. But
salvation wasn’t the point of the covenant of works. It was also a political device for ordering
societies and no less part of God’s wise providence. Thus, Presbyterians viewed society as a
hybrid of faithfulness to both the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. Faithfulness to
the covenant of works was accomplished more through the parish model of the church. Unlike
the Independents and Congregationalists, Presbyterians took a broader view of the church
covenant and the sacraments. Scotland’s Kirk, the bastion of Presbyterianism, embraced a
different kind of partnership of the civil and the ecclesiastical than the Independents did.
Presbyterian use of the federal scheme also allowed for a wider secular sphere. Political theory
and jurisprudence were free to draw from secular British traditions, including natural law and
common law. This makes the Presbyterians more mainstream and modern from our perspective.
Their apparent primitivism is their parish model of a state Presbyterian Church and their
religious intolerance.2
13.3 The Legacy of the Covenant Device
The covenant device enjoyed its zenith in the seventeenth century as variations of
Reformed theology predominated in Britain and America. It met harsh resistance after the
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Restoration in Britain, though its concepts and principles continued to echo in British political
theory. American Puritans (mainly Congregationalists) were not caught up in the crucible of the
British Civil Wars, and enjoyed much more freedom to explore the covenant. But this freedom
did not preserve the covenant. Instead it enabled American Puritans to pursue the internal
tensions of Reformed theology to their political conclusions and confront what the British
Presbyterians and Independents faced during their crucible of civil war and regicide. American
Puritans, largely Independents, struggled to define the appropriate and successful Church-State
partnership that could adapt to demographic changes and theological challenges.
The experience of the American Puritans and the eventual decline of the covenant device
brings us back to the contrasting approaches of Elazar and Novak. Can the covenant device be
successfully applied to society at large or can it be successfully applied only to a community of
the faithful? I will return to that question below. For now, it is appropriate to explore how the
covenant device has retained its echo within the development of Western political theory. I will
explore this in the traditions of constitutionalism, liberalism, and republicanism.
The covenant device proved to be surprisingly flexible in adapting to the demanding
British and American experience. It not only provided political concepts with modern
consequence, it was able to largely survive its own radical inclinations. This may be because the
more radical interpretations of the covenant device were moderated by the Reformers’
appreciation of commonwealth and natural law. As far as temptations toward millenarianism and
revivalism (as outgrowths of covenantalism) these were probably thwarted mainly by widespread
British and American opposition to “enthusiasm” together with the Reformed humanist
hermeneutic. These traditions had the effect of keeping the covenant grounded in its practical
application. There is also an internal logic in covenantal political theology that limits the grant
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and use of political power. That internal logic had some interesting consequences during the
English Civil War, for example. Independents used their Reformed theology (applying divine
sovereignty over salvation) to argue against the imposition of Presbyterianism. Presbyterians
used their Reformed theology (applying the covenant of works) to argue against the radical
implications of Independent jurisprudence. Without this built-in restraint, the covenant device
probably would have been associated only with its more radical interpretations and eventually
abandoned altogether.
Earlier in this chapter, I referred to three kinds of faithfulness emphasized in the reformation of politics expressed through the covenant device: religious reformation, moral
reformation, and political reformation (reformation of authority and limits on authority).
Protestants succeeded in reforming how Britons (and therefore Americans) viewed Christianity.
But the Reformation ethos of semper reformanda, once loosed, could not be perfectly led by
clergy to only orthodox positions. (Even some clergy themselves began to chafe against received
orthodoxy.) Insofar as covenanting required a common orthodoxy to sustain the various forms
of faithfulness, it began to fail. As the covenant device became increasingly problematic to
explicitly apply to politics, its various emphases found their way into other strains of AngloAmerican political theory. Covenantal emphasis on moral reform found its way into the revival
of modern republicanism. Covenantal emphasis on limiting authority and natural right found its
way into liberalism. The idea of political communities as consensual agreements among equal
citizens to establish the rule of law found its way into modern constitutionalism and social
contract theory. And even while those three orientations grew in importance, political theology
did not disappear. There remained a tension as Christians struggled to discern the appropriate
intersection of sacred and secular. That struggle continues today.
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There is much more research to be done to pursue the continuing legacy of the covenant
device. That is particularly true in the case of America, where the role of religion in political
orientation continues to be vigorously debated.3 The significance of political Christianity in at
least the first 150 years of American political theory is now virtually uncontested, and seems to
enjoy a revival of scholarly interest every few decades. But it may be that the familiar liberalrepublican debate about eighteenth century America is missing an important common
denominator in both: the covenant device. Recent monographs on Locke also invite more
research into the role of theology in both eighteenth century America and in so-called
“Enlightenment” political theory. Four of the most recent monographs on Locke, for example,
emphasize the role of Christianity in his political theory.4 That includes not only Locke’s
familiar discussion of natural right; but also his oft-overlooked emphasis on virtue and moral
consensus. Lutz’s survey of early American political tracts demonstrates that Locke is ranked
behind only Montesquieu and Blackstone in frequency of citation because of the American
clergy’s use of Locke in political sermons.5 One has to ask why it is that Locke is so highly
favored among America’s late eighteenth century clergy, especially in “covenanted” New
England.
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13.4 Applying the Covenant Device Today
But this would still not tell us where the covenant device stands today. How far can the
concepts of the covenant be stretched before the covenant device becomes unrecognizable from
the intent of the Hebrews or Reformers? Elazar and Novak offer two different futures for the
covenant. Elazar’s is a more ecumenical version. While rooted in the Biblical model, it could
conceivably be applied to persons outside the historical Biblical covenant. This is the challenge
that confronted Christian covenantalists as they sought to blend political theory with Biblical
mandates. What is unclear, however, is precisely what could be retained of the covenant’s
essential attributes in a culture of democratic pluralism. Most of the essential aspects of the
covenant device, which emphasizes unity and community, would struggle. One could, as Elazar
attempts to do, emphasize the aspects of moral reform or constitutionalism. But moral reform
outside the internal logic of the covenant can run contrary to liberal values. Constitutionalism is
perhaps healthy enough as a modern political orientation without requiring any explicit help
from the covenant device.
Ironically, the only way to retain the covenant device is to repair to a more exclusive
understanding of it. Novak provides this alternative. If modern states cannot or will not covenant,
preserving covenants within social contracts would be the only viable course of action. This
would not only be consistent with the prescription of a modern covenantal theorist (Novak) but
also with an ancient one – Johannes Althusius, who described political society as a federal
network of private associations. Covenants per se could not be adopted by all private
associations because many of them are deliberately secular in orientation. But covenants could
be adopted by religious communities and perhaps even more successfully by ethnic religious
communities.
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Assuming that communities are even willing to adopt the covenant device, can such a
thing be tolerated by modern democratic pluralism? Some important questions have to be asked
of the pluralistic ethos. As Novak frames the problem, it may be that in juxtaposing the demands
of covenanting with the demands of democratic pluralism we once again reveal the inherent
tension of religion and politics on an ontological and ethical level. Democratic pluralistic
regimes give the appearance of being laissez faire on such matters, but only under certain
specific conditions and understandings could covenanted communities thrive in modern
democratic and pluralistic polities. Ironically, this matter hinges on a longstanding social
challenge: the appropriate domain of what is “secular.”
Novak offers an insightful contrast between secularity and secularism. Secularity is finite
(what Novak calls “neutral”). He defines it as follows: “Secularity . . . is simply the realm of
inter-human, multicultural interaction that does not look to any unique community with its
singular historical revelation and special tradition as the exclusive source of social
legitimization.”6 It is consistent with the biblical covenant and the Talmudic principle that “the
law of the state is the law.” 7 Secularity respects the authority of biblical revelation, but limits it
from being the basis of public norms in political life.8 Secularity respects religious persons as
such and seeks an accommodating and neutral negotiation of claims so that parties may retain
their identities but still benefit from political association. Secularism, by contrast, is an ideology
that seeks to co-opt all real community into an amorphous social construction.9 It sees humanmade law as not only necessary for modern life, but sufficient for human fulfillment as well.
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Secularity can accommodate and respect covenanted communities. Secularism cannot.
Secularism becomes intolerant and oppressive because it asserts that the ontological priority of
persons is secular before it is religious. If religion is tolerated but subsumed only to the most
insulated and so-called “private” status, then its value is marginalized.10 When a civil society no
longer respects the communal priority of its religious members, it attempts to replace the sacred
realm by becoming the sacred realm itself.11
What secularism forgets is that communities precede society. The democratic polity
depends on the nurture and socialization capacity of its communities. Persons exist in
communities before they can exist in societies. Their happiness depends on those communities
enjoying a certain degree of autonomy together with respect from the society at large. When their
sociality is thought to be rooted first in civil society, there is no real place for community.12 One
therefore makes room for real society only by making room for communities.13 The problem
with oppressive public ideologies (like secularism) is that they see this original orientation
toward communities as something to be overcome rather than something to be developed.14
When religious communities are respected and intact, there is hope for true and neutral secularity
because these communities have a religious need for that space. They desire to preserve it intact
for themselves, but realize that this cannot be to the exclusion of others.15 This becomes a
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Madisonian solution to the problem of religious faction, or perhaps an application of the
Prisoners’ Dilemma.
A final question remains, which is how morality will be negotiated between covenanted
communities and the civil polity. The kind of communities spoken of here (those able to
covenant) are defined by their moral ethos. The civil polity also obligates a moral ethos. A
successful social contract (for the civil society at large) will address the task of social morality
through both theology and philosophy. Moral principles for a society cannot (and do not) come
from the society “at large.” Rather, basic moral principles come from the respective
traditions/communities within a society which are then coordinated through philosophical
reasoning. Theology is used to articulate the norms within a particular tradition. Philosophy,
particularly “natural law” is used to enable inter-cultural dialogue.16 All that then remains within
the society is the historical task of discovering the overlap together with demonstrating how
universal moral norms can have authority in this multicultural society. This dialogue and
implementation is only possible within secularity. It is not possible under secularism.17
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